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There are many examples of the utilization of formal methods for creating
complete specifications of software applications. Often these are bounded
in scope to the concept of a critical system. This work looks to expand the
definition of critical systems to include systems that provide safety mea-
sures outside of contexts like utilities or military. The expanded definition
is an exploration of the concept of financial crime detection measures and
their specifications, a vital element in counter terrorism controls that high-
light the movement of terrorists and their funding mechanisms.
Within the context of financial crime detection systems we explore if for-
mal methods can be used in the description of software from this industrial
application. The resulting analysis of this research is the selection of a
formal method for the documentation of a specific example of a financial
crime model from industry. We further analyze the applicability of the
selected method for industrial software development and survey industry
experts to understand if formal methods has a valid place in the software
development life cycle for financial crime solutions.
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Formal methods have been used as a mechanism to both validate and invalidate all
forms of specifications related to the development of critical systems (Sohn and Seong
(2000)). A necessary element to this process is the aspect of verification. Verification,
be it manual or automated in nature, provides an independent capability to measure the
accuracy of a software programs intended design versus its respective output.
There are many examples of formal methods being utilized to verify the specifica-
tions of different software examples. Often these examples are derived from software
deigned to be a critical system. A critical system is defined as being any piece of soft-
ware acting as a control mechanism where through a fault in design or realization of
the program results in the loss of life or causes physical harm.
This thesis addresses this concern through the examination of an example of some
software from a non-traditional critical system. This research examines financial crime
systems which are used by regulators and banks to detect potential money laundering,
terrorist financing and human trafficking. We examine the area of Know Your Customer
(KYC) which is an initiative recognized by law and operationalized by the financial
services sector.
Financial crime control systems are a modern mechanism of determining crimi-
nal intent with regard to money laundering, terrorism, fraud and cyber-crime related
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threats. Each have substantive impacts on the global population’s daily activities but
act as a behind the scenes mechanism to serve and protect. Through the application of a
case study, we attempt to generate a formal representation of the case study application
model in order to assess the applicability of the formal method approach in describing
software from this industry. Further, this work examines some strategies to test the
completeness of the formal representations and surveys industry experts to understand
how easily comprehended these representations are. We examine the technologies
used in financial crime to provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of
the techniques used to ground our case study through a survey.
Formal method representations of software are aimed at software developers wish-
ing to improve their software quality. While there are many types of formal methods
this work focuses on original work in the areas of tabular expressions, such as Group
(1997). Tabular expressions are a method of representing key information pertaining to
the inputs and outputs in an easy-to-read table that developers can be trained to under-
stand Janicki et al. (1996). The advantages of such tables are their comprehensibility
and the ability of a user to verify the accuracy of their software specification using an
automated or manual verification system. The use of tabular expressions has proven
to be invaluable in past experiments, such as Heninger et al. (1978) or Parnas et al.
(1987).
To most developers, formal methods represent an arduous adjustment to the cre-
ative process of code development given the lack of industrial tooling and education
to support its use. However, to ensure the safety and accuracy of software intended to
support critical systems, formal methods represent a valuable means of examination
and validation that this thesis argues should be explored for financial crime use cases.
The goal of the tabular representations is to allow software developers to develop
software with documentation that explicitly shows how the software operates under all
conditions the system could experience. Previous work in this area by Quinn (2007)
explored an industrial example for telecommunications examining the validity of the
approach. This work further builds on that existing research and focuses on the evalu-
ation of an industrial example from a very different domain to investigate whether the
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use formal methods in that specific context adds value by improving alignment to gov-
ernment regulations and improves on current methods employed in designing software
for this purpose.
Further, the use of formal methods allows for a verification process such as Jing
(2000) to be employed and thereby highlights to the user whether or not their software
code will accurately map to the specification and satisfy all restrictions per the design.
Once verified, the software developer should have higher confidence to argue the com-
pleteness of the formal representation of the software. The availability of appropriate
tooling, such as verification capabilities, is critical in order to enable developers to
take advantage of a specific formal method. The absence of tooling being present in
industrial form makes the use of a formal method in industry unlikely.
As developers would have a detailed set of proven mathematical representations of
the code base in this scenario, expansions of the code base and documentation could
be maintained accurately, ensuring the integrity of mappings to legislation. As such,
this methodology is intended to provide an ongoing mechanism to ensure the clarity,
longevity and accuracy of a code base and its associated documentation. The soft-
ware specification could thus be leveraged by domain experts to ensure that the design
rational makes sense for the domain problem and its attributes being solved.
The goal of this research is to build on this background, to survey popular formal
method approaches to drafting specification documents of software programs through
a literature review. Further, it will provide an argument for selecting one of these meth-
ods and explain its use through examples and will explore the availability of supporting
tooling. It will introduce the topic of financial crime detection and how it is currently
regulated and survey the technologies used to detect financial irregularities. Next, we
attempt to answer if formal methods can successfully specify an industry financial
crime model. Finally, we attempt to discover if we can adequately find strategies to
solve for coverage and how comprehensible the specification is to industry experts.
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1.2 Motivation
This research examines critical systems from a different perspective and attempts to
build a foundation for improving our financial control systems. The motivation behind
this is driven by the impact that factors such as terrorism, criminal activity and corrupt
practices has on global financial systems. By applying formal methods to financial
crime detection system documentation, we should be able to enforce a stronger defence
against malicious behaviours by both understanding software better and ensuring that
unintentional security gaps are not present in these systems.
We argue that formal methods is one approach that could improve the confidence of
banks and regulators in software deployed in this industry. To validate that assertion
it is necessary to have both a formal documentation standard and a mechanism for
validating it. Hence the necessity for building on the existing work of Jing (2000) and
Quinn (2007) to query the usefulness of formal methods in an environment that deals
exclusively with time-sensitive, large-volume, complex data. By proving the relevancy
of formal methods and specifically tabular expressions in a financial ecosystem, it is
hoped that we can create an adaptive means to encase financial software systems with
rigour and undermine criminal efforts to take advantage of such systems.
The motivation to carry out research in this area is to ensure that software engineers
can align with design specifications and improve the overall quality of their software
by using a formal method in their software design. This case study presents valuable
insight into how we try and validate criminal activity in different contexts. As the scope
of criminal intent touches almost every aspect of our lives it is important to validate
that the right governance is applied to the software that protects our finances. As such,
creating a specification means that can be used to generate accurate representations
of these systems has the potential to alleviate some of the risk associated with the
implementation of these capabilities.
Ultimately, it is our intention that the reader be able to understand by the conclusion
of this work if formal methods has a place in the development of software for financial
crime applications. Second, if there is a method that offers more utility than others.
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Thirdly, to understand via a literature survey what technologies are employed by finan-
cial crime detection systems today. Further, if said method offers a mechanism to test
its accuracy either through manual or automated means and the availability of tooling
to support this endeavour. Finally, to determine if readers of specifications written in
the selected formal method truly can understand them and can see utility in using them
in their work.
1.3 Related Work
Previous work carried out on tabular representation based formal methods includes
research by Quinn (2007) and further by Group (1997), Kahl (2003), Heitmeyer (2001),
Lawford et al. (2004) and Eles and Lawford (2011). Also related to this is work in
broader formal methods-based research discussed later in this work.
With regard to research into financial crime, some work has been completed by DJ
Hand Bolton and Hand (2002) regarding mechanisms to detect behaviours indicative
of criminal intent. A number of these methods utilize statistical methodologies sur-
rounding Bayesian causality and Benford clustering to show harmonization of events
into clusters and further, make predictions based on past observed behaviours Bolton
and Hand (2001).
Other work by Phua et al. (2005) surveys some of the technologies available and in
use by vendors today to solve financial crime related problems. The survey includes
several areas important to the detection of irregular financial transactions and provides
a good foundation for understanding the variance of technology in this domain.
The scope of this work is to build on the utilization of these methods for the purposes
of our use case and examine practical methods of the application tabular expressions
to real-world criminal activity detection. However, the act of translating any detection
model using formal methods has not been attempted according to our research.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
The scope of this thesis is to discuss concepts regarding formal methods, software
design and documentation, and research into specific software engineering problems
pertinent to describing financial crime models. It is the intent of this work to examine
the potential of describing financial crime detection systems with formal methods and
to discover if a specific method has sufficient coverage to describe the unique aspects
of this area.
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to a survey of several formal method approaches and
looks at where they have been used to describe industrial examples in the past. It builds
on this survey to conduct an analysis into what method would be most appropriate for
this industrial application and provides further context, using examples, into how this
method is applied.
Chapter 3 introduces the case study and discusses the background legislation and
regulations evolving from FATF(Financial Action Task Force) and the European Union
that lead the necessity of operable technological solutions to solve for financial crime
detection. These regulations are what drive innovation within the financial crime space
and ultimately are the driving force behind this research to ensure an easier method of
ensuring compliance.
Chapter 4 is a survey of the available literature on financial crime detection technolo-
gies and illustrates the breadth of research conducted into this industrial application.
It delves into several examples to showcase how formal methods could provide lift in
aiding code comprehension and verification efforts. Further, it conducts an analysis on
what technologies can be translated into a chosen formal method approach.
Chapter 5 examines a financial crime use case around customer due diligence and
highlights code developed to solve for this concern. It illustrates the use of translating
the model using the trace function method and reduces the code down to a compact
formal description that encompasses all aspects of the regulatory drivers.
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Chapter 6 looks at some potential coverage testing strategies that could be applied
to verify the coverage of the representation. It further surveys a group of industry
professionals in order to understand the applicability of formal methods in the financial
crime software development sector. Further, it attempts to understand how readable a
formal method specification is to these industry professionals.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a discussion of what was learned from this
project, its limitations and successes. It discusses what we feel are the core contribu-
tions. It also presents a breakdown of ideas that could be built upon from a foundational
perspective and where technological advances could assist in improving the tool in the
future. It also critically analyses the ease of use of the method and ultimately if the
approach offers the utility desired for developers in this space.
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This chapter introduces the concept behind choosing a formal method to represent the
software use case. It explores what work has been conducted in the past in this area.
It continues by surveying formal methods existing currently that could potentially be
utilized.
We explore the basis to the mathematics behind tabular expression representations
and provide the reader with example expression trees to introduce them to key con-
cepts. We discuss efforts made into the provision of tooling to support developers.
We conclude by providing key elements associated with the Trace Function Method
(TFM).
2.2 Introduction
This research is based around the concept of tabular expression-based documenta-
tion. Tabular expressions are a formal method approach to define scope, requirements
and to act as a documentation standard for software functions. What follows is an
overview of the previous research initiatives into the field. Further, commentary on
the state of tooling is provided in order to establish efforts to make the methods more
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main-stream for software developers. In the absence of tooling it would be very dif-
ficult to assume any form of uptake for any formal method. Industrial processes to
generate software try and attempt to take the path of least resistance even for critical
system design. The inference being that if it hard to create a specific representation
of software for a software engineer during their day-to-day work it is highly unlikely
that the method will gain ground within that industry due to the cost it would require
in terms of time.
2.3 Formal Method Description Types
There exists an abundance of formal description approaches, each of which have
relative strengths and weaknesses. Building on the survey of Quinn (2007) in the area
we examine some of the more actively utilized methods and from there attempt to
rationalize the appropriate method for use in describing this case study.
As Quinn points out, algebraic and axiomatic description types described in work
such as Ehrig and Mahr (1980) and Tucker and Zucker (2002) have waned in terms
of research popularity mostly due to issues in terms of the ability to express some key
mathematical concepts like a finite axiomatisation. Nonetheless they formed the basis
for future work and thus should not be discounted in terms of their importance to the
field. Specifically, they laid a foundation for Bartussek and Parnas (1978) to build the
concept of traces and trace functions upon.
Quinn also points out the utilization of abstract models by standards organizations
such as Z ISO (2002) but his observation regarding uptake on these descriptions re-
mains true today as there has been limited utilization of these standards in industry
beyond academic examples. In part the reason for this lack of uptake has been the
lack of available tooling and education aimed at developers regarding the use of these
methods. Thus this work examines some of the other pragmatic methods that have
been employed to describe an industrial example of a critical system beyond tradi-
tional algebraic and axiomatic approaches.
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2.3.1 Parnas 1972 Method
This pragmatic model method originally published by Parnas (1972b) has seen several
industrial applications primarily in the area of military research, such as Heitmeyer
(2001). The basis of this method is the formal definition of a module; a software
unit of work with its own discrete series of inputs and outputs. The method had the
benefit of allowing the developers to remain agnostic in terms of the specific coding
language utilized and reduced the burden on testing by focusing on the specifics of the
module statements rather than potential interpretations. As discussed by Quinn (2007)
the method has a severe drawback in the form of temporal displacement of historical
values meaning only the most recent value could be referred to at any one time by the
specification of the module thereby allowing the potential for errors to creep into the
specification format.
2.3.2 Z
Z is an example of an abstract model description method defined originally in Bowen
(1992). It utilizes mathematical abstractions to create a representation of a software
system. As Quinn (2007) points out it is not possible to create an implementation of
the software directly from the mathematical representation of its specification without
the use of Floyd-Hoare Logic Floyd (1967). The reasoning behind this is that Z is
effectively a notation-based description language that uses first order logic and set
theory to describe software systems.
Rather than focus on Parnas style modules, Z uses schema as the atomic unit of spec-
ification and describes a component by examining the interactions between schemas.
Thus, it is not possible to represent the Parnas (1972b) definition of a module in Z
without further mathematical manipulation due to the inherent differences between the
approaches.
Whilst Z is relatively well used due to its ISO 2002 standardization, it does suffer
from the fact it cannot easily be translated into development languages for the real-
ization of the design. Despite this inhibition the method has gained adoption by some
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developers due to the availability of tool suites to aid in its utilization as a documenta-
tion standard during the software development life cycle.
2.3.3 VDM
VDM is another example of an abstract model description method that focuses on
the development method. It’s made up of two subcomponents; VDM Jones (1990)
and VDM-SL Dawes (1991). The VDM element focuses on the abstract design de-
scriptions and generation mechanisms, while VDM-SL is the structured description
language. Due to similar limitations to Z, VDM is not actively utilized beyond aca-
demic circles. The inability to translate VDM specifications into an actual software
representation has led to limited uptake in the development world.
2.3.4 B
B is an example of a collection of mathematically-based techniques originally based
on both Z and VDM research, but Abrial builds upon that foundation to develop more
of a fully fledged independent method Abrial (1996). B uses keywords as an atomic
description unit and each keyword combines to form modules. A further concept used
in B is the idea of interdependent abstract machines which are effectively state descrip-
tors for the module.
With the exception of the Parnas-based approaches B has seen the broadest adoption
in terms of industrial use and case studies such as the Paris metro Dehbonei and Mejia
(1994). B has a broad range of tools and adapters that allow it to be easily translated
from specification to code including several compilers. However, outside of the case
studies above it has yet to be utilized more broadly probably as a result of its lack of
standardization.
2.3.5 Trace Assertion Method
Bartussek and Parnas (1978) provide a definition of a trace that defined a trace as
being "a description of a sequence of calls on functions with the module in the initial
state". Further, it elaborates on the definition to include subtraces and the parsing of
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such traces and the removal of ambiguity by actively parsing from left to right to show
execution order. As such the trace assertion method is a means of describing modules
through the mechanism of traces.
Quinn (2007) elaborates on the advantages and disadvantages of the method where
it is pointed out that traces are a compact means of module description that can eas-
ily be extended. The logical flow of the trace means for ease of translation into a
development language of choice without sacrificing the accuracy of the specification.
However, while the method does create more compact descriptions in comparison to
other methods it can have excessively detailed traces that can lead to complexity and
difficult-to-consume information.
2.3.6 Trace Function Method
As per Quinn (2007), Parnas (2003a), Bane et al. (2004) and Parnas and Dragomiroiu
(2006) the trace function method is a formal method of description that utilizes traces
with other techniques in order to accurately describe software components. Applying
logic to the evolution of changes of state to a component Parnas introduces the con-
cept of events, which are discrete point in times perspectives on the internal state of
the module, its variables and changes-to values. With events a trace now becomes a
sequence of event descriptors which is analogous to a historic and current snapshot of
the module. It is feasible then, using this method, to accurately describe inputs, outputs
and the related actions occurring within the module over time.
Quinn (2007) notes several advantages of the technique. Primarily, the advantage of
being able to aggregate several documents into one unified description eases the burden
on developers regarding documentation overhead. This document should provide all
necessary clarity with regard to inputs, outputs, module interfaces and transformations
within the software. There are also advantages with regard to testing as the method
lends itself towards ease of verification and validation of the descriptions. Some evalu-
ations of the method have been observed with specific utilization in industry use cases
like research conducted in Feng et al. (2011), Parnas and Vilkomir (2007) and Liu
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et al. (2010). These build upon the telecommunications industry use case introduced
by Quinn (2007).
2.4 Understanding Tabular Notation Past and Present
Tabular notation is a method of data representation that involves the use of expres-
sion trees. We begin to see the advantage of representing data by using this format in
representing computer software using tabular notation in Janicki et al. (1996). It is im-
mediately apparent that by using tabular notation we can document all conditions that
directly impact a function and instil mathematically-driven certainty on the outcomes
of a function’s expected outputs. Tabular notation is stated to be a clear and concise
notation and is something that anyone can be trained to read Janicki et al. (1996). Yet,
although it is claimed to be easy to read1 by involving mathematics, it, more impor-
tantly, allows us to verify aspects of software and ensure that they meet with their
specification.Tabular notation has much to offer software engineers due to the diverse
spectrum of information to which it can be successfully applied to without introduc-
ing ambiguities detrimental to the software’s design. Tabular representations provide
a means in document driven design to validate and alleviate concern over unexpected
outcomes, something that has been proven to be of particular value in critical systems
Parnas et al. (1987).
It is important to note for any of the variants of tabular notation that they aim to
provide a set of reference documents. These reference documents are supposed to be
complete representations of the software and describe the changes that occur as inputs
are detected and transition through the software to create output. As such, elements
such as modules, which break down the software into specific work tasks and interfaces
are vital to understand the changes in state that occur as the program completes its ac-
tions. Further, these elements are important as they provide us with an understand of
where error states could potentially creep in within the design. These reference docu-
ments should be mathematically based to allow for verification and easily manipulated
to allow for software maintenance.
1By individuals with a mathematical background whom have undergone some training
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To fully comprehend the notation of this method of data representation we first have
to understand the logic operating behind it. In Parnas (1993a) we are introduced to a
very unique logic proposed by Parnas which is aimed specifically at software engineers
to help them with problems in their domain. Using this logic as a mathematical foun-
dation Janicki et al. (1996) introduces us to a notation to help us describe functions
using tabular notation. Further work has continued on this subject resulting in Bane
et al. (2004) which is an improved mathematical model for tabular expressions which
shall be discussed later in this chapter. This work proved pivotal in the creation of the
Trace Function Method (TFM) Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) used in our industrial
example. Parnas theorized that with a suite of utilities to allow for ease of manipu-
lation, validation and construction the use of tabular expressions for the purpose of
software documentation would have the potential to enter the mainstream Parnas et al.
(1994).
A verification tool for tabular expression trees is most necessary in order to provide
a method of checking that a tabular expression satisfies its restriction1 term Parnas
(2003b). A human being could do this but the process would soon become tedious and
as Parnas explored could become confused depending on the complexity of a given
function. As such, seeking a tool that provides functionality to help us solve this prob-
lem in an automated fashion without sacrificing the ability for human beings to direct
interact and adjust expression trees would provide significant assistance to developers
utilizing the approach.
Since the most recent development of a tool to help ’verify’ tables using third party
tools we believe that there has been a change in the state of the art in the technologies
surrounding mechanized mathematical tools Jing (2000), Lawford et al. (2004), Eles
and Lawford (2011), Heitmeyer et al. (2005). A specialized tool could be developed
for the purpose of solving our verification problem but it is not within the scope of this
research.
1A restriction is a mathematical method of representing constraints on the tabular expression
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Jing’s work determined that the shortest path to success was the utilization of the
Prototype Verification System (PVS) Shankar et al. (1993) which has been successfully
utilized for the purpose of checking the expression trees as per Rushby and Srivas
(1993). While this successfully proves that PVS should be a candidate for reuse in
another mechanism for validating tabular expressions it would be remiss not to evaluate
the art of the possible in terms of validation/verification technologies now available.
Later in this chapter, 2.6.1, we examine some of the research available into tooling for
this area.
The term mechanized mathematical tools (MMTs) encompasses a large number of
different types of software such as: theorem proving systems, computer algebra sys-
tems, model checkers and hybrid systems; all of which should be explored in terms
of fit for purpose in tabular verification. As we are looking for a means of consuming
precise documentation standards, as per Parnas et al. (1994), it is of the utmost impor-
tance that whatever candidate category of tools, and the tool itself, be able to be further
validated to ensure a proven platform. Without such, the validity of verifications of all
representations produced could be called into question. Rather, should these methods
be adopted into industry a potential extension of this work could be to provide tooling
to support developers efforts to adopt the method to their daily work.
The TFM brings some ancillary capabilities beyond that of its predecessors that are
useful for those tasked with describing complex software. It is not equational or ax-
iomatic but still allows for the use of multi-dimensional tabular expressions. Its struc-
ture allows for the limitations of the previous methods to be addressed by providing
further flexibility. For example the TFM allows the documenter the ability to document
modules that utilize global variables. It further simplifies important details rather than
overcomplicating them while allowing for some degree of abstraction of the internal
workings of the software implementation.
The core concept of the TFM is that any software module has both a global data
structure and a hidden one that masks the process by which the module achieves its
work. As Parnas (2006) notes, global variables are a fundamental way that modules
communicate. Thus it is important to capture through our reference documentation the
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intricacies of these variables and how they are transformed by a module. As we noted
earlier, the concepts of events is another cornerstone of the TFM where the software
module can be imagined as a finite state machine operating over a logical time-line
delineated by important milestones. In this case the milestones are what the TFM calls
events, and quite simply an event is where a module performs an action on either its
external or hidden data structure.
Every event is different and thus should have a unique description of what has oc-
curred. The TFM utilizes event descriptors for this purpose. These event descriptors
are ultimately unique identifiers that shows the pre and post values of a specific vari-
able prior to and post the work conducted by a software module. Finally there is a
trace, a formal methods concept, which is simply a sequence of events that show what
occurs once the module initializes.
The TFM brings all of these component elements together into a component inter-
face document. This should have the descriptions necessary for a reader to understand
the complete listing of all inputs and outputs of a given module, inclusive of the types
involved. Further, it should detail the set of relations that occur tying the history of
events that occurs between input and output through the form of a trace. As per Par-
nas (2006); "A TFM document is complete if there is a relation for every output and the
complete set of possible traces for which the value of each output is defined is included
in the domain of the corresponding relation."
Ultimately the purpose of this methodology is to validate options for use within our
case study construct of financial crime detection. While the restriction terms would in-
herently vary depending on the use case in question (AML1/Periodic Fraud/Real-time
Fraud) there should inherently be a consistency in approach to solve for verifiable spec-
ification patterns. Thus, we aim to produce a TFM component interface specification
document that accurately describes a financial crime software use case from industry.
1Anti-Money Laundering
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2.5 Parnas Predicate Logic
As logic forms the basis to the validation work in this thesis it is important to un-
derstand the origins of the logic utilized in tabular expression trees. Parnas (1993a)
introduces us to his predicate logic variant which is notable as it forms the basis for his
other work in tabular expressions and document-driven design (Parnas, 2003a). The
importance in this logic is placed in eliminating all forms of logically derived ambi-
guity hence making it a suitable precursor to the idea of tabular notation. With that in
mind we can state for each assignment of values to variables that appear in a logical
expression they should simply evaluate to either true or false. This ensures that no
matter what inferred programmatic driven complexity exists prior to representation in
this logic the outcome can clearly be tested, validated and understood with stark clarity.
An attribute that differs Parnas (1993a) from other forms of logic is the way in
which it handles partial functions. A number of types of logic assume that all functions
dealt with are deemed to be ’total’ functions. A total function means that the function
is defined on a domain that includes all possible values of its arguments. A partial
function on the other hand means that for a given function not all the possible values
of the arguments on a given domain have been defined.
Mathematically we can see these as defined in Gallier (1986) where Gallier defines
a partial function to be a triple f =< A,G,B > where A and B are arbitrary or even
empty sets and G is a relation. Gallier (1986) continues noting that a partial function
f ∶ A→ B is a total function if domain(f) = A.
Cheng and Jones (1990) introduces a survey of a few methods of dealing with par-
tial functions using different logics. These methods include totality over a restricted
set, viewing functions as relations, fixing notions of equality, conditional operators,
to name but a few. Parnas (1993a) discusses another method of dealing with partial
functions by altering the common perception of dealing with predicate expressions.
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The use of Parnas (1993a) for a financial crimes definition should be a good appli-
cation of the method. From a functional logic perspective the observed specifications
thus far do not push too broadly into restriction terms dominated by partial functions
rather, they attempt to simplify terms as much as possible for computational purposes.
As such the specification types discussed by Bane et al. (2004) should be easily ap-
plicable to the context discussed and easily transition to proving stratagems for the
mechanized aspect of the tool set. When this breaks down human interaction would be
required to make a decision and finalize the resulting output.
2.5.0.1 Example Tabular Expression Tree
The logic written in the trace function method attempts to assist software engineers
in constructing accurate specifications about their software. Janicki et al. (1996) builds
on this work and incorporates this logic into an easily read form of document specifi-
cation called the tabular expression or, simply put, a table. Tabular expressions allow
software engineers to instantaneously note whether there are ’gaps’ in their specifica-
tions as such ’gaps’ are clearly evident when tabular expressions are used to specify
software. Furthermore, because tabular expressions are constructed using predicate
logic and other forms of mathematics, none of the usual ambiguities about some soft-
ware are evident due to the elimination of natural language.
This mathematical model specifies how using a relational model applied to software
that a tabular expression representing that software could be derived. Tabular expres-
sions are useful because the same information can be represented using different tables
thereby making certain aspects of the information more pronounced or clear. Due to
this fact many different table types came into existence, each concentrating on repre-
senting data in a subtly different fashion.
Bane et al. (2004) introduces a new mathematical model for tabular expressions.
Here the author introduces both an evaluation term and a restriction term. The eval-
uation term is clearly for use in evaluating tabular expressions whereas the restriction
term gives us interesting semantic constraints being imposed on that specific tabular
expression. The restriction is similar to what was proposed by Guttag (1977) which
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explicitly notes when the value of an operation will loosely defined, but has been mod-
ified as per Bane et al. (2004) to map more with tabular expression notation.
The constraints on a tabular expression could be things like, type, cardinality or
number of grids, for example. It is from the restriction term that we are given the
means to construct a theorem as it contains all the ’facts’ we need to know about that
tabular expression.
Several types of tabular expression trees are utilized in Bane’s mathematical model
and we will examine some of the structural elements and table types in order to ensure
that we have the full flexibility required to map a financial crime detection system to a
tabular expression format.
Jin and Parnas (2010) defines an indexed set as being an indexed a triple (I,X, f)
where I and X are finite sets and f is a function defined from I to X . Further, it’s
noted that the sets X and I can be of any type. With respect to the domain of the
function f , I , is called the index-set; an element of I is called an index. Thus if S is an
indexed-set, (I,X, f), then IndexSet(S)def = I or in an alternative representation if
K is the indexed-set (I,X, f) and i ∈ I , either K[i] or Ki can be used to represent
f(i). Either can be utilized at the preference of the person designing the specification.
Jin and Parnas (2010) introduced a normal function table as a popular example to
explain the functionality of tabular expression trees. They are structured like Table 2.1
which describes a simple function, f(x, y). In simple terms the function becomes x
squared - y squared if x and y < 0. What follows is an examination of what occurs if
you examine this more formally:
Jin and Parnas (2010) suggests that within the our example of a table construct
there are several unique properties. They begin by first examining the concept of con-
stituents. In the case of Table 2.1 there are several constituents to consider. They are:
• integer ∶ n.
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T1
x < 0 x = 0 x > 0
T2
y < 0 x2 − y2 x2 + y2 x2 − y2
y = 0 x + y x2 − y2 x + y
y > 0 x2 + y2 x + y x2 + y2
T0
Table 2.1: Normal Function Table
• {integer ∶ Li∣1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
• grid ∶ T [0], index − set = {1, ..., L1} ×⋯ × {1, ..., Ln}.
• predicategrid ∶ T [i], index − set = {1, ..., Li}∣1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Jin and Parnas (2010) explains that the parameter n is the number of dimensions of
T0 that we see in Table 2.1.The parameter n should be noted as being always one less
than the number of grids (T0...Tn) of the complete table. The Li parameters give the
dimensions of T0 and the lengths of the one-dimensional grids, T1...Tn. In the example
illustrated in Table 2.1, n is 2, the grids are T0, T1 and T2. T0 is a 3 × 3 grid and both
grids T1 and T2 have three elements.
Once the constituents of Table 2.1 are understood we next need to understand any
conditions that they must satisfy, or to simply the restrictions associated with the ex-
ample. In this case they would simply be:
• The number of grids in T,n + 1, must be at least 2.
• The lengths of grids T [1], ..., T [n] must be positive.
• Grids T [1], ..., T [n], must be proper1 where proper is defined by Jin and Parnas
(2010) through the example of a predicate grid, G, which is considered proper
for a predicate C if, for every assignment of values to its variables that satisfies
C, exactly one predicate in G is satisfied.
1Proper(G,C)→ ((∀j, k ∶ j, k ∈ I, (j ≠ k → G[j]∧G[k] = false))∧(G[i1]∨...∨G[in] = true))
where I = {i1, ..., in} is the index set of G.
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Thus, we arrive at the final element of Bane et al. (2004) the concept of evaluation.
For Table 2.1 a normal function table, T , represents a specific function that can be
evaluated for an assignment, A, in two steps which are:
• Choose j1, j2, ..., jn such that ∀i(0 < i ≤ n)T [i][ji] evaluates to true for A.
• Evaluate T [0][j1, j2, ..., jn] for the assignment A to compute the value of T .
The explanation of this is that the value of this expression for an assignment A is the
value of T [0][select(eval(T [1],A)), ..., select(eval(T [n],A))] according to Jin and
Parnas (2010). Thus, for any assignment that is complete for T this holds true and as
such, we need not mention A, and can simplify to the term.
T [0][select(eval(T [1])), ..., select(eval(T [n]))].
In this example expression, eval is used to indicate that the evaluation of the predi-
cate grids must happen first and is followed directly by the selection of the expression
in T [0] to be evaluated rather than evaluate all expressions of T [0] and then select
one of the values. Jin and Parnas (2010) cautions that as there may exist some partial
functions in the expressions, it may not always be possible to evaluate all expressions
in T [0] for every assignment. However in this case as predicates in the logic used are
always total, we can evaluate any predicate grid for any assignment.
Prior to finalizing the translation of the above into a final TFM representation we
need to define one more function that is highly utilized within the method; namely the
select function. Using the same construct as the definition of the proper function we
state that if PCG denotes the set of predicate Constant grids, select is a relation defined
by:
selectdef = {(G, i)∣G ∈ PCG ∧G[i] = true}.
Jin and Parnas (2010) thus argues that when select is applied to proper predicate
constant grids, it is a function and we can write “select(G)” to denote the index of the
only element of G that is true.
Thus our TFM representation of Table 2.1 is;
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Constituents:
• integer ∶ n.
• {integer ∶ Li∣1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
• predicategrid ∶ T [i], index − set = {1, ..., Li}∣1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• grid ∶ T [0], index − set = {1, ..., L1} ×⋯ × {1, ..., Ln}.
Auxiliary functions:
• Proper and select as per our definitions.
Restriction schema:
• (n > 0)∧ (∀i,1 ≤ i ≤ n→ Li > 0)∧ (∀i,1 ≤ i ≤ n→ Proper(T [i])).
Evaluation schema for an assignment that is complete for T:
• T0[select(eval(T1)), ..., select(eval(Tn))].
What we learn from this tabular expression example is that any method utilized
needs to provide a broad range of flexibility for the definition of a mapped expression
from a module specification. As developers attempt to use the most effective means
of resolving problems there is no means to guarantee that they will solve the same
problem in a consistent form. This means that we need multiple mechanisms to relate
expression information to allow for deviations in how developers would construct an
expression tree around their interpretation of the module interface specification.
2.6 Applying the TFM
The Trace Function Method of Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) provides a precise
mechanism to describe software programs and the associated documentation of inter-
faces for information hiding components. As mentioned earlier, Parnas introduces the
concepts of event, event descriptor, and trace and provides definitions. Further, ba-
sic functions on event descriptors and traces are introduced in order to simplify its
utilization for developers and or documenters.
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Quinn (2007) discusses the classical application of explaining a formal method by
using the TFM to describe a stack program example. However, other examples for the
explanation of the method exist and are equally illustrative in showing the flexibility
of the method. The importance of any example is to provide a comprehensive full
specification which as defined in Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) implies that a full
specification is any specification which states all properties. The emphasis highlights
that many specification methods focus only on required properties associated with the
product description.
Earlier in this document we discussed some other approaches to describing soft-
ware which try and meet the needs to describe the interface specification without com-
promising the internal operations of the program. Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006)
and Quinn (2007) both create category groups associated with these other approaches
which in their terms loosely collect to being pragmatic, algebraic, axiomatic and a mix
of two or all approaches. The conclusions drawn are that each approach has a discrete
set of strengths and weaknesses associated therein. Extrapolating from that work, the
major weaknesses that leap out are the lack of intuitiveness of the specifications applied
in each method, the inelegance of the description and the limitations in applicability.
The TFM is interesting as it brings new elements that can be utilized in the goal to
provide accurate, elegant and complete descriptions of software specifications. Parnas
and Dragomiroiu (2006) discusses these at length but in brief they are:
• The TFM is neither equation-based or axiomatic.
• It is flexible in the number of multidimensional tabular expressions it supports.
• It utilizes the logic Parnas introduces in Parnas (1993a) which provides an el-
egant means of dealing with partial functions as opposed to other higher order
logics.
• The TFM provides support for modules that use globally referenced variables in
their communication.
• It provides clarity in the conveyance of important information pertinent to the
module.
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• It provides an abstraction layer from the internal operations of the module.
• It provides clear delineation between important information essential to a mod-
ule’s operation versus non-essential elements.
• The TFM builds on existing mathematical concepts.
• The TFM is very specific in how information is organized.
One of the major elements of Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) is how it defines a
module as a finite state machine and the temporal evolution of its states linearly through
a series of events which potentially read or update variables and alter the internal state
of the module. Further descriptors are provided for these events such as PGM The
Name of the Program invoked at a specific event. Descriptors examine variable states
through changes in their values. Specific treatment of input and output variables utilize
abbreviated descriptors.
Traces are of vital importance to the method and as explored formally in Parnas
and Dragomiroiu (2006) we understand that it is a grouping of event descriptors that
captures a certain sequence of events allowing for further nuance through the use of
sub-traces.
The TFM thus requires its interface documentation to have complete specifications
of a program’s inputs, outputs and relational information tying the operations on inputs
to output values. Completeness in the TFM is defined by Parnas as being when there
is a relation for every output defined and there exists a complete set of traces for which
the value of each output is defined and included in the domain of the corresponding
relation.
As such, our goal for our industrial application for a financial crime system is to
provide a TFM description of all modules such that all possible traces within that
program are specified. Through this specification we hope we will be able to verify the
completeness of the program and the accuracy of its documentation.
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To simplify the description of industrial programs Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006)
provides a series of primitive functions on events and basic functions, predicates and
function generators for use on traces.
It is important to note though that as the examples provided by Parnas and Dragomiroiu
(2006) are quite simple one should consider more complex examples like Quinn
(2007) in order to gain a broader perspective on the application of the method within
a more complex finite state machine example. While the trace function method does
not become a silver bullet to describe with ease all aspects of formal specification of
module design it does provide a more holistic and pragmatic approach to doing so.
Our conclusion here is that while a myriad of other methods exist that attempt to solve
the problem only the TFM has the potential depth of mathematical validation neces-
sary to ensure a complete and accurate description providing the necessary coverage
for complex critical systems. We will attempt to validate this assertion later in this
document.
This conclusion is shared and validated through examination of works like Semegn
(2011) where a more comprehensive analysis of the approach is conducted specifically
around ensuring consistency in specifications.
2.6.1 Tooling Supporting Tabular Formal Methods
Some of the previously discussed approaches have attempted to create tooling to
reduce the burden on software developers to enable themselves on the approach. A
lot of emphasis has been put on developing tools that have been adapted to map to the
approaches that originated in Parnas (1972b). The evolution of this tooling has been to
move from standalone tools like Heitmeyer et al. (2005) and move to more integrated
applications or widgets like Eles and Lawford (2011). Given our previous discussion
on the tabular notation itself it is clear that any tooling would provide significant lift
for software developers using formal methods. This lift would come in the form of
mechanisms to input, output, verify and store the representations easily and potentially
should integrate with development environments.
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Of the above mentioned research into this area associated with Parnas-based meth-
ods, each attempted to create some form of tool suite to interact with tabular expres-
sions. However, not all of them were successful in creating a complete offering of
the components necessary. Only the McMaster Jing (2000), NRL Heitmeyer et al.
(2005) and the OPGI Lawford et al. (2004) research teams were able to create tool-
ing that included mechanisms to design, check and output tabular expressions. Other
research did include some capabilities that focused on evaluation of expressions and
some manifestation of a kernel but did not attempt to make a more complete offering
for end-to-end program descriptions.
The McMaster TTS and more recently the table toolbox for Matlab/Simulink Eles
and Lawford (2011) would be seen as immediate predecessors for more recent versions
of the table tool system. It was designed and implemented over a period of years by
both staff and graduate students at McMaster University in Ontario, Canada. The first
iteration was the TTS and it was composed of three layers of operations;
1. The Table Holder & Information Modules, the basis for all logic data structures
and persistence layers for tabular expressions.
2. The Library Layer provided abstraction information to the tool layer.
3. The tools themselves, which ultimately contained a table checking tool amongst
other user tools for the manipulation of tabular expressions.
In the next generation of the McMaster research work they took a very different
research path, opting instead to focus on integration with existing toolkits to provide
the same level of functional capabilities. As such the division of functionality aligned
as follows:
1. Mathlab, providing the library of cohesive end user capabilities to graphically
edit, generate and manipulate tabular expressions.
2. Simulink, to gel all the component layers together to provide a seamless end user
experience for designing and verifying tabular expressions.
3. PVS and CVC3, two automated theorem proving systems to provide a mecha-
nism to verify tabular expressions themselves.
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The use of the theorem proving system PVS, Prototype Verification System Owre
et al. (1992), for both approaches makes sense given that PVS has existing support for
tabular expressions. This allows the research teams to focus instead on generating PVS
code directly to support any given expression tree and the PVS system generates the
subsequent obligations surrounding disjointness and completeness conditions.
CVC3 is an automatic theorem prover for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
problems that can be used to prove the validity (or, dually, the satisfiability) of first-
order formulas in a large number of built-in logical theories and their combination
(Barrett and Tinelli, 2007). It is a very different entity to PVS in terms of approach and
does not inherently have the support necessary for tabular expressions. Thus the Mc-
Master team needed to extend their toolkit to generate the obligations for disjointness
and completeness conditions for CVC3 in query form. The generated queries can then
be provided to the proof stack of the CVC3 tool and it can thereby attempt to verify
the queries. It outputs a counter model post evaluation, should it consider a provided
query to be invalid in nature.
When considering the basis for both of the above approaches (complete develop-
ment versus integrated development) it is important to consider the variations of all
tabular expression tool suites surrounding table types management. We agree with
Bane (2008) on their commentary regarding table type extension to support model
flexibility, which is something that the McMaster team succeeded in doing in both
efforts at designing tabular expression toolkits. This gives both these efforts a distinc-
tive edge over the NRL efforts which really had hard-coded table types built into their
toolkit. McMaster seemingly built on the work of Janicki et al. (1996) in successfully
showing a mechanism to provide broader flexibility for type manipulation.
As the McMaster TTS utilizes a formal model with a library of each table type de-
veloped as independent segments of code, it provides a formal layer of abstraction that
provides a common definition of general tables with specific code basis for variations.
This abstraction layer helped in providing Jing (2000) a solid basis for deriving PVS
code based on these table definitions that could be in turn checked for the appropriate
level of completeness and disjointness.
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Due to the nature of the NRLs core purpose as a military research facility, the man-
ifestation of NRL SCR* tools are being used on military problems such as guidance
systems, weapons control systems and power governance systems. The SCR* tools
are discussed in the supporting literature for the research project Heitmeyer (2001)
and Heitmeyer et al. (2005) and specifically reference work around designing, check-
ing and outputting tabular expressions.
With the aim of improved accuracy and rigour the SCR* tool suite made several at-
tempts at designing and implementing tooling for tabular expressions. On examination
of the checking mechanisms specifically, they varied in a number of ways depending
on the depth of verification, programmatic complexity of the associated tabular ex-
pression tree as well as the integrated back end mechanism to automate the validation
effort. Like the McMaster effort PVS was also utilized in this research, mostly because
of its support for tabular expressions and also because of its accuracy in the associated
proof obligations. Model checkers were also examined but had limitations in scope, as
model checkers at the time were highly limited in breadth of function in comparison
to theorem proving systems like PVS (SPIN Holzmann (1997), Salsa Bharadwaj and
Sims (2000), PVS Owre et al. (1992)).
These capabilities are able to eliminate a lot of the tedium associated with check-
ing tabular expressions but were not entirely capable of checking all conditions and
expression trees passed to them. As such the NRL project also made use of human
review to ensure the accuracy of the results thereby undermining the automation ele-
ments associated with the system. To conclude, the overriding factor in determining
the success of the NRL SCR* toolkit was based on the limitations of the associated
verification technologies and not the tools themselves. Usability and interaction de-
sign were elements of concern but ultimately these were out of scope for the project.
Nevertheless, they attempted to utilize methods to ease interactions with these systems
to promote a healthier utilization of the checking methods Archer (2000).
Like the McMaster and NRL efforts, the OPGI (Ontario Power Generation Inc. Law-
ford et al. (2004)) developed a set of tools that was instantiated in design to assist in
30 2. Literature Review: Formal Methods
formally documenting the design of nuclear reactor shut-down software systems Law-
ford et al. (2004). Like the other research efforts here also PVS was heavily utilized
as the back end validation systems. This highlights a key common factor in research
efforts we’ve discussed which is a dependency on the PVS automated theorem proving
systems. PVS is not without its problems and limitations so it is very interesting to
note the continued use of it as a basis for these efforts. We’ve determined that a num-
ber of factors led to this, mainly the lack of mature competitor capabilities. Potentially
model checking or computer algebra systems could have been utilized but at the time
they did not offer the same breadth of function. Further, they also did not offer the na-
tive interfaces for tabular expressions via the TAME project that PVS offered Archer
(2000).
In Jing (2000) we garner further insight in the limitations of the McMaster efforts
where evaluations on the PVS system led to a number of conclusions on its effective-
ness. Namely, Jing focuses on a number of function related issues associated with the
PVS proof function library. Jing conjectures that the GRIND function in particular is
highly limited due to its reliance on a specific tuple structure. The grind function is de-
fined as being the highest-level automated proving strategy in PVS. It does skolemiza-
tion, heuristic instantiation, propositional simplification, if-lifting, rewriting, and ap-
plies decision procedures for linear arithmetic and equality Shankar et al. (1993).This
issue with GRIND is still the case and as such predicate tuples with different types
of predicates may be unsolvable due to the expression structure. As a tabular expres-
sion checking tool system is envisioned as being flexible and supportive of multiple
predicate statements, this inherent limitation could lead to forced obsolescence of the
toolkit.
Jing evaluates the usefulness of GRIND in general terms throughout the research
into theorem proving, as generally it is faster and capable of solving most problems
passed to PVS for checking. Regardless of its issues, even Jing agrees that PVS offers
alternatives to solve complex predicate statements like vector tables and avoid skolem-
ization, iterative expansion and heuristic methods as a solving strategy which generally
cripple alternatives as each presents a logical problem that breaks the proving ability
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for complex specifications. This issues are common amongst many of the mechanized
mathematical tools available but work-arounds exist in some situations.
Other limitations of the McMaster variants of checking tools vary depending on the
generation observed. In the MinJing variant there was a statute of limitations associ-
ated with supported tabular expression tree types, meaning that a number of table types





When examining the later generation of the tool kit this appears to have remained
consistent with the research team making a scoping decision to not support special
cases like decision tables.
Further limitations included determining the uncovered area of a tabular expression
should the domain of the table be incomplete which leads to issues in the underly-
ing mathematical structure surrounding partial functions. External to these factors,
all other limiting factors were purely technical in nature focused on infrastructure and
communications abilities between the other table tool suite components. This in part
was solved for in the next generation of the suite as it successfully removes oper-
ational complexity by integrating existing systems to simplify operation interfaces.
This does however introduce the potential for misrepresentation of specific expression
assets when parsed between different component libraries.
Other examples of the use of tabular expressions include innovative work introduced
in Singh et al. (2015) which looks at a case study of Insulin Infusion Pumps. This is
another example of a critical system application of the method to ensure accurate de-
scriptions of the software code and insure the accuracy of the document driven design
of the program used for the industrial application. The main contribution of the paper
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however is a refinement strategy to aid in the automation of formalization of require-
ments from their associated tabular expressions which the authors define as being a
correct-by-construction approach.
To impart the effectiveness of the approach they use the Event-B modelling lan-
guage as a basis for the industrial application. This is a departure from previous efforts
which utilized automated theorem provers for this function. These representations can
be thus used to check for correctness of the functional behaviour of the program with
the associated properties provided. The authors conclude that they can guarantee that
the safety properties are preserved throughout the life-cycle of the associated program
thereby ensuring the necessary critical elements for safe operation of the insulin Infu-
sion Pump.
While it is clear that some efforts have been made to develop tooling the majority
of these have been driven by academic initiatives. There has been some success to
ensure that there is a suite of available tools for verification, inputting and outputting
tabular representations but none of these has been part of or extension to an integrated
development environment used in industry. One could argue that Eles and Lawford
(2011) attempts to bridge that gap but the widget created here only addresses a very
targeted audience. Later in this thesis we will examine the impact of this lack of tooling
and discuss the implications for the method in a financial crime context.
2.7 Summary
This chapter examined the related work in the field of formal methods. It examined
several different types of methods employed in critical system design documentation
Dehbonei and Mejia (1994), Abrial (1996) and Bartussek and Parnas (1978). Further
it delved into tools developed to support formal method applications in Jing (2000),
Lawford et al. (2004), Heitmeyer (2001) and Eles and Lawford (2011). It looked for
commonalities in approach and what industry applications the tool was utilized for.
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Later the chapter introduced several preliminary elements surrounding the Trace
Function Method (TFM). It examined elements of the historical approach around traces
and discussed elements utilized by the method in order to create comprehensive de-
scriptions of modules. It examined work in this area like Bane et al. (2004), Parnas
and Dragomiroiu (2006) and Quinn (2007) and discussed some of the definitions and
examples provided.
The chapter showed that while simple examples should have simple descriptions in-
creased complexity would generate the same degree of complexity in their descriptions
and that no method could alleviate that concern. Effectively while the TFM approach
has areas of coarseness it represents the best means of generating accurate descriptions.
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The evolution of policy and laws around customer due diligence functions originated
due to a widespread utilization of criminal agents of the banking system. The integrity
of the financial system globally was challenged by regulators internationally and thus
new regulations were drafted based on policy makers advice. One major policy maker
FATF (Financial Action Task Force) and others lobbied for drastic change to how banks
operate in order to highlight accounts owned by criminal organizations, dictators and
terrorists. Prior to regulation of this nature institutions were able to offer anonymity
products which could be used for nefarious purposes by their clients or by ultimate
beneficial owners of the accounts (Tang and Ai, 2010).
In this chapter we will examine the high level provisions recommended by FATF
for the purposes of accurate customer due diligence record keeping. Further we will
look at the realization of the policies as applied to the fourth EU directive on anti
money laundering. Money laundering is a tool utilized in order to obfuscate wealth and
the movement of funds internationally. Whilst commonly utilized by organized crime
rings it is more often utilized today by individuals associated with corrupt practices or
their agents (Siclari, 2016).
Even with increased legislation and technological process to detect money launder-
ing the practice is still quite rampant. Criminal intent still attempts, and succeeds, to
circumvent controls within the banks themselves often using the guise of legitimate
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business to achieve this (Riccardi et al., 2016). Commercial trade is the perfect instru-
ment to hide money laundering as the volume of cash transactions involved is huge
and import/export documentation can be forged especially when combined with cor-
rupt practices like bribery.
3.2 FATF
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that was es-
tablished to promote mechanisms to counter both terrorist financing and money laun-
dering. The mechanisms commonly utilized tend to be driven by legal, regulatory and
operational means but FATF remains a policy making body that drives for the reforms
necessary at a government level (FATF, 2012). As a policy-driven organization FATF is
unique in their employed methodology in the fight against terrorism globally (Gardner,
2007).
The majority of the policies FATF promotes has been aggregated into a series of
specific recommendations that tackle a portfolio of anti-money laundering and counter
terrorism financing operational needs. Of particular interest to this research is their
recommendations for customer due diligence (CDD). In their recommendations FATF
provides an exhaustive set of guidelines specific to CDD and enhanced due diligence
(EDD). These recommendations are pushed not just towards the adoption by the EU
but also the G8 countries (Scherrer, 2006).
The foundation of this recommendation is scrutiny applied to business relationships,
transactions that exceed a fifteen thousand dollar threshold or suspicious wire activi-
ties. Historically, the integrity of the financial system could be compromised when an
organization allowed the proliferation of accounts that did not have adequate data col-
lection methods associated with the account holder. Examples of this included cases
where anonymous accounts are held (Austria, Switzerland) or the utilization of ficti-
tious names to mask true identity.
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Such measures became necessary due to activities conducted by individuals and
governments around wartime, dictatorships or state sponsored terrorism. As such the
banking sector had doubts about the validity of account ownership and how the funds
were being utilized (Badali, 2010). With these measures enacted regulators now have
a legal instrument to punish institutions found wanting in terms of their operation com-
pliance risk management processes.
When the recommendations are enacted into national regulatory compliance laws,
banks must find means to operationalise the legalities, this generally means utilizing
various technologies to ensure compliance. While many countries have agreed to par-
ticipate there is an active list of countries that choose not to enact anti money laun-
dering and counter terrorism financing measures into law. As such FATF maintains an
active list of high risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. This list has implications for
banks that are monitoring client records and transactional activity.
Thus it is incumbent upon a bank in a participating country that it must do as follows
(FATF, 2012):
• Verify customer identity utilizing reliable forms of documentation.
• Seek out beneficial owners and take reasonable means to verify their identity.
• Understand the nature of the business relationship between the beneficial owner
and the client.
• Apply ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutinize transac-
tions to ensure that they are within the risk profile applied to the client relation-
ship and the source of the funds utilized.
The approach further advocates the use of a risk-based approach where the bank
is responsible for creating a means to stratify their client populate in terms of risk
buckets; generally high, medium and low. However, as explored by Fratangelo (2016)
there a number of different means to create various custom style risk strata depending
on the products/channels a given institution operates within.
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In instances where an institution is unable to acquire the necessary validation ele-
ments like passport, national identification numbers etc. it is incumbent upon them to
not initiate a business relationship or open an account for said client and potentially
file a regulatory report regarding the customer for national security agencies or regula-
tors to examine and investigate. The requirements here dictate that all clients, new or
existing, should be subject to this form of continuous risk assessment to ensure against
malicious activity.
Given this burden upon them it is not surprising that financial institutions have turned
to technology to help them with this risk assessment process. The record keeping
requirements have transitioned from traditional printed duplicates into electronic forms
stored in data warehouses. Institutions are required to keep a five year rolling window
of all interactions with a client with the associated audit information up until five years
after the termination of the client relationship.
An ancillary requirement of these policy recommendations is the capture further
measures in the case of foreign politically exposed persons for customer due diligence
purposes. These are:
• All institutions must have operational means to uncover using a risk based ap-
proach if the client or beneficial owner of an account is a politically exposed
person (PEP).
• Approval from senior management to establishing or continuing a business rela-
tionship with a PEP. In some geographies individuals may have personal liability
when they obfuscate the details of client relationships under AML law.
• Establish the source of wealth for the client.
• Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring (Enhanced Due Diligence) over the course
of the business relationship.
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The diligence requirements applied by banks on PEPs is also applicable to their
relatives and close associates. This is as a direct link to the use of organized crime
of family members to mask the movement of funds for money laundering purposes as
explored in Serio (2008) where mafia elements utilize relatives and close associates to
launder money across several geographies.
3.3 The Fourth EU Directive on Anti-Money Launder-
ing
The European Union over the past decades has enacted several directives with regard
to anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing. Most recently on 26 June
2015, the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU) No. 2015/849 (4th AMLD)
entered was enacted by the federation. It is incumbent upon all EU Member States
to implement the 4th AMLD by 26 June 2017 into national laws and regulations (EU,
2012).
The 4th AMLD builds upon the existing 3rd Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Di-
rective 2005/60/EU (3AMLD)) and the directive that drove its implementation (Com-
mission Directive 2006/70/EC). The driving force behind it is the adoption of new
recommendations released by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2012).
With the 4th AMLD more emphasis is accorded to the activities of a risk-based
approach to enforcing adequate protections for the the detection of suspicious activ-
ity or irregular account behaviours. The EU organizations responsible for measuring
compliance with the directive will conduct an omnibus analysis of money laundering
and terrorism financing risks as applicable to all its members. The findings of this
analysis and subsequent recommendations were sent to the respective countries under
EU membership. Armed with these recommendations and the analysis of the risks the
membership is able to apply tighter controls to its national financial regulations. Ef-
fectively, this represented a starting point as each country may have unique risks that
cater towards some more economic driven factors (resources, borders, trade) and the
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expectation is that each member state ensure that they have adequate risk coverage as
per the FATF recommendations to meet the unique elements also.
Due to increased concern regarding beneficial owners of accounts, the 4th AMLD
directs that countries in the EU create a registrar that has a holistic index of beneficial
owners of corporate entities. To adhere to this the financial institutions under the man-
date of regulation look at statements of corporations along with information provided
by corporations themselves regarding its director and business area through taking cus-
tomer due diligence measures. A centralized register is intended to be a more reliable
and comprehensive data repository that can be used to identify potential beneficial
owners. Further, with such an active registrar in place at a national and financial in-
vestigation unit (FIU) level transparency levels applied to beneficial ownership should
improve meeting the explicit demands of the FATF.
Through its implementation, (EU, 2012) provides justification that national regula-
tory authorities and Financial Intelligence Units must have access to the central regis-
ter under the reciprocating member state national anti-money laundering legislation for
exercising their customer due diligence law. To simplify, this means that each country
can maintain a central database that banks can query regarding citizens to understand
if the information they provided regarding source of wealth or identification details
is accurate. It is feasible that other organizations or even individuals may be allowed
access to the registrar in cases where they can prove the legitimacy of the request but
meet exceptions in the form of information regarding trust structures. Each individ-
ual EU Member State should be entitled to restrict access to certain fields of sensitive
information regarding beneficial owners completely or partially in exceptional cases
where they feel there is just cause regarding the request.
As the key element is information and record keeping, ensuring the quality, stan-
dardization, normalization and storage of these elements is key (Angelopoulou et al.,
2012). As infrastructures to enact the directive are implemented a core aspect of tech-
nologies utilized will be the ability to provide accurate logs on all customer touch
points over the client life cycle. This is to provide regulators with effective means of
governance on the bank’s execution protocols for the directive.
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As part of the directive there is no longer any form of differentiation in EU (2012)
between politically exposed persons (PEPs) residency, be that their naturalized coun-
try of residency versus other countries. There are other obligations that apply to PEPs
classified as beneficial owner of different financial products/accounts. EU (2012) ex-
pands the category of PEPs to include members of the governing bodies of political
parties. At an operational level the additional PEP designations will result in the ne-
cessity to update existing PEP lists, thereby increasing the operational requirements
for banks around Know Your Customer (KYC) compliance.
Under the existing regulations the financial services sector is already obliged to meet
with regulatory compliance system requirements and the 4th EU AML directive (EU,
2012) simply builds on this pre-existing set of measures with more strictures based on
customer due diligence and beneficial ownership legislation. As this is being enacted
as an EU wide initiative it will enforce action for all institutions and their subsidiaries,
both within and outside the EU, to comply with the enhanced measures. Failure to do
so will result in the potential application of severe penalties for institutions deigned to
be operating outside of regulatory compliance.
3.4 Conclusion
With FATF (2012) we have a credible reference that can act as a basis for modelling
customer information and financial transactions for the purposes of customer due dili-
gence. The data attributes discussed in the 4th EU AML directiveEU (2012) builds
upon this foundation but allow for flexible adoption for EU member states. Globally,
there is a variance in adoption of the recommendations with some countries opting to
partially comply or remain completely outside of compliance.
Technology vendors can use these regulations to enact an operational facility to de-
tect money laundering and terrorist financing whilst giving some further utility around
data representation to the banks they service. As compliance is the most critical ele-
ment of this problem transparency around scoring elements is vitally important. Thus,
underscoring the need for specifications of function and score that are clear, concise
and exact.
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This chapter introduces the idea that financial crime systems should be treated like
critical systems. It further surveys several key technologies in use to provide solutions
to the different types of financial crime pervasive within the banking sector.
Examples are provided to explain the complexities associated with describing finan-
cial crime detection programs and an analysis will be conducted on the appropriateness
of using formal methods to help alleviate concerns around adequate documentation for
regulators.
4.2 Financial Crime Detection as a Critical System
Financial systems are dominated by mechanisms that protect and regulate its in-
stitutions from monetary loss the world over (Phua et al., 2004). Increasingly, these
institutions are the victims of targeted attacks by individuals and groups that seek to
exploit weak detection systems or the vulnerability of employee/colleague trust for
profit (Vanasco, 1998). Subversion of financial systems by criminal gangs to launder
the proceeds of crime or by terrorists to fund acts of terror are common practices than
consistently need urgent attention and action to counter. This area has a considerable
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impact on all fiscal endeavour and can have as a result a critical impact on our lives.
Thus I assert that such systems by definition are representative of critical systems and
should face the same degree of rigour and specification as examples from military and
nuclear applications.
Criminal activity is ever evolving globally with criminal organizations utilizing new
techniques and technologies to advance their goals and circumvent security systems.
As a result, these systems are also forced into rapid evolution cycles to counter such
schemes (Phua et al., 2004). We propose an alternative approach utilizing better mech-
anisms to specify and control the design and outputs of these systems.
Commercially there are many systems which utilize varying techniques to counter
criminal activity using business rules, modelling languages and specially-designed
strongly typed structural languages. Ultimately we are interested in helping to stop
criminals and terrorists successfully finding holes that can capitalize on. For this re-
search we are reducing our scope to solutions focused on data pattern detection systems
using data science techniques discussed by Zhang et al. (2011), Jyotindra and Patel
(2011) and Behdad et al. (2010) as these represent the largest cross-section of mod-
ern techniques to detect these form of crimes. In order to craft a methodology around
studying financial crime detection systems using tabular-expression-related technol-
ogy we must first examine the feasibility of translating the specifications used in these
domains to a formal methods specification language like Parnas (2003a).
Should these systems be a successful application for formal method representations
then regulators and the financial services sector will have a secondary mechanism of
ensuring compliance with national regulatory legislation and still be able to scale ap-
propriately as new payment channels become available. We define success in this case
as the reference documents being able to act as independent entities that are able to
prove or disprove compliance with a specific aspect of AML regulatory compliance.
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4.3 Financial Security System Specifications
It is clear when examining the work of the OPGI team(Lawford et al., 2004) that
design through documentation as recommended by Parnas (2003a), provides a mech-
anism to assuage concerns around software flaws, gaps and inaccuracies in design.
When we consider financial crime system design however, these too have evolved due
to regulatory and fiscal drivers resulting in software that attempts to meet those laws
but invariably provides an abstraction layer to them due to the interpretation of laws
that they are attempting to create solutions for. As such it should come as no sur-
prise that within the sector of finance this issue persists as an ongoing problem which
costs financial institutions of all sizes and business areas considerable sums of money
annually in order to validate the accuracy and compliance of these systems.
The issue is that this type of behaviour in today's global economy cannot be summa-
rized as the lone act of sole individuals; rather it has expanded to included organized
groups targeting weaknesses in our institutions and acting on these weaknesses inter-
nationally. As such the scale of this activity cannot be ignored and countermeasures
have evolved through both the stimulus of financial loss from penalties for non compli-
ant banks along with a growing regulatory commitment from governments worldwide.
Thus we argue that the specification problem has to account for a number of criteria to
aid and not hinder efforts of detection, namely:
1. Opportunistic Detection Specifications: Driven more by logic and detection of
spurious activity outside an observed set of normalized behaviours (Denning,
1987).
2. Organized Detection Specifications: Driven by models that are able to resolve
and link data attributes and entities for the purposes of risk scoring (Lades et al.,
1993).
3. Scalability: Volumes of information are high in this use case and as a result a
specification checker would need to be able to cope with excessive data volumes
(Aghion and Howitt, 1990).
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4. Type Support: Due to the different data storage mechanisms and variance of
function in these systems any checking tool engine would need the flexibility
to support multiple types and scale to provide mechanisms to check new ones.
Bane (2008) discusses this at length and highlights flexibility as a major concern
in any tabular tool kit.
There are a wide variety of technologies in play in any given institution at one time
(Phua et al., 2004). Also it is not unusual for a given institution to place multiple
layers of security and analysis around core processes in order to facilitate better gover-
nance and monitoring. As such it should come as no surprise that financial institutions
represent a key driving force in the software engineering industry.
Logically one can extrapolate the basis of securing an institution from fraud and
other forms of criminality in the same way one could think about the problem of in-
trusion protection for these self-same institutions. The analogy being that for a given
perimeter, in this case the banks assets, we can envisage that bad actors are at play
to both penetrate the layers of defences, whilst simultaneously there are good actors
trying to protect against that action: hackers versus defenders.
The technologies behind these systems utilize the following techniques: data analy-
sis, profiling, machine learning and neural networks. As such they tend to be adaptive
entities which are easy customizable in the face of an ever-changing enemy. The sys-
tems themselves adapt internal security models to protect and secure investigative data
from prying eyes and often integrate with existing bank systems to enact as much
protection as possible. The inherent requirement here is that any form of formal repre-
sentation must be easily maintainable to account for these extensions and adjustments.
The institutions demand numerous things from these systems. Primarily though, the
bank is interested in being a profitable entity that does not bleed cash unnecessarily.
One of the more obvious means of losing money is through criminality, however these
institutions also can lose considerable sums to non-compliance with national financial
regulations.
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As big business entities themselves, the banks and insurers are also interested in
value for money and as such are continuously looking for products with more features
that are cheaper, easy to implement and learn.
So we can state that the institutions specifically hunt for an internal security system
that:
1. Is affordable: A system must represent value for money in that it must cost the
bank less than current losses or be a fraction of impending fines (English and
Hammond, 2014).
2. Is adaptable: Criminals are always finding new means of taking advantage of
financial systems. Any detection security system needs to be able to quickly
respond to new types of threats once the threat becomes noticed (Gao and Xu,
2009).
3. User friendly: The traditional fraud investigator is not very tech-savvy and, as a
result, any such solution needs to display data so that its quickly absorbed and
evaluated by even the least technical of users (Senator et al., 1995).
4. Is Reliable: High availability is a consistent demand of modern enterprise and
banks are no exception to this. Criminals can strike at any point and the in-
stitutions need to be able to react. Further, the demands on these systems are
growing as the complexity of the crimes increases. As such, the stability of a
given environment is of critical concern (Graham and Lussier, 2012).
5. Is Scalable: The systems have to scale both horizontally and vertically in func-
tion to deal with functional advances on the vertical to tackle new crime types
and horizontally to deal with expansion of their clients customer base or refer-
ence data (Rajan, 2010).
The systems themselves are built to examine the fiscal and static data of a given
institution. We can define fiscal to include any form of monetary transaction, be that a
deposit, withdrawal, credit card transaction or a claim payout. We can define static data
to be any form of customer reference data which describes the customer, their account,
associations data and supporting data e.g. passport information, driver license, etc.
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The majority of systems in today's marketplace rely on a combination of both types
in order to derive decision data. We define decision data to be any data which shows
and supports an argument that a detectable criminal action has occurred for a given
entity or group of entities (Phua et al., 2005).
How systems get that decision data depends, as each utilizes different techniques to
arrive at that endpoint. Later in this chapter we will examine the mathematics involved
in reaching that point, however we can describe the techniques they use. One type of
system is based on the principal of learning behaviours for a given entity. As such
over time the system learns what constitutes normal behaviour. Using a series of rules
entered into the system, through a code level application programmable interface or
via a user interface, it highlights information that does not follow that learned pattern
(Bolton and Hand, 2001).
Another type of system is one where a static snapshot of the data is taken and fed
into an analysis engine which uses a library of existing abnormal/criminal behaviour
patterns and looks for matches (Ghosh and Reilly, 1994).
Other systems utilize the concept of social networks to trace pockets of activity
highlighting potential accomplices and dubious actions and entities. A dubious entity
can be a number of different things but normally is a phone number, address or some-
thing along those lines that can be used to link criminal activities (Goldberg and Wong,
1998).
As these systems continue to evolve, it is not unusual to have hybrid versions that
incorporate some or all of the above concepts.
The differences between this domain and intrusion testing tend toward the separation
of concerns around data. Holistically we can diversify by stating anti-fraud and anti-
money laundering systems examine inferences acquired through the understanding of
data and the relationships between all data elements held therein. On the other hand,
intrusion testing centres on evaluation the susceptibility of a given data store is to
unsanctioned access (Denning, 1987).
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Ergo, it is the purpose of any enterprise financial crime solution to protect and under-
stand the data held in the enterprises infrastructure. For the most part in the commercial
world these solutions are divided in purpose due to the functional realities. Security
access to data clearly permeates throughout the banks infrastructure, however for the
most part intrusion-based system concentrate around external interfaces where the pos-
sibility of unsanctioned access is most probably. This is further enhanced through the
utilization of further governance mechanisms to ensure access control lists for critical
systems and data stores.
Historically, fraud detection systems have relied primarily on business rules. This
has been good for identifying re-occurrences of lessons that have already been learned.
There are three main issues with utilizing only this methodology. First, business rules
create a lot of noise as legitimate customers constantly do things that look suspicious
but are likely not criminal. Examples would include depositing a cheque with a greater
than average value, submission of an insurance claim, changing their address, adding
a spurious payee to their on line banking. False positives take time to triage and result
in operational inefficiency (Phua et al., 2005).
Second, business rules eventually become common knowledge to the fraudsters due
to either trial and error in fraud schemes or worse, infiltration of the organization caus-
ing business rules become known. This results in a risk to your organization, which
results in constant tweaking of dollar thresholds in the associated scenarios, which re-
sult in more operational inefficiency. Finally, business rules are not forward looking.
They are not there to catch tomorrow’s fraud types (Bolton and Hand, 2002).
What an approach utilizing advanced analytics offers is a methodology that helps
counter the problems that a business-rule-only approach fails to address. Using the
concept of risk factors we can begin to move into a world where we are dollar amount
agnostic. Organizations should not be forced to only try to catch the fraud over a
certain dollar amount. All fraud losses are going to the bottom line and in today’s
economic climate every dollar counts (English and Hammond, 2014). Secondly, an
advanced analytics approach looks for true fraud anomalies versus the narrow scope
typically associated with business rules for specific fraud schemes. Finally, Social
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Network Analysis (SNA) brings to the table a new tool for detecting and visualizing
fraud. Too often investigators are so focused on individual cases that they do not see
the forest for the trees. SNA is about discovering previously hidden relationships that
are meaningful to an organization. In the list below we itemize the approaches and
describe them:
1. Predictive Modelling: Perform knowledge discovery, data mining, predictive
assessment based on previous disposition of alerts and cases Examples of tech-
niques used would include neural networks, decision trees, generalized linear
models, econometric models and gradient boosting (Phua et al., 2005).
2. Text Mining: Unlock the power of unstructured data within reports, staff notes,
and websites (Bolton and Hand, 2001).
3. Anomaly Detection: Identify individual and aggregate abnormal patterns that
exist within your data. (Mean, standard deviation, percentiles, univariate & mul-
tivariate regression, clustering, sequence analysis, peer group analysis)
4. Automated Business Rules Using Machine Learning): Automate rules based on
known patterns/factors leading to suspicious behaviour using machine learning
and filter those transactions. An example would be two transactions in different
time zones from the same account owner within an unreasonable short period of
time (Bolton and Hand, 2002).
5. Database Searches: Accessing internal and external data sources like data ven-
dors such as Lexis Nexis, CIS, Web search, Dunn/Bradstreet and OFAC.
6. Social Network Analysis: Establish connections between people and businesses
through associative linkage analysis. Examples include social network, linkage
analysis, community detection and advanced analytics (Goldberg and Senator,
1995).
The long-term goal of a bank to solve financial crime concerns is to establish a
framework for enterprise-wide deployment of resources, including both material and
human assets. This framework should make it possible to:
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1. Gather and cross-match relevant data from all product lines, organizational units
and geographic regions of your organization (English and Hammond, 2014).
2. Analyse this data to connect the dots and spot large-scale fraud attacks early in
their life cycle (Denning, 1987).
3. Plan and execute focused countermeasures to combat large-scale attacks.
There are two key business drivers that are causing organizations to give serious
attention to an enterprise-wide strategy. These are:
• Increased effectiveness. The ability to look at the issues holistically across the
enterprise and identify large-scale threats early in their development, and mount
effective countermeasures while there is still time for them to have maximum
impact.
• Increased efficiency. The ability to leverage investments in data, tools and per-
sonnel in an economic environment where every organization and function is
being asked to do more with less.
4.3.1 Detection Techniques
Bolton and Hand (2002) applied critical thinking to the industrial field of fraud and
financial crime, the result of which was a definitive work that outlines the systematic
approaches undertaken to detect anomalous activity specific to fraud within transac-
tional data feeds. The methods discussed centred around two distinctive approaches:
supervised and unsupervised.
Supervised methods generally confine themselves to the forensic element of detec-
tion. This means that, in order to be effective, a seeded data set of both positive and
negative events needs to be provided to the engine in order to determine with any de-
gree of certainty that fraudulent activity is potentially occurring in the rest of the data
space. The mainstay idea being primarily that, with a set of known bads, it is feasible to
mine a given set of data for characteristics that correlate with the behaviours observed
in the set of known bads (Bolton and Hand, 2002). A known bad is a data indicator
provided in data set with is a provable example of a fraudulent behaviour.
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With that information it then becomes possible to instantiate what-if scenarios or
predicate decision trees and other methods like Naive Bayesian, FOIL and RIPPER in
order to effectively create a controlled means of scoring the data set and solve for a
portion of the data that could be indicative of dubious behaviour.
Further to this analysis it would then be feasible according to Bolton and Hand
(2002) that some form of link-based analysis could then be performed to create a net-
work of individual customers from the data set based on linking rules. These linking
rules would highlight how clients are linked through fiscal interaction and could be
statistically shown to have a potential role in a fraud like scheme. Using such net-
works allows a statistician a means of binding risk biases on individual customers and
their networks to show propensity for criminal intent and highlight the need for further
investigation.
Unsupervised methods were the next evolution that the same group examined by
Bolton and Hand (2001). Here they noted that charge off1 risk and loss in fraud are
highly correlated. Further, without some form of manual investigation by a human in-
vestigator at an institutions investigation unit, it would be very difficult to distinguish
between the two. Thus the need became apparent for an unsupervised approach that es-
caped the bindings of traditional supervised approaches in detection and instead relied
on mathematics and compute engines to highlight the delta between typologies.
Anomaly detection, they argue, was the natural plug that filled the void left by the su-
pervised methods. This allowed analysts to create customer-based profiles that charted
behaviour characteristics to establish norms for a given customer. Thus, using statis-
tical distance formulae, etc. finding deviations from that norm became indicative of
potential loss events and most certainly worthy of further investigation. Progressing
beyond this allows institutions to garner some agility to deal with a loss event to halt
replication of that behaviour in other customers thus closing the loop on a specific
fraud scheme.
1A charge-off is a debt, for example on a credit card, that is deemed unlikely to be collected by the
creditor because the borrower has become substantially delinquent after a period of time.
4.3. Financial Security System Specifications 53
Expanding from basic anomaly detection allows for further areas of detection. Ex-
amining the areas of text mining, Benford analysis and clustering allow for the capture
of different types of loss events along the lines of temporal analysis, group behaviours
and structured and unstructured analysis of the data feeds. These techniques allow for
means of looking for deviations where the fraudsters is more premeditated in intent
and not foiled by velocity, i.e. showing non-suspicious behaviours for a long period
before entering into a short period of criminal activity before vanishing.
With these techniques, segmentation analysis and clustering become useful for di-
viding and grouping the customer population into sets of similar entities where ob-
servations regarding the set can show nuances on the standard deviation for detection
anomalies. Furthermore, with text mining new data sources become available as the the
traditional transaction feed can be aggregated with log information from devices, logs
and other sources. With a Bayesian approach you add updates from a trained model
thus providing a bridging mechanism that evolves beyond more simplistic modeling
mechanisms to push a detection engine into a more predictive system. Predictive de-
tection technology methods allow an institution further means of stopping fraud events
from occurring in real-time versus retroactive analysis.
In their work Bolton and Hand give us an academic appreciation for what tradi-
tionally was determined to be an industrial problem. They examine the mathematical
methods involved in the application and posit the applications of the approaches in the
field. They garner what works well in isolation versus what thrives under a bridged
approach that combines both supervised and unsupervised elements. Thus their work
allows us to get an appreciation for the techniques and a more complete understand-
ing of the fundamentals behind the applications and see into the murky depths of the
problems they are trying to solve for.
The methods discussed truly seem applicable to different fraud or anti-money laun-
dering problems but at that time they did not delve into the application of artificial
intelligence as a combined approach. The reason for this was that sufficient train-
ing data to highlight anomalous activity at the time of their investigation into the area
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without the need for a more comprehensive model using neural networks as the prob-
lem was deigned solved using less advanced techniques. As criminal schemes have
evolved artificial intelligence capabilities used in an ensemble model approach have
become more common-place.
Building on the work of Bolton and Hand, Otey et al. (2006) focused on the unsu-
pervised approaches in which an unsupervised anomaly detection model is based on
distances and density of events. The core behind the idea is to apply detection analytics
to a local environment with a smaller data set and then productionalize it globally fol-
lowing a strong round of stress testing to prove reliability and robustness of the model
when distributed and scaled to a large dataset.
Further, Otey focuses extensively on the composition of the data itself. The hetero-
geneous mixture of data necessary to capture suspicious events successfully is noted.
Otey highlighted that production system datasets from the detection engines include
attributes that either are continuous or categorical. Otey et al. (2006) states that cat-
egorical or nominal attributes may take on a relatively small number of values, and
these values have only a partial ordering, if any at all. Whereas, continuous attributes
have values that are usually numeric and have a total ordering. They argue that many
techniques for outlier detection assume that the attributes in the data set are either all
continuous or all categorical rather that mixed. This highlights the need in industry for
augmented datasets that address not just the transactional perspective of the customer
but ideally to further decorate customer records with enhanced data attributes such as
external data like watch lists in order to improve the detection process.
During the process of exploring the treatment of attributes, the data is generally
categorized into one of the two variable types. The allocation further implies the po-
tential existence of concept drift where a target variable in the data set changes over
time in unforeseen ways as the result of predictor behaviour losing accuracy over time.
Another concern was also raised for both models in that density-based models tend to
compute at a slower pace due to the computational intensity of the calculations and that
the distance based models tend to be more linear in nature. A density-based approach
to outlier detection as discussed by Breunig et al. (2000) involves a local outlier factor
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(LOF) is computed for each point. Otey et al. (2006) notes that the LOF of a point is
based on the ratios of the local density of the area around the point and the local den-
sities of its neighbours. Further, the size of a neighbourhood of a point is determined
by the area containing a user-supplied minimum number of points.
Otey et al. (2006) shows how these type of models scale if a model that contains
a transactional or time-dependent structure is examined. Given the nature of modern
data capture around financial crime, this work shows explicitly the importance of data
characteristics and model performance over time. It highlights also the impact of model
degradation on the effectiveness of the detection rate. The logical conclusion is that for
a given model there is a limited lifetime expectancy for an acceptable rate of anomaly
detection and beyond that, model degradation advances swiftly.
More recently, another examination of the state of the art by Ngai et al. (2011) high-
lights the difficulties in expanding the state of the art in this space. It builds on the
methods discussed by Bolton and Hand (2002) and Otey et al. (2006) and observes
which techniques have been adopted by industry for financial-crime related anomaly
detection. Ngai et al. (2011) also provides a comprehensive overview of the bank-
ing and security fraud. Realistically though, the consequential insight from this work
comes in the form of the barriers the authors faced in the attempts to enhance tradi-
tional approaches to solving for criminal intent.
Ngai et al. (2011) noted that the availability of data pertinent to fraud detection is
a major stumbling block for advancing the science. This can be directly attributed
to what financial institutions consider to be market risk on their carefully managed
public perception. Financial institutions are always concerned about customer loyalty
and what could initiate a customer churn event where they conclude all business with
the bank so this impacts the ability of compliance departments to legitimately exit a
client. Further, the perception of criminal organizations on what institution represents
the weakest of the herd is sometimes measured by the deterrence mechanisms each
bank utilizes and which one is lagging in terms of technology.
56 4. Financial Crime Detection Technologies
Thus, industry is highly resistant to sharing data with academia and has stymied the
efforts to enhance and improve existing methods and models dedicated to this space.
Ngai et al. (2011) is a departure from work like Phua et al. (2005) where the focus is
on the core themes of supervised and unsupervised approaches. Extrapolating from
the works of previous research into the area they posit that in the case of supervised
learning, it is suggested to avoid using rule-based predicate trees or nearest neighbour-
based matching mechanics unless the data is seeded with a large number of positive
cases.
Further, a degree of concern was raised in methods used in the unsupervised space.
Typically the implications of utilizing model-based approaches mean time has to be
dedicated to training the model, time which given the potential lifetime of a model
may or may not provide a significant return in investment. Instead, the idea around
utilization of a two stage classifier system is suggested: One phase, which scores based
on randomly drawn positive and negative entities within the dataset and a second phase
then average scores the entity and its neighbours to reduce false positives. The first
approach really is a sampling approach utilizing seeds to bias the score of a particular
population which it observes over the complete segment. The second looks at the
individual and the insights the system already has to calculate a propensity likelihood
that the individual is fraudulent in comparison to a much small cluster of statistically
similar individuals.
Extrapolating from this work, we can gather that models are consuming either from
an I/O (data management/movement) perspective or on the computational side in the
form of analytical processing. This raises questions on where to better focus for a res-
olution, either on the data side through better data scalability and a reduction in the
functional movement of data elements or to improve accessibility to the data space
through some form of in-memory capability that is capable of distributing the compu-
tational processes.
Garnering from these insights collectively, the concern of scalability, performance
and degradation of modelling based techniques applied to this space is raised. One
notes only one specific absence within the cycle that is the application of stepwise
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regression within the space. This is discussed at length by Foster and Stine (2004)
where they discuss the utilization of the technique to solve for a specific problem in
industry. This paper shows the power of applying analytics to the complete life cycle
of an industrial issue and seeing what came to light when utilizing models over the
lifetime of the data.
What comes to light is evidence that shows that, had statistical techniques been
applied at the start of the process, there was a correlation which showed bankruptcy
could be predicted. This really enforces the most important outcome of both spaces
the need for a scalable means that can predict loss events without the need for multiple
instances of a loss type occurring. Seeded bads and rules utilized in supervision can
in isolation protect institutions. However it is our opinion that only with an ensemble
approach mix of both methodologies can we successfully ensure a modicum of security
across the dataset under examination and have the certainty that predictive measures
with adequate scrutiny can indeed model and show potential fraud anomalies.
4.3.1.1 Link Analysis
Diving deeper into the realm of link analysis we can trace the origin of the techniques
application in this space to work conducted by Goldberg and Senator (1995). That
work examines the application of link-based analytics in the area of entity resolution.
This is effectively where separate silos of data are compared using known attribute
links to score the likelihood of similarity between two distinct entities. The classic
example here is the determination in financial institutions where it is statistically likely
that an individual named in one account is the same individual named in another.
The primary application in Goldberg's work is applied to FinCEN (Financial Crime
Enforcement Net) data which focuses around AML data and entity resolution for the
purposes of identifying suspect money launderers and their activities in a series of
different institutions. By being able to create link-based scores on the networks them-
selves Goldberg is quickly able to posit a high correlation in determining that a criminal
is engaging in illicit activity in a number of banks.
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Continuing in the same vein, Goldberg continued to apply link analysis years later
(Goldberg and Wong, 1998), again on FinCEN data. The variance between this and
the original work was the use of temporal characteristics on the link analysis network
and applying their transactional reduce technique for network score refinement. This is
interesting as it shows score behaviours adjusting over time as new node entities join,
change or leave the link network.
Kubica et al. (2002) take the method and push it into the predictive space. Here they
start adding predictive behaviour to the link analysis when determining the next likely
link that will be added to the network. Extrapolating from this they are effectively
stating that they are able to statistically predict within their experiments that certain
data elements within that dataset will, over time, attain a link to the network. This
effectively becomes a function of transactional behaviour that can be validated.
Where this specifically can be interesting is through observation of initial charac-
teristics of the dataset in the purposes of fraud detection. Assuming a known set of
behaviours or known fraud schemes seeded within the model it should then, with pre-
dictive capabilities, be feasible to apply this to extended data sets to posit potential
fraudsters within the data.
With their work Kubica create fuzzy or soft links to show the relationships between
entities but it was not really until the work of Xu and Chen (2003) that this work was
combined with path algorithms to truly evolve the technique into a fraud detection
method.
In their work Xu and Chen utilized the shortest path algorithm to find the minimum
distances between two nodes based on given criteria. This allowed the model to isolate
and focus on the key player in a fraud ring over time. This enabled them to quickly
identify contexts where a group was working together to purposely defraud an insti-
tution and score the network thus. Using a path algorithm allowed them to vary links
and nodes in such a way that the central individual in that crime ring was displayed in
a hub and spoke type evolution of the link analysis graph of the dataset.
4.3. Financial Security System Specifications 59
Following up on this further improvements to the method were made (Xu and Chen,
2005) by contrasting three core approaches to the link analysis method. They di-
vide these into generations where the first generation effectively was a manually-based
method of link analysis through the dataset itself.
They posit the second generation as being a graph-based application that comple-
ments the first generation such that a network visualization is formed.
In the third generation of the approach they add relational analysis to the network.
This is based on node-based concepts of degree, betweenness and closeness. This
allowed them to look at the dataset and create node clusters and adapt key decision
scores around where a given node sat in the relationship tree and if it exhibited one of
the characteristics noted above. This creates link biases to prioritize a link to a node
given multiple links to the same node in the tree.
An example of this would be to consider all the actors interacting in a new home
purchase scenario. Actors would include buyers, sellers, relationship managers, bank
managers, lawyers, developers, realtors as an example. Several of these actors would
have repeat interactions over the course of time on different homes. Others would be
far more infrequent actors to the chain as the purchase of a new home should be an
infrequent event. Thus, we can consider the links between actors that often pursue
this type of scenario like realtors, bank personnel and developers to be close but their
relationship to buyers and sellers more distant. This would be reflective of the third
generation of the network.
They then created a series of attributes through the use of a position analysis-based
approach with this generation which allowed them to score the position of the node in
the network. The difference to the previous approach is that if a node had a number of
different links each link was scored the same but the subset is scored in importance to
other nodes and their subsequent analysis links in the network.
60 4. Financial Crime Detection Technologies
The natural evolution from both of these techniques was a hierarchical clustering
of the link analysis network. This meant that, for the relational approach, clustering
created subgroups or subnets on the original network deigned to be of statistical in-
terest. Clustering allows the user to determine similarity between nodes, which is an
enhanced form of entity resolution. This work thus imparts a very important division
of application within the link analysis.
Depending on the context of observation you can utilize either Xu and Chen (2003)
or Xu and Chen (2005) but Xu and Chen (2003) appears better for determining fraud
type behaviours while the Xu and Chen (2005) appears better in the context of entity
resolution or perhaps in noting statistical similarity between node clusters.
Other work around the same time includes Getoor and Diehl (2005) which looks at
other interesting techniques that could be applied in this domain. This examines con-
cepts like link-based object ranking in order to display centrality for a given network.
This also allows for the assignment of scores for entities and network solely based on
data and linkages but does so at a more granular level of detail.
They next discuss object clustering (group detection) and object identification (en-
tity resolution) like the previously discussed work of Xu and Chen, where clusters of
data of similar characteristics can be determined and visualized in the dataset. Filter-
ing approaches for the network are discussed where subgraph discovery, using AGM
(Apriori based algorithm1) to induces in the data as well as applying some other form
of group classification mechanism.
This is an extension of graphing-based methods to classify a network and further re-
duce it for various means. Significant research into the generative models for a range of
graph and dependency types have been researched around the social network analysis
theme. Getoor and Diehl (2005) notes specifically that for directed graphs with a sin-
gle object and link type, there are several major classes of random graph distributions.
Primarily, it appears to be most useful in reducing false positive matches within the
1Apriori is an algorithm for looks at the frequency of items for set mining and association rule
learning over transactional databases.
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network and refining the overall network in terms of fraud applications to determine a
high propensity for a fraud scheme match.
All these techniques and the evolution of the approach into graphical visualizations
made it very evident that there was a big problem with super clusters. This is where
every entity has some form of link between them and determining suspicious activity
becomes highly improbable. Thus, work like Yang et al. (2006) becomes interesting to
determine how we can refine a super cluster into usable groups within it.
Here they apply a Spring Embedder Algorithm (Eades, 1984) to the network to
improve the aesthetic qualities of the graph. This is a method of reducing network
complexity based purely on data structure without the necessity of problem domain
knowledge and is also known as force-directed graph drawing. The procedure effec-
tively creates a subgroup of the underlying network to show simpler networks for high
score sub-graphs. By applying domain knowledge to further refine this sub network
we can hunt more effectively in this network graph window for suspect entities.
They also explore the concept of changing the overlay of the node layout on the
graph for optimizing detection of suspicious entities by the human investigator. To do
so they use different views on the graphical network diagram like fish eye and fractal
views. This allows the investigator to enlarge regions of interest within the network
for study and exploration while diminishing the rest of the network for the scope of
view. This technique allows the investigator to improve clarity of the network and the
cleanliness of the link analysis outcome.
In most investigation units trying to solve for financial crime problems they seek to
have a marriage between techniques like Xu and Chen (2005) and Yang et al. (2006)
in order to ensure that investigators are examining higher value networks that are com-
prehensible, rather than looking at noisy networks that are more like super clusters.
4.3.1.2 Text Analytics
Delving into the world of text analytics allows us a means of data mining information
sources for curious patterns. Patterns that are not immediately apparent to the human
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eye but come to light through analytical investigation and the use of technology are
particularly relevant in the realm of fraud detection.
When we examine earlier work in this area like Rosset et al. (1999) where they
look to determine new means of optimizing and operationalizing rules in the telecom-
munication context, we see that text mining is a method of search that consumes and
analyses data for user determined characteristics and acts within a specific binding
scope.
In contrast to the normal use of the Greedy Algorithm where the rule selection
always takes the best immediate, or local, solution while finding an answer (Black,
2005), in the work of Rosset et al. (1999) we see the use of non-greedy rule selection
where optimization efforts are applied to create a more robust selection process. This
theoretically allows for more in-depth analysis of text streams to allow for classifica-
tion prioritization to be applied on taxonomies that map to financial crime patterns,
What they effectively do is stratify rule selection for different tiers (prioritizations)
such that they have high specificity and sensitivity at the customer (case) level. Fur-
ther, they then ensure that they have high coverage of true fraud alerts at the behaviour
level. Thus by creating strata for classification of rules and data patterns they are in
a position to compute accuracy and coverage indices to serve as benchmarks for the
effectiveness of the fraud rule detection strategy.
Bolton and Hand (2001) utilize a similar technique for the purposes of segmentation
of the customer base from the transactional information. With these separate, yet in-
trinsically linked, streams due to the commonality of data elements in both, Bolton and
Hand are rapidly able to create clusters based on behavioural characteristics of both the
customer set and transactions.
With these clusters they then seek out outlier transactions and compare them against
the customer cluster for risk score evaluation, thereby stratifying the customer base into
risk clusters such that they can be targeting with specific models and rules for fraud
identification. A good example to consider is the concept of employment type risk
scoring. One could argue that some professions are of higher risk than others and then
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further evolve the taxonomy with other indicators to improve the risk clustering further.
Example professions would include professions like realtors, lawyers and accountants
in high risk jurisdictions.
By using analytics in this fashion against the data sets Bolton and Hand are able to
ensure better scalability in applying models to what are traditionally static and dynamic
data sets, while ensuring justifiable outcomes which are indicative of loss at the nexus
of both streams.
Kim et al. (2003) examine and propose an expansion to the breadth of the search
capabilities in order to expand upon the customer profiling abilities by increasing the
number of dimensions considered. They do so from an algorithmic perspective by uti-
lizing a Support Vector Machine (SVM) ensemble. SVM is defined as a supervised
machine learning algorithm used for classification and regression analysis. It works
well in the financial crime context due to the quantity of structured labelled data avail-
able to the financial entity trying to find criminal behaviour patterns in their data.
Extrapolating from this paper we can envision this technique being utilized to aug-
ment traditional static perspectives of the customer or fraud schema with characteristics
from a modelling perspective. This would show annotative clustering of that customer
segment and where this customer sits in that regard from a risk perspective. This
would be of significant value for investigative purposes and is a unique contribution of
the method.
The theme of using stepwise regression in some form to augment our understanding
of customer behaviours is further explored by Foster and Stine (2001). In this work,
using data mining techniques, the authors attempt to create a predictive model for
bankruptcy. In this case we are interested as bankruptcy predictors can also be similar
from a risk indicator perspective to fraud, as many fraud schemes follow a similar
pattern. An example of frauds related to this area would be cheque kiting. Cheque
kiting is a form of fraud, involving taking advantage of the float to make use of non-
existent funds in a checking or other bank account.
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One area Foster and Stine (2001) highlights though is that validation of the model
given the dynamic nature of the data can be difficult. Work like Fan (2004) explores
this area in depth. It posits that in the case of unknown data sufficiency and concept
drift, the use of a cross validation decision tree supervised method helps to reduce the
false positive rate for detection.
As both temporal data elements and fraudulent behaviours are in a constant state of
flux, mining the temporal data becomes burdensome and computationally difficult. As
such, Fan (2004) promotes a means for pattern recognition that utilizes the cross vali-
dation decision tree algorithm to reduce dependencies of past events and to minimize
the impact of stale data on the scoring mechanics.
What this effectively means is that the method continuously evaluates the effective-
ness of a particular risk bias on a score. Its logic determines that if the bias is weighted
by stale data elements, it biases that rule towards lower prioritization in the isolation
of fraud events.
4.3.1.3 Neural Networks
The use of different aspects of artificial intelligence methods has also penetrated the
domain of fraud detection. Ghosh and Reilly (1994) present an introductory use of
the neural networks applied to fraud where they utilize the approach for credit card
contexts. Their approach is to utilize a more supervised approach using P-RCE neural
networks. A P-RCE neural network is a radial basis function which was developed for
use in pattern recognition systems. In modelling, a radial basis function network is an
artificial neural network that uses the functions as activation functions for the network.
The output of the network is a linear combination of radial basis functions of the inputs
and neuron parameters. Radial basis function networks have many uses beyond the
pattern recognition use case discussed by Ghosh and Reilly (1994), including function
approximation, time series prediction, classification, all of which are recurring areas
of interest within the financial crime domain.
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The authors describe their P-RCE neural networks as being a three-layer, feed for-
ward network following the established pattern of other radial basis functions. They
distinguish it from its peers through the fact that it only requires two training passes
through a data set rather than other approaches which use significantly more training.
They apply the neural network to NRI (non-receipt of issue) fraud which is a spe-
cific fraud scheme targeting credit cards. They also utilize it in risk assessment and
mortgage assessment issues on determining potential loss patterns. The paper shows
a 20-40% loss reduction from fraud losses and operational efficiency gains compara-
tively to other traditional approaches.
Further work using neural networks in card fraud detection was investigated by
Brause et al. (1999). Here they evaluated success criteria for a given model and the
likely propensity of fraud occurrences across the breadth of financial activity. As the
likelihood for an event to occur is statistically so low in their opinion, it garners the
need for almost perfect capabilities to detect a potential loss event on a given instance.
Their approach is to use a more context-based approach and to use a 4-layer neural
network. This is to allow them to incorporate domain knowledge in order to instantiate
do not care variables from transactional data and use the neural networks to then seek
out patterns in the transactions from the tweaked data set.
Syeda et al. (2002) seek granularity in the approach and their work focuses on a
more granular type of neural network. Here the primary driver is based on building
better efficiencies based on insights from the training data but the method proposed
also pushes computational complexity to a 5-layer tactic which is differently from
previously discussed approaches like Ghosh and Reilly (1994).
With parallel processing for lowering training time they are able to garner some op-
erational efficiencies from the technique. They focus their efforts at combining trans-
actional data from various channels in order to get better prediction outcomes as well
as to reduce the probability of model training induced errors. They succeed in this goal
and as a result are able to have a considerable impact on fraud detection rates within
the data.
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Training and the data it requires is a popular concern as shown by Barse et al. (2003).
The delta here between their approach and that of their predecessors is to utilize syn-
thetic data to train the neural network rather than to utilize traditional seeded data sets.
The synthetic data in this case is generated on the audit trail or authentication data
from the cards transactions, rather than just looking at posted transactions. This means
far more potential fraud detection as the training capability broadens the event focus
away from traditional fraud characteristics and into areas which would show tester
authentications and other interesting validators.
Srivastava et al. (2008) attempts to broaden the scope of neural networks within the
fraud domain. Here they do so by utilizing a hidden Markov model on the credit card
training data associated with the potential loss events. As per the norm the network
needs to be first trained with normalized behaviour for a given segment of cardholders.
They then use this knowledge and apply it in deciding the value of observation
symbols and some initial parameters for the model. The model therefore is able to
discern and predict a potential loss event based on deviations from what it considers
to be normalized behaviour for a given card-holder. If the behaviour is not consistent
with the observations it has made, the model logic dictates that this is evidence of fraud
and escalates the risk correlation score accordingly. The authors claim to have high
scalability but due to the nature of human transaction profiles for any card portfolio it
also could incur massive levels of false positive matches as it can not predict human
behaviour with complete accuracy.
Contrasting the methods discussed above we can note how the current state of the
art evolved to use more training data sets in order to fine tune detection models. The
breadth of the data also grew to include non-traditional elements like Barse et al. (2003)
introduces. Each tweak to the neural networking approach successfully improved fraud
loss avoidance and allows financial institutions a more statistically driven mechanism
to react faster to fraud schemes and thus become less reactionary in nature.
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4.3.1.4 Bayesian Networks
In probabilistic graphical models, Bayesian network theorems help to explicitly ex-
press the cause-and-effect among variables in graphical structure and its applications.
This has led to significant research attention to the technique. In the realm of financial
crime, the Bayesian network model can be used to discover complex hidden relation-
ships between entities. However, it has been argued in research papers that a Bayesian
network can be counter-productive in both training time as well as accuracy in predic-
tion if not tailored for specific data structure as a majority of the Bayesian models are
constructed to fit the database.
Ezawa et al. (1996) created the goal-oriented K2 algorithm with the purpose of pre-
dicting collections-related risks1 in a telecommunication risk dataset based on APRI,
a supervised Bayesian network model. The proposed systems modify the Bayesian
network by introducing a class node for prediction, which provides a tailored model
specific for this problem . In short, each variable expects to have effect on the class
variable and aggregation of variables would further constitute significant impact on
classification accuracy.
As part of the empirical outcome, the group demonstrated that the proposed algo-
rithm can be effective to more accurately solve unbalanced binary classification ques-
tions. Thereby providing lift when applied to collection problems in telecommunica-
tion risk data. This risk data is what is traditionally used to find payment concerns
within the customer base and provides direct links to fraudulent use cases.
Maes et al. (1993) applied a Bayesian type network model in a credit card fraud
experiment aiming to characterize and to identify strength and weakness with STAGE
Bayesian network approach. By comparing with the neural network, the Bayesian
network training time is relatively shorter, but longer when applying to new problem
domains outside of the provided example. True positive rate is higher compared to
the neural network, but they noted that the false positive rate is also higher. As dis-
cussed by the group, a further enhanced Bayesian network approach to financial crime
1Collections is a process that financial institutions utilize to recoup assets from clients that are in a
deviant account status for financial or fraudulent reasons.
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is suggested in which the necessity of incorporating both continuous variables and a
structure-learning mechanism based on dependency analysis should be considered.
Borsuk et al. (2004) proposed the concept of applying Bayesian network to visu-
alize and understand relationships that are often ignored or overlooked. Simplicity
is among the key factors that were discussed. Based on the heuristic knowledge, the
complexity of the Bayesian network can be reduced by trimming the number of nodes.
Subsequently, a fictitious network mirroring the real-world scenario can be created.
By constructing the simplified version of the underlying scenario, the requisite time
for integrating with other models can be reduced. This can be an effective strategy to
winnow down complex fraud schemes into more consumable elements and allow for
validation using other techniques.
Viaene et al. (2002) demonstrated the use of AdaBoosted naive Bayes scoring which
provides the advantage of boosting and the flexibility of heuristic knowledge inte-
gration for the model. AdaBoosted naive Bayes scoring combines the use of naive
Bayesian classifiers with tree structures in order to achieve significantly lower average
error than both the naive Bayesian classifier and boosting the naive Bayesian classifier
itself. Ting and Zheng (2003) subsequently develop a method of successfully applying
the boosting technique to naive Bayesian classification. The weight for each elemen-
tary node can be aggregated and used to create the risk scores which further improve
the pattern recognition found in the positive data. The model can be used to support op-
erational investigative discovery by assisting the domain experts performing sensitivity
analysis and running what-if scenarios.
Bayesian networks have been used in various financial crime detection frameworks
to observe previously indeterminable patterns like unknown cause-and-effect relation-
ships using probabilistic modelling. In one attempt to depict advantages of Bayesian
networks and graphical models, Kubat et al. (1997) argued that in the case of rarity
of positive data, the accuracy of a Bayesian network model might be impacted signifi-
cantly. This is a challenge faced in compliance-related financial crime as an institution
often obtains few true positives to compare against due to regulatory restrictions on
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responding to suspicious transaction reports. To date regulators decline to provide in-
formation back to financial institutions on whether the regulatory report filed led to a
criminal charge or not.
4.3.1.5 Positive and Negative Match
In empirical science, systems and models are built based on the results of experiment.
Traditionally, both supervised and unsupervised algorithms are developed with the pre-
sumption both positive and negative data are distributed with relative similarity in pop-
ulation where the probability of sampling positive data is comparable to the negative.
However, in the financial crime domain, the positive data often contributes approxi-
mately 0.1% to the overall population. In such an extreme environment where positive
data is more infrequent than negative data, many of the established and mature mod-
eling techniques are being challenged in terms of whether these models can properly
adapt to the imbalanced structure of data.
In addition, in the real-world, imperfection of the data creates additional burdens to
achieve theoretical expectation in both performances and accuracy for various models.
It is important to consider the data environment prior to deciding which types of model
to apply and ensuring high adaptivity of that model to the target specific domain prob-
lem. Various research groups have contributed and focused on the topics of sampling
and models enhancement while factoring rarity of positive data as a main challenge in
the process of data analytics and predictive analysis.
A framework summary was published by Weiss (2004) to illustrate several method-
ology issues, such as improper evaluation metrics, lack of data, data fragmentation, in-
ductive bias and noise as the toughest challenges to surmount in the application of data
analytics. Weiss also proposes several methods for addressing rarity such as improv-
ing evaluation metrics, applying non-greedy search technique, incorporating heuristic
knowledge, etc. They define rarity as ideally being defined with respect to the under-
lying distribution for a given dataset. The framework provides an overall picture of
techniques that could be applicable. In financial crime, the institution faces challenges
as the result of absolute rarity and imbalanced weighting heavily biased to the rarity.
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The relevance of this becomes important when one starts considering the daunting task
of identifying rare pieces of data which could point to elements of terrorist financing
or client risk data attributes that previously were not mined by the analysts responsible
for compliance.
As mentioned previously, the imprecise environment of a real-world scenario results
in challenges for operational conditions which further degrades the performance of the
model. Provost and Fawcett (2001) present a robust classification model - Receiver
Operating Characteristic convex hull (ROCCH) that seeks to minimize the uncertainty
caused by the imprecise real-world environment as well as improving the efficiency,
scalability, and ease of management. The ROCCH is a hybrid approach by integrat-
ing decision analysis with ROC analysis and further optimizing the AUC (area under
curve/C-Statistic) by selecting the best fit classifiers.
Several approaches have been discussed and developed over the years to address the
imbalanced dataset in various scenario. Several research groups published approaches
utilizing over-sampling, under-sampling, one-side-sampling, etc. One model that has
attracted significant discussion is SMOTE, Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Tech-
nique discussed by Bowyer et al. (2011). In short, the group demonstrates SMOTE
can be used to improve the AUC in ROC space by forming a new minority group as
the result of interpolating between minority classes.
The new data samples are synthetically fabricated by applying noise to the minor-
ity group hence improving the accuracy by avoiding the over fitting normally as the
outcome of traditional oversampling techniques.
Building on the SMOTE algorithm, Batista et al. (2005) proposed that by integrating
SMOTE with Tomek link1, or ENN2, the overall accuracy can be improved based on
multiple empirical outcomes where these techniques score the highest AUC among
1Tomek links remove unwanted overlap between classes where majority class links are removed
until all minimally distanced nearest neighbour pairs are of the same class.
2Wilson’s Edited Nearest Neighbour Rule which classifies an input sample by assigning it to the
class of the majority of its k closest prototypes
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other under-sampling and oversampling techniques. One note worth mentioning is that
the experimental data elements are selected in order to capture imbalanced datasets.
A fresh view on the problem in Liu et al. (2009) discusses an under sampling tech-
nique. To compensate the inaccuracy caused by the imbalanced dataset, the group pro-
poses two approaches, EssayEnsemble and BalanceCascade. Essentially, to counter
the exclusion of potentially useful data by under sampling, the idea is to randomly
break down the negative data into smaller sizes and construct classifiers with the pos-
itive data. Liu defines that EasyEnsemble samples several subsets from the majority
class, trains a learner using each of them, and combines the outputs of those learners.
In contrast, the BalanceCascade removes the negative data used once classified and
repeats the training process.
In the financial crime space, rarity and imprecise environment have been deemed to
be of the most crucial and obstructive challenges in applying advanced data analytics.
Training data size, class prior, cost of errors, and placement of decision are key cri-
teria in phases of system variables determination and model selection, as pointed out
by Breiman (1996). The arbitrage characteristic of ROCCH model can be used to re-
duce the impact when interpolating new classifiers as well as honing the performance
efficiency to reduce the operation management involvement. SMOTE and its child
methods, SMOTE-KNN and SMOTE-Tomek, and under sampling ensemble methods,
EssayEnsemble and BalanceCascade, show that they can successfully provide detec-
tion improvements in financial crime systems.
4.4 Financial Crime Model Examples
As we have already ascertained there are numerous types of detection problems
within the financial crime domain. To crystallize the value of document driven speci-
fications for this space it is important to understand some of the complexity associated
with the space by examining some examples which attempt to solve (through code)
several areas of concern.
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4.4.1 Name Recognition in Financial Crime Applications
Name matching is an important part of anti-money laundering activity where it is
incumbent on financial institutions to examine their client bases to identify potential
links to terrorism, human trafficking, drugs etc. There are a series of generated data sets
that several regulators generate to target specific individuals around the globe and it is
subsequently illegal to bank these individuals or their associates, such as the sample
data used in Figure 4.1 for illustrating the approach. Any banking entity as a result
is forced to scan their client lists looking for said individuals, links to them or places
where they potential are acting as ultimate beneficial owners of accounts.
The following method using the SAS modelling language (Barr and Goodnight,
1976) takes advantage of two core procedures to conduct the name matching function
(Russell, 2018). In this case they simplify the problem for illustration purposes against
a series of simple data elements but this approach scales to solve for fuzzy matching
in larger more appropriate data sets also.
The first function, SOUNDEX in Figure 4.2, is a realization of the algorithm used
within the SAS language to identify phonetic elements in English names. Apache
(2018) is a project that provides similar algorithms to SOUNDEX but these algorithms
provide support for other languages phonetically. This is a complex issue as some
languages are more tonal and the impact on the algorithms can be severe for phonetic
matching.
The second major function, COMPGED, returns the generalized edit distance be-
tween two strings according to Barr and Goodnight (1976). This code looks at the
Levenshtein edit distance which examines strings and provides a score on how dissim-
ilar they are to each other. It operates by breaking each string into its specific character
components and examining the number of operations required to transform the second
string to match the first.
The example above provides a simple perspective on the name matching problem
using names like the ones observed in Figure 4.1. The increased complexity occurs
when you consider the multidimensionality of financial data and start to include other
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Figure 4.1: Name Recognition Example
/* Sample data that contains names and the class being taken *
/
data class;












/* Data set that contains the name and the grade for the class
*/
data grade;
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do i=1 to nobs;
set grade(rename=(fname=fname2)) point=i nobs=nobs;
tmp2=soundex(fname2);
dif=compged(tmp1,tmp2);
if dif<=50 then do;
possible_match=’Yes’;






pertinent fields like phone numbers, addresses, known associates, countries, email ad-
dresses etc. Further, there are other considerations surrounding language and character
sets to further complicate matters. This is exactly why a comprehensive perspective is
necessary in order to ensure that all fields are being consumed and scored appropriately
and where formal methods specifically can add a lot of value.
4.4.2 A Neural Networking Fraud Detection Example
Earlier in the chapter, Section 4.3.1.3, we introduced neural networks as a central
element for techniques to solve for financial crime. Neural networks are used to detect
a variety of complex financial crime patterns as evidenced by Phua et al. (2005). The
method is most useful when dealing with large volumes of data and a diverse popula-
tion where multiple observations are necessary to identify suspicious behaviours.
The ability to identify these behaviours requires information where true positives
indicate the presence of the crime of interest. These indicators included information
like common phone numbers, emails etc. used in multiple crimes where a scheme was
detected. Often however these schemes are determined after the fact hence the need
to have a system in place which helps financial crime analysts identify the crime more
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Figure 4.3: Neural Networks Example Step 1
/* Step 1. */
libname mylasr sasiola host="fraud.example.com" port=10010 tag
=’hps’;
%let base = https://www.kaggle.com/ntnu-testimon/paysim1;
data mylasr.fraudbase;
infile "&base/fraudbase/fraudbase.data" device=url dsd dlm=’,’
;
input step type amount nameOrig oldbalanceOrg newbalanceOrig
nameDest oldbalanceDest newbalanceDest isFraud
isFlaggedFraud Cap_Avg Cap_Long Cap_Total Class;
run;
proc imstat;
swiftly and halt the loss of capital from the accounts at risk. The training data sets used
generally provide over a years worth of data inclusive of both good and bad actors.
To illustrate the method the following example illustrates the training of a model
using a publicly available dataset based on the work detailed by Lopez-Rojas et al.
(2016). The example is modelled in this case for a fraud context based on the dataset
created by Lopez-Rojas et al. (2016) using SAS modelling code (Barr and Goodnight,
1976). This approach targets the SAS LASR facility for in-memory analytics across
multiple processors. The idea behind that is because fraud is a time-dependent problem
the faster we can have results back the better a position we are in to counteract the affect
of a specific scam.
This code examines the data in several phases. The first phase, Figure 4.3, is a
consumption phase where the dataset is consumed into the analytical environment and
the variables are set up for usage. The data can be consumed from a variety of places:
data stores, a URL, flat files etc.
The next phase, Figure 4.4, is to pre-train several ’shallow’ neural networks starting
from different points in the data set. This helps avoid creating a neural network that is
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Figure 4.4: Neural Networks Example Step 2
/* Step 2.
table mylasr.train;
where part <= .75;
NEURAL class/ seed=12345 details temptable
/*input */ input=(make--cap_total) std=std
/*target*/ targetact=softmax targetcomb=linear error=entropy
nominal=class
/*hidden*/ hiddens=(10) act=(logistic) combine=(linear)
/*prelim*/ numtries=5 maxiter=10 tech=congra
/*NLOP */ maxfunc=1000000 linesearch=2 fconv=1e-4 lower=-20
upper=20;
run;
ineffective due to poor initial values seeded within the dataset. An ineffective network
reduces the efficacy of fraud detection and negates any potential lift overall.
Building on this we next select the best neural network from the pre-trained neural
networks we just built, Figure 4.5. Using this neural network as a foundation we
attempt to train a much deeper neural network as the final model.
The ASSESS option specifies to add the predicted probabilities calculated to the
scored data for all the levels of the nominal target variable. In this example, Figure
4.6, two levels are created because the variable named class has two values, 0 or 1.
The scored data are stored in a temporary table.
Next we perform model assessment using the scoring result in order to gauge how
effective the model will be at finding fraud, Figure 4.7. The probabilities of all levels
are in output, but only the probabilities of the event level are necessary for analysis.
The WHERE clause is used to select the rows with event level only from the output.
The STRIP function is applied to remove the blanks in character variable _NN_Level_.
One of the most important parts of being able to understand whether or not a specific
model provides the necessary lift is the use of model validation. Often the most popular
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Figure 4.5: Neural Networks Example Step 3
/* Step 3. */
table mylasr.train;
where part <= .75;
NEURAL class/ seed=12345 details temptable
resume LASRANN=mylasr.&_templast_
/*input */ input=(make--cap_total) std=std
/*target*/ targetact=softmax targetcomb=linear error=entropy
nominal=class
/*hidden*/ hiddens=(10) act=(logistic) combine=(linear)
/*train */ tech=congra maxiter=50
/*NLOP */ maxfunc=1000000 linesearch=2 fconv=1e-4 lower=-20
upper=20;
run;
Figure 4.6: Neural Networks Example Step 4
/* Step 4. */
table mylasr.valid;
where part > .75;
NEURAL class / lasrANN=mylasr.&_templast_
input = (make--cap_total) nominal=class temptable assess vars
= (class);
run;
Figure 4.7: Neural Networks Example Step 5
/* Step 5. */
table mylasr.&_templast_;
where strip(_NN_Level_) eq ’1’;
assess _NN_P_/ y = class event = ’1’ nbins = 20 step = 0.05;
ods output ROCInfo=work.rocdata LiftInfo=work.liftdata;
run;
quit;
proc lasr term port=&myport;
run;
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Figure 4.8: Neural Networks Example Step 6
/* Step 6. */
proc sgplot data=liftdata;
series x = depth y = Cumlift / markers markerattrs=(symbol=
circlefilled);
series x = depth y = CumliftBest;














series x = one_minus_Specificity y = Sensitivity / lineattrs=(
color=blue);





validations are the use of lift and ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves. In
this use case we would derive these from the result of ASSESS statement used above.
Using the visualizations generated, by 4.8, we would be quickly able to assess if our
model had any tangible impact in finding fraud within the dataset by comparing its
results to the known frauds seeded in a test data set.
Given that this represents just a neural networking functional approach to looking
at a financial crime it is important to note that the effective complexity grows as you
start to consider more model features and more comprehensive data sets describing
customer interactions. As these models grow in complexity the ability to have a com-
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prehensible asset that ensures that a given model meets its intended design becomes
more necessary. Some of this void is filled by the use of developer driven commentary
but often when a model is put into production there is no guarantee that the description
is effective enough to explain nuance to a regulator or peer modeller.
Formal methods represents a significant improvement on basic comments for ex-
plaining model outputs as it provides a more effective means of highlighting all aspects
of the program’s intended definitions. Given the stringent regulations that regulators
have on the banking sector and the severe financial penalties for non-compliance we
argue that enabling the sector to have more of a document driven design approach
would be a benefit to all parties involved. This holds true only if the documentation is
maintained and is reflective of the software as it is augmented and built upon.
4.5 Analysis
Financial crime applications within the anti-money laundering domain face a very
difficult task in satisfying regulators that they provide adequate coverage in deterring
criminal activity seeking to take advantage of a financial institution. We argue that the
answer to this concern is to utilize the TFM to provide precise and readable documen-
tation suitable for both machine computation and human review.
When looking at linking formal methods to the world of financial crime specifica-
tions there are a number of concerns that immediately leap out. One immediate concern
is the management of Bayesian predictive modelling space and neural networks. We
can see a correlation on the management of training data to that of tabular expression
constructs as each record over time should generate a boolean link in terms of a if-
then-else style of construct. However the risk comes in mapping the model grouping
mechanism into clusters and how to map that network into a form that can be easily
checked. Neither Ezawa et al. (1996), Maes et al. (1993) nor Borsuk et al. (2004)
provide us with a bridging mechanism to do so. Potential biasing methods could be
inferred from Viaene et al. (2002) given the utilization of weights and scores. Regard-
less, for the scope of this research we will exclude this area as it is too far a stretch
goal from the specification logic described by Janicki and Khedri (2001).
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Positive-Negative match is a clearer mapping as we can see native matching in terms
of predicate statements between values held in an array akin to a tabular expression
format. Due to the relative comparative ease offered by a parsing function in the kernel
element offered by Bane (2008), translating fuzzing matching style mechanisms to an
array of values should be feasible. Further, the predicates map cleanly to proving
strategies and should for the most part escape overwrought complexity.
Text analytics also represents a challenge but less of a challenge in comparison to
Bayesian or Neural Networks. This is predominantly because text analytics is effec-
tively an advanced pattern recognition system for unstructured data sets like Rosset
et al. (1999) discussed. An array of indicators can be assessed from a storage array
held in tabular expression format. The specification mapped should be able to assess
incoming data streams against that specified entity list and evaluate down to predicate
checking solvable by an automated mechanized mathematical tool proving strategy.
Link analysis-type specification trees like Goldberg and Senator (1995) or Goldberg
and Wong (1998) would appear to have a translation path to tabular expression formats
that works well and should be easily understood. Assuming that we can create logi-
cally sound specifications of the link definition structure, it should be feasible that we
could create expression trees of suitable completeness and disjointness to represent the
specifications.
While it is not optimal that we are unable to consider all aspects of financial crime
detection methods, we believe we have enough cross over to study the application of
formal methods to this unique form of critical system. Of the above treated areas each
bring unique approaches to describing a financial crime model.
It is clear though that the trace function method offers a lot of advantages when
considering programming models based around risk scoring attributes. This is because
this method offers capabilities above and beyond those of the other methods discussed.
Primarily, the logic of the left-right sequence reading of the traces themselves allow
for ease of comprehension with the associated module Parnas (1992). Further, with the
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addition of events the method potentially allows for tighter alignment with the evolu-
tion of risk scores over time but this would need further testing to validate. Another
potential win would be the effective functional library offered by the method which al-
lows the developer access to several descriptive functions that empower them for more
compact descriptions (Bane et al., 2004), however if these have be utilized without
tooling this negates the impact severely.
Ultimately the biggest win by potentially using the method could be that it might
help reduce the possibility of errors within the code being deployed to detect anti-
money laundering. This would be a twofold success in that it satisfies the constraints
on institutions placed on them by national and international regulators. Second, it pro-
vides an accurate depiction of all aspects of the deployed code thereby ensuring ease
of adaptation to suit new regulations and to counter new criminal schemes. When one
considers the breadth of the legalities that compose a regional wide directive like EU
(2012) it is important to note the diligence required to translate the directive into policy
for a given institution. Further, the translation of policy into operations is equally com-
plex. Hence the need for accuracy at all levels of the institution becomes paramount.
Another consideration is the comprehensive nature of being able to prove compli-
ance. Technology provides us with a wealth of mechanisms to evaluate and audit data
and this is especially true within the financial services sector where such audits are
a strict part of their review process. Compliance concerns result in severe financial
penalties and human driven review cycles are slow, tedious and also prone to error.
The TFM could provides us with an ancillary mechanism to inspect, audit and evaluate
the coverage of the financial crime system by using technology to verify the complete-
ness of the specifications and could short cut the time necessary to present results back
to regulators and costs involved for banks. If this hypothesis holds true, we cannot
underscore enough the value of both time and cost savings to financial institutions and
in particular the IT departments responsible for maintaining financial crime detection
systems.
The other strength of the Parnas Trace Function Method is the fact that it has wide
adoption in industrial case studies of critical systems such as the ones illustrated by
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Heitmeyer (2001) and Lawford et al. (2004). TFM representations are simpler to com-
prehend and are applicable to many more table types than older models discussed in
2.3 but the method is inclusive of previously known and utilized table types. They
are also not tied to any specific physical layout, pictures, etc. Also there is broad tool
support to assist developers across many generations that allow for developers to deal
with traces effectively in the documentation of their software as discussed by Bane
et al. (2004) and Eles and Lawford (2011). For the purposes of this research it pro-
vides broad coverage to apply the method into the use case of customer due diligence.
4.6 Summary
This chapter surveyed several key technologies in use in financial crime detection
systems today. It looked at some of the critical research that has helped develop these
technologies and explains why they are important to the financial crime context. Some
examples were also provided to show case the complexity of the code necessary to
solve this time of problems.
We reason that to potentially use formal methods to check restrictions on specifi-
cations of these industry applications we first need to map the underlying technology
back to formal methods for appropriateness. We determine that not all areas are appro-
priate and note that Bayesian (predictive) and neural networks are currently not easily
mapped to a formal methods approach and deign them out of scope.
"There’s an old story about the person who wished his
computer were as easy to use as his telephone. That wish
has come true, since I no longer know how to use my
telephone."
Bjarne Stroustrup 5
Use Case and Code Review
5.1 Overview
This chapter will examine the financial crime critical system use case introduced pre-
viously (Customer Due Diligence). Building on what we know of how financial crime
tools operate at a mathematical and functional level we will describe a customer dili-
gence model using the Trace Function Method Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006).
The emphasis is on the FATF requirements FATF (2012) around customer due in-
telligence. We will evaluate an application of a code driven mechanism to observe
customer attributes and examine the best approaches to describing the program utiliz-
ing the trace function method.
5.2 Customer Due Diligence
Customer Due Diligence or CDD is a special case of anti-money laundering regula-
tory compliance that focuses on customer related risk rather than a specific financial
transactional risk. The foundation of this domain problem is the exercise of what in
business is called KYC or "Know Your Customer" type activity. KYC is driven by data
collection activity both from internal sources and external sources. Through KYC a
bank is able to make determinations on a how valuable a client’s business is to the
bank, the specific areas of activity a client engages in and most importantly of all the
risk the bank assumes by doing business with this individual or entity.
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Customer Due Diligence generally is a modelling-based mechanism that attempts
to aggregate information regarding customer data into models and attempt to normal-
ize, cluster and score the information accrued. The basis to all of this is information
acquisition at the on-boarding of a newly-acquired client for a given institution into a
customer record management system and the ongoing information capture surround-
ing financial transactions and changes of state in non-financial data such as address,
citizenship etc. As an alternative to modelling methods, some vendors try and utilize
business rules only to solve for customer due diligence but because of the boolean
nature of decision trees are unable to accurately align scoring bands to a degree that
meets with regulatory satisfaction.
The end state result of either selected method, modelling or business rules, is an
aggregation of scores that represents an overall client risk rating score which in turn
presents the overall risk a customer relationship presents for a given institution. De-
pending on the risk tolerance of that institution they may then decide to ’de-market’/’de-
risk’ the client, meaning they will cease business with client immediately, close ac-
counts and reimburse balances. When necessary, the bank will also create regulatory
filings for regulatory authorities to audit regarding the activity of the client if it is war-
ranted. The results of such filings are also indicators of risk for an ongoing relationship.
5.3 Formal Decomposition
The trace function method employs tabular expressions for the description of com-
ponent behaviour without explicit reference to internal state (Trancón y Widemann,
2014). Trancón y Widemann (2014) continues by noting this precise form is given by
outright course-of-value iteration, for which rough but general implementation guide-
lines can be given, depending on the pattern of access to the past. The revelation this
gives is that through the use of the Trace Function Method we have a path to accurate
and systematic representations of software programs.
As discussed in Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) that even in the case where a pro-
gram already exists, asking the users to read the code to find out what it will do in
all cases is often inappropriate. There are always cases where people are in a posi-
tion where the meaning of the code is not easily understandable. Further, often due
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to programmatic complexity code can be very difficult and time consuming to grapple
with in order to achieve the understanding necessary to modify the code base. This
can introduce severe delays in code upkeep and modification by developers tasked
with maintaining a software component. This is especially true when we considering
the interpretation of complex law into code especially considering the fluid nature of
the legislative process and the dynamic nature in which legislators need to respond to
newly emerging threats and schemes.
Our goal is examine a software code interpretation of European CDD related legis-
lation and to convert it into a concise, precise and verifiable representation. To achieve
this we utilize the Trace Function Method and describe the model in terms of its com-
ponent variables, interfaces and output function. This chapter is thus focused on study-
ing the use of the Trace Function Method to provide reference documents for profes-
sional software developers examining financial crime models.
We will describe a CDD model with the appropriate banding and aggregation rules
in the attempt to reach a final score which could be bucketed appropriate for risk man-
agement purposes as per the fourth EU Anti Money Laundering Directive EU (2012).
This description will use the previously introduced Trace Function Method Parnas and
Dragomiroiu (2006) as a basis for formal decomposition of CDD code write in the
SAS programming language (Barr and Goodnight, 1976). The aim of this decompo-
sition is to provide developers with a more succinct human readable variant of model
documentation which has exhausted all potential outputs1 and thus becomes viable for
formal verification mechanisms.
This model is broken up into several component pieces in order to break down its
coverage alignment with the FATF regulations. As such several banding and aggrega-
tion mechanisms are used. Banding refers to stratifying the risk score using a logical
hierarchy. The typical risk bands utilized in risk rating models are;
High This band is the most severe indication of potential criminal activity or of data
elements that could pose either an operational, regulatory or reputational risk to
1By exhausting all potential outputs we mean that all outputs of the system are known and under-
stood and that the program is incapable of entering into an unknown state.
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the institution. Generally, high-risk clients make up only a tiny percentile of the
overall client population.
Medium This band is generally utilized when enhanced diligence is required. When
flagged this implies that a client presents areas of concern that require further
investigation by a compliance specialist. Typically, this occurs generally be-
cause of links to sanctions-related risks, high-risk geography linkages or high-
risk business activity. The norm here is to establish a continued governance
procedure on the client with a regular observation cadence to look for changes
in state that would warrant further action. From a client population perspective
this is generally a small percentile of the population with a notable bias towards
high wealth individuals and business entities.
Low This band is representative of the majority of the client population in normal
banking institutions operating in the western world. It indicates little to no cor-
relation with data indicators or behaviours that warrant further investigation and
that the client/entity is operating within the normal boundaries of the business
relationship.
Aggregation mechanisms are means of combining scores using a logical mechanism
to bias in favour or against specific data elements. A classical example of this is the use
of Auto High1 or Panic elements where in a pool of data elements some are highlighted
of being sufficient indicators by themselves of high risks. Recent examples of this
would include areas highlighted by FATF FATF (2012) as specifically important such
as ties to war torn countries, despots, weapons trading, drug or people trafficking.
Otherwise, several elements can be scored in groups and compared algorithmically to
determine if the composite score shows a worrisome behaviour.
Often in applications of this nature the use of ceiling and floor functional scores is
common in order to add different weights to areas that a bank or country may find
of particular importance. Aggregation is used to to combine several different scoring
1The use of an auto-high indicator is common throughout customer due diligence models as once
a key field has been positively validated it may be sufficient of itself to flag a client as a high risk.
Examples would include links to terrorist, people trafficking or drug organizations





Figure 5.1: Composite Risk Score
elements together to amass an overarching score and can consume either several sub
functions or various data elements.
It is also interesting to note that in order to establish the correct band all of the
above mechanisms provide scores that correlate back to a band range e.g Low = 0 -
500, Medium = 501 - 750 and High ≥ 750. The code and examples provided in the
following decomposition are scoped to be inclusive of all relevant elements associated
with the 4th EU Anti-Money Laundering direction and do not allow for the proposed
changes/amendments undergoing current review in European Parliament EU (2012).
It is often easier to understand aggregations through a graphical reference. The fol-
lowing diagrams introduce the aggregation logic associated with each category pillar
and show how each function rolls up to create an aggregate score.
Figure 5.1 elaborates on how the composite risk score is evaluated based on a series
of scores coming from each category within the model. These scores propagate up
from each child category thereby allowing a bank the flexibility to add new categories
as regulation changes. The concept of the AutoHighIndicator is to allow the propaga-
tion of major risk indicator being positively matched with complete certainty from a
specific rule score function to highlight the client in question for immediate review by
the banks compliance department.
Figure 5.2 exposes the logic of how the category scores are created. We simplify this
representation by examining the rule score functions collectively (RuleFuncn) as the






AutoHigh MinScore MaxScore RuleScore Param
CountryMaxScore
Figure 5.2: Country Score Category
logic can be universally applied to each rule score function. As discussed each function
examines a unique compliance related parameter originating from the interpretation of
governing legislation EU (2012).
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show the same logic being applied to the other categories
pertinent to the Customer Due Diligence model being examined. This type of rollup
allows for ease of modification of the model in the event of a new category pillar being
introduced via legislation. Further extension is also available horizontally should new
properties regarding a clients activity become required for data capture.
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AutoHigh MinScore MaxScore RuleScore Param
ProductMaxScore
Figure 5.4: Product Score Category
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Further, our example code takes a modelling approach with some business rules ap-
plied to the aggregation mechanisms. This allows for more flexibility in the model and
clarity for the formal description. In the next sections we will attempt to provide the
necessary data elements with some description and then conduct a full Trace Func-
tion Method description of the elements we now introduce. Coding elements for the
associated aggregation rules are available in the first appendix to this work.
The example code elements found in the appendix as well as the tables and rules we
explore below are based on an industry example provided by SAS with the approval of
their product management leadership. The basis of their existing documentation can
be found here; Ferro et al. (2015). Throughout the remainder of this chapter we utilize
the IDs and structure that SAS use industrially for supporting Customer Due Diligence
in the financial services sector.
5.3.1 CDD Model Overview
As discussed a CDD model is broken into a series of different elements: aggregation
rules, data elements and scores. The end result of a CDD model is a score that can be
utilized in a customer record management system. The industry norm is to utilize an
enterprise case management system that will track changes in customer scores and
highlight alarming changes in state. This score can further be applied to banding logic
to arrive at the appropriate risk band for the client or entity. In industry these scores are
maintained across the entire client population and are continuously updated to record
changes in state.
Each area uses different variables with associated variation in types in order to cap-
ture all the salient information that the EU requires EU (2012). The general execution
work-flow is that data is collected via a relationship manager. The data is digitized
at this point to capture personal identifying information like tax numbers, passport
number, data of birth etc. This information is centralized to an enterprise data store.
An operational scoring facility consumes this information, assuming that it is of an
adequate level of data quality, and scores it against a model deployed in its execution
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harness. The cadence of execution for CDD models varies but generally scores are
generated via a batch process every twenty four hours. Intra-day execution occurs in
small batches to facilitate customer on-boarding events for a bank.
5.3.2 Top Level Aggregation Rules
The CDD model is broken into a series of separate elements in order to facilitate
data mapping at a financial institution as every operational data store will have a dif-
ferent data model in place. Top level aggregation rules allow the detection system to
prioritize/de-prioritize key elements based on the banks risk appetite. Risk appetite
is determined by senior banking officials which combine regulatory factors with prof-
itability motive.
The aggregation rules below divide up the compliance data elements into groupings
that can be executed according to the operational profile that the bank has in place.
The grouping discussed here cover three main tranches of compliance groups, namely:
country, entity and product. Each corresponds to the major compliance risk focus
areas where indicators of money-laundering or criminal activity can highlight a client
as complicit in some form.
Each aggregate rule group is constructed of three core types. Namely:
Compliance Data Elements These are code elements that specifically grab and parse
for hits against indicators that are specifically relevant to AML compliance and
client risk rating. These in and of themselves can be grouped also into areas of
interest or can be managed individually.
Attribute Maximums This is a ceiling function to set a maximum score value for one
of the aggregate groups. These are useful in cases where one pillar outweighs
the importance of another and generally occurs where a bank has a higher or
lower risk associated with the pillar in question.
Pillar Aggregation This group type does the work of creating the composite score for
the group. It does so by analysing the scores generated by each compliance ele-
ment, combining them and then conducting a comparison to the MAX attribute.
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The logic of injecting ceiling and floor values at each level of aggregation allows the
risk rating model to offer a lot of flexibility to analysts in mapping the model to the
banks offerings and risk appetites.
Country Rule Element Aggregation This group, Table 5.1, ties together areas as-
sociated with sanctioned countries and highlights where a client has a tie through busi-
ness or personal links with a sanctioned country.
Table 5.1: Country Rule Element Aggregation
Rule ID Rule Name Order Rule Group ID Rule Group Name
CDDR_C101 Registration 1
CDDRG_C010 Country Attribute
CDDR_C102 Primary Business Address 2
CDDR_C103 Beneficial Owner Residence 3
CDDR_C104 Director Residence 4
CDDR_C201 Residence 5
CDDR_C202 Citizenship 6
CDDR_C910 Country Max Attribute 1 CDDRG_C020 Country Attribute Max
CDDR_C920 Country Aggregation 1 CDDRG_C030 Country Category Score
Entity Rule Element Aggregation This aggregate group, Table 5.2, examines polit-
ical exposures for individuals and corporations. Further, it looks at the source of wealth
for the associated entity along with ties to shell-organizations, negative news elements.
Often terrorist or criminal organizations mask illicit activity through the utilization of
charities or companies that have the ability to negate the potential suspicion that one
would attribute to certain transactions.
Product Rule Element Aggregation This aggregation facility, Table 5.3, combines
several product score areas for the purpose of establishing an aggregate score based on
product risk. Product types inherently can be more or less risky. For example, the risk
associated with a high value wealth management offering is significantly higher than a
credit card with only a $3000 limit.
Final Score Rule Element Aggregation Each of the previous three aggregation
groups presents a score. This group combines those scores and applies some logic
around importance, some functional biases and ordering elements. The final score is
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Table 5.2: Entity Rule Element Aggregation
Rule ID Rule Name Order Rule Group ID Rule Group Name
CDDR_E101 Industry 1
CDDRG_E010 Entity Attribute
CDDR_E102 Legal Entity Status 2
CDDR_E103 Non-Profit Organization 3
CDDR_E104 MSB 4
CDDR_E105 Engaged In Internet Gambling 5
CDDR_E106 Trust Account 6
CDDR_E107 Foreign Consulate Embassy 7
CDDR_E108 Issue Bearer Shares 8
CDDR_E109 Politically Exposed Person (NP) 9
CDDR_E110 Negative Media News Search (NP) 10
CDDR_E201 Occupation 11
CDDR_E202 Politically Exposed Person 12
CDDR_E203 Negative Media News Search 13
CDDR_E204 SAR Count 14
CDDR_E910 Entity Max Attribute 1 CDDRG_E020 Entity Attribute Max
Table 5.3: Product Rule Element Aggregation
Rule ID Rule Name Order Rule Group ID Rule Group Name
CDDR_E920 Entity Attribute Aggregation 1 CDDRG_E030 Entity Category Score
CDDR_P001 Product 1 CDDRG_P010 Product Attribute
CDDR_P910 Product Max Attribute 1 CDDRG_P020 Product Attribute Max
CDDR_P920 Product Category Aggregation 1 CDDRG_P030 Product Category Score
what would be presented to an operational element where investigators would deter-
mine your aggregate risk to the bank. Within that operational platform they would be
able to see what elements from the rule groups generated the high scores that pushed a
client towards a high risk band.
The final table, Table 5.4, presents the last set of rules associated with the functional
elements discussed above. CDDR_X010 creates the aggregate score the previous three
groups. CDDR_X015 handles if the bank is dealing with a new or existing customer.
CDDR_X020 assigns the customer score to the right risk band. CDDR_X030 is used
to determine if this score should be suppressed based on the banks internal policies on
risk management. CDDR_X040 handles if the scored customer is going to be sent for
further investigation in the form of a case.
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Table 5.4: Final Score Rule Element Aggregation
Rule ID Rule Name Order Rule Group ID Rule Group Name
CDDR_X010 Category Aggregation Rule 1 CDDRG_X010 Category Aggregation Rules
CDDR_X015 New Customer Rule 1 CDDRG_X015 Rule Group Name Strategy Rules
CDDR_X020 Banding Rule 1
CDDRG_X020 Banding/Suppression/Investigation RulesCDDR_X030 Suppression Rule 2
CDDR_X040 Investigation Rule 3
5.3.3 Compliance Element Rule Groups
What follows is an analysis of the different parameters and functions necessary to
create the aggregate perspective needed for each pillar. There are groups that directly
tie to country, entity and product pillars and beneath each group are associated rule
functions. Rather than repeat the code we have eliminated as much redundancy as
possible to try and mitigate against mundane elements. All the excluded elements can
be found in the appendices of this thesis. The code is included as it was provided by
SAS for the purposes of our evaluation. They purport to be transparent and provide the
code elements of the model to the client base. This simplifies the documentation for
them as all actions can be clearly reviewed assuming that the reader has a knowledge
of SAS.
The only variance is the attribute that is under examination and this is extrapolated
from EU (2012) and as stated can be reviewed either through reading the Table 5.4.3
of the TFM section or through review of the first Appendix.
5.3.4 Rule Group CDDRG_C010
This rule group examines accounts/clients at a country level against data sets that
would contain risk indicators for the bank. These risk indicators would show high
risk geographies and potential politically exposed persons.
5.3.4.1 CDDR_C101
This element looks at the registration information for an organization and tries to make
a determination if it has links to a high risk geography. It takes the inputs listed in Table
5.5 to manage internal logic. The development team attempt to standardize inputs
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where possible to simplify program execution. The inputs provide pointers for the
model to examine certain fields of the customer record, in this case REGISTRATION,
and give guidance on plugging in values to bias the score created.
Table 5.5: C101 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name "REGISTRATION"
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 200
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 1
SAS The code used in the following example is constructed in the language of SAS
(Barr and Goodnight, 1976). The SAS language provides mechanisms for designing
complex models and working with data. Further, SAS is an accomplished vendor in
the financial crime detection solution world and has its solutions deployed at many
financial institutions internationally.
This code is what is used by the model execution engine, in this case SAS, in order
to arrive at a score for a certain category. It utilizes the variables discussed above and
is applied to an incoming data set of banking information regarding a client base. The
code associated with the other rules discussed in this chapter is available in the first
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5.3.5 Rule Group CDDRG_C020
A sanctions rule group is one that examines for breaches of national and international
sanctions on people, goods and countries. Not every sanction rule group contributes
the same level of risk to the bank. In our example the developer simplified matters by
creating one group of rules to map to sanctions regulations in EU (2012). However
in a situation where others exist the use of minimums and maximum values would be
more of a necessity.
5.3.5.1 CDDR_C910
No parameters are utilized here as this manages the maximum value attributed to the
overall group. Once all values from each rule within the group are aggregated the score
is checked against the maximum value here and if it is exceeded the model uses the
score here otherwise the aggregate number. Here a bank would be able to decide and
adjust the overall risk attributed to country-based KYC risks and make a determination
if it is more/less important to the operations of the bank. Normally a bank would deter-
mine this area to be of higher importance when they have more of a multi-geographic
presence or if they operate within a region where there is extreme risk of terrorist group
activities.
/* Country Max Attribute Rule */
%cdd_rule_attr_max;
5.3.6 Rule Group CDDRG_C030
The country category group will always be a dynamic category due to the changing
nature of sanctions lists. As new lists and risks are identified the logic controlled how
those scores impact country risk scores would be considered in this section.
5.3.6.1 CDDR_C920
No Parameters are necessary for this group as it creates the composite score based off
of the guiding logic of the maximum and the overall combinatorial logic of the sub-
groups. The PRIMARY_ENTITY_NUMBER referred to below is indicative of a unique
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identifier that the bank would use to identify all client activity at the bank through any
channel. The code behind this group behaves by doing the actual aggregation of all
necessary rules for this specific client.
/* Weighted Sum of Country Attribute Scores Divided by
Weighted Sum of Max Country Score */
/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */





, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_
SCORE*WEIGHT / SUM_MAX_SCORE*100, .))
, auto_high_exp=MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND
);
5.3.7 Rule Group CDDRG_E010
This grouping examines entity related risk. As previously discussed this type of risk
examines compliance indicators for both personal and legal entities (e.g. corporations)
and examines them for areas where illicit activity is known to occur. Money launderers
attempt to use case intensive businesses along with mechanisms where money can be
issued to non-identifiable owners in order to clean money. Some vehicles of these
types of activities include casinos, money service bureaus and shell corporations. At
a personal level it also includes relatives and close associates of political entities in
troubled governments that can be used as influencers in corrupt practices.
Further, certain types of industrial activity is indicative of potential high risk activity.
Normally people would associate this type of activity with weapons trading but even
construction activity can mask illicit practices. The rules here follow the same structure
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as the preceding category and thus we exclude all other rules with the exception of the
first to avoid redundancy.
5.3.7.1 CDDR_E101
This group focuses on industry associated with the specific entity and how it generates
wealth. The bank will utilize industry type tables and will associate risk values with
each industry based on its overall risk appetites. Examining the input variables, Table
5.6, and focusing on the important attribute under examination we can see that here the
clients area of employment is being scored against a list of industry codes.
Table 5.6: E101 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name "INDUSTRY"
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 1
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 100














The remain rules and rule groups focus on the mechanics of generating a score and
operate in the exact same way as the previous section.
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5.3.8 Rule Group CDDRG_P010
This rule examines banking products from a risk management perspective. In this case
products can be various forms of credit instruments like cheques, card accounts etc.
This looks cumulatively at the product utilization of a client/legal entity in order to
risk rate their modus operandi in banking. This score is further normalized through
segmentation mechanisms where the client is compared to similar individuals/entities
in order to establish a behaviour pattern that they risk rate as normal.
5.3.8.1 CDDR_P010
This rule examines all the products that a bank offers and rates it against a risk ranked
scale of how the bank assesses them. The bank changes this hot-list often as new
products are created/retired and as a result is often in flux. Given the changing nature
of banking, moving from a physical interactions to digital, banks are increasingly wary
of ensuring more security controls for product offerings in order to meet regulatory
needs. This however counteracts customer experience measures and profitability as it
inhibits a clients ease of use for new banking products. Table 5.7 is the manifestation
of this in the model.
Table 5.7: P010 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character Constant Attribute Name "PRODUCT"
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 200
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 1
/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */
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, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_
SCORE*WEIGHT / SUM_MAX_SCORE*100, .))
, auto_high_exp=MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND
);
5.3.9 Rule Group CDDRG_X010
The purpose of this rule group is to start combining all of the three categories into a
composite score. Business analysts at a bank would have the opportunity to further
tune the bias of different elements at this level. Operationally the bank looks to create
risk buckets for all the client population that are tuned and examined on an ongoing
basis. This grouping allows them the flexibility to augment the scoring categories with
new ones should they deign them necessary.
5.3.9.1 CDDR_X010
The output of this group would be the final risk score associate with the client or le-
gal entity. This score would then pass into more operational rules to assign it to a
risk band for investigators to examine. This score is the aggregate value passed from
the three major categories as per Table 5.8. The code here functions by first doing
some basic setting and getting of values. Next by examining the customer record by
doing a lookup on their PRIMARY_ENTITY_NUMBER it starts the scoring process
by checking if AUTO_HIGH_IND is operating within expected conditions. It then
constructs the score for each of the three categories; COUNTRY, ENTITY and PROD-
UCT. The RULE_SCORE is and AUTO_HIGH_IND take the appropriate values and
output is generated to the appropriate data store.
Table 5.8: X010 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
COUNTRY_WEIGHT Numeric Constant Country Weight 0.4
ENTITY_WEIGHT Numeric Constant Entity Weight 0.35
PRODUCT_WEIGHT Numeric Constant Product Weight 0.25
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length MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND $ 1;
retain MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND;
drop MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND;




if AUTO_HIGH_IND > MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND then MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND=
AUTO_HIGH_IND;
if CATEGORY_CODE = "COUNTRY" then TEMP_RULE_SCORE = TEMP_RULE_
SCORE + RULE_SCORE * &country_weight;
if CATEGORY_CODE = "ENTITY" then TEMP_RULE_SCORE = TEMP_RULE_
SCORE + RULE_SCORE * &entity_weight;
if CATEGORY_CODE = "PRODUCT" then TEMP_RULE_SCORE = TEMP_RULE_
SCORE + RULE_SCORE * &product_weight;






5.3.10 Rule Group CDDRG_X015
An important distinction in risk management for banks is the treatment of new
clients at on-boarding versus ongoing due diligence of the establish client base. As
such the rigour and intelligence gathering of new clients being on-boarded into the
102 5. Use Case and Code Review
banks core systems is a more onerous activity as products are being established by
the relationship manager. Information collection on existing clients at the bank can
be made difficult to track as it is at the discretion of the client to provide updates to
changes in status but the majority of the client population are transparent in their fiscal
dealings.
5.3.10.1 CDDR_X015
This rule group examines the customer age and allows the bank to tweak treatment
based on the client establishment date, i.e. the date the client registered their first
product with the institution in question. Table 5.9 looks at the weighting that a bank
would give to this process given the information, or lack thereof, provided. Further, it
specifically measures the age of the relationship with the client in question and applies
different treatments accordingly. This is reflected in the code snipped below which
looks specifically at the field CUSTOMER_SINCE_DATE which it pulls from the
customer record. In the absence of a date in this field the program reacts by setting a
date record for today and weighting the customer using the preset weight bias the bank
has for new customers.
Table 5.9: X015 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
new_customer_age Numeric Constant Age in years customer NOTEQUALTO new 1.01
new_customer_weight Numeric Constant weight to use for a new customer 1.2
missing_age_weight Numeric Constant weight for customers with unknown on-boarding date 1.2
/* Apply weight based on customer age */
if RULE_SCORE ne . then do;
if CUSTOMER_SINCE_DATE eq .
then do;
/*use missing date weight*/
RULE_SCORE = ROUND(RULE_SCORE * &missing_age_weight,1);
end;
else do;
if yrdif(datepart(CUSTOMER_SINCE_DATE), today(), ’AGE’) <= &
new_customer_age
then do;
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5.3.11 Rule Group CDDRG_X020
This rule group manages finalized risk score mechanics for operational investigation
facilities at the bank. Banks hire compliance specialists tasked with ongoing monitor-
ing of the client base. They analytically determine what the banks risk tolerance should
be. For ease of use once these bands are analytically determined based off the popu-
lations initial scores they are provide as ranges/bands that are highlighted via colour
schemes in enterprise case management systems. An enterprise case management sys-
tem is a workflow system to track changes in scores with the client population.
5.3.11.1 CDDR_X020
This rule group allows the bank to set minimum and maximum ranges for risk bands
with the client base. They can fine tune these with ease at any point and even create
new bands for consumption at a workflow level if needed. Table 5.10 sets the banding
score limits for the model to determine the appropriate boundaries between the differ-
ent risk buckets. The code snippet provided by SAS shows more detail of how this
works as it lists out the classification methodology. What occurs is the checking of
RULE_SCORE against the different risk bucket values; l_max, and m_max. Should
the value exceed the ceiling value of m_max it is clearly in the HIGH risk bucket.
Logic is also provided here that if AUTO_HIGH_IND has a character value of yes
then the risk is immediately set to high. Some other logic included here is to flag what
the last review score was and record the difference for analysis. Finally the score is
persisted.
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Table 5.10: X020 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
L_MAX Numeric Constant Low Risk Max Score 50
M_MAX Numeric Constant Medium Risk Max Score 85
SCORE_DIFF Numeric Constant Score Difference 10
/* Assign Score Classification */
if RULE_SCORE <= &l_max then SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE = ’L’;
else if RULE_SCORE <= &m_max then SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE =
’M’;
else SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE = ’H’;
/* Auto High flag overrides score classification */
if AUTO_HIGH_IND eq ’Y’ then SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE = ’H’;
/* Use the override rating if the new score is close to the
last review score */
if CDD_REVIEW_FLG ne ’1’ and
SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE=’H’ and
OVERRIDE_SCORE_CLASS_CODE ne SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE and
OVERRIDE_SCORE_CLASS_CODE ne ’’ and
( RULE_SCORE <= LAST_REVIEW_SCORE or






Operationally decisions need to be made around client retention versus de-risking/de-
marketing them should they hit sufficient levels of risk scores. It is important to ensure
that this is flagged within the system so that in the case the client tries to re-establish a
business relationship the past scores are persisted. Further, in the case of a retention de-
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cision certain aspects of the ongoing scoring mechanisms can optionally be suppressed
in order to allow the bank a means of ’ignoring’ the client until a major change occurs.
The value SCORE_DIFF, Table 5.11 highlighting the variance of a change in a cus-
tomers risk categorization is the basis of activity here. This code is specifically used
within the workflow investigation system for the CDD case review process. The out-
puts here are set directly in the workflow system to decide what action should occur.
While workflow is an interesting problem to solve we are de-scoping this aspect from
the TFM as it would require a whole program of other work to capture the data model
used in full.
Table 5.11: X030Parameters
Name Type Description Value
SCORE_DIFF Numeric Constant Score Difference 10
/* Suppression Rule */
if FINAL_DISPOSITION_CODE=’RETAIN’ and
CDD_REVIEW_FLG ne ’1’ and
SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE=’H’ and
( RULE_SCORE <= LAST_REVIEW_SCORE or








As discussed earlier and as defined per Bane (2008) the trace function method offers
application developers a means of describing programs mathematically. There are two
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major advantages to the method: firstly, it allows a developer to minimize the doc-
umentation elements associated with a program. As we’ve seen from our industrial
example documentation to describe the complexities of a program can be time inten-
sive activity. Secondly, it allows developers to verify formally that the program acts
as specifies and does not result in unexpected outcomes. The TFM is built on early
tabular notation formats as per Janicki and Khedri (2001) but has evolved from the ba-
sic tabular notations Parnas used in Parnas et al. (1987) to have more of a trace based
focus. The notation now focused more on traces, events, programs, messages and set
elements and is more reflective of how technology has changed in the intervening forty
years since formal methods started to be used.
To show the power of the trace function method we utilize an industrial example, the
customer due diligence model previously introduced. In doing so our goal is to attempt
to minimize the associated program specification whilst maintaining the comfort of
being able to validate all outputs of the system. This ensures that any model meets
with the formal regulatory references provided by regulations like the 4th EU anti
money laundering directive EU (2012) and the recommendations proposed by FATF
FATF (2012). What regulators would expect to see here is a readable format of what
fields are being examined in customer records, how scores are generated and to garner
some idea of how the program logic would work. Someone in more of IT focused role
would expect to learn more about what would drive an error state and how it could be
avoided. Both use cases are supported through the TFMs layout.
5.4.1 Using the TFM
It should be noted that earlier in this work we provided a basic example to explain
some concepts of how tabular notation and the TFM operates in 2.1. This was a basic
example that purely sought to describe a normal function table and introduce the topic
rather than the complete details necessary to create an accurate TFM component de-
scription document. Other examples that align more to how our industrial use case is
described include; Quinn (2007), Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) and Parnas (2006).
The following example is, as previously noted, a real example from industry and has
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been successfully deployed as an active model is several banking institutions around
the globe.
The TFM will be used in this context to explain the relationship between several
elements of the model and their associated variables. It is important that we note the
context of that relationship graphically in order to highlight how the TFM simplifies
these links. The purpose of the program is to create a composite risk value of a given
entity/client in order to determine if they pose a compliance risk to the bank.
As such the program is designed to use several major categories that aggregate up
using predetermined logic to bias the scoring algorithms. This priority bias would nor-
mally be provided by the bank where the financial crime detection system is deployed.
For the purposes of this example we assume that each pillar is of like importance.
Built into the logic of the model is the ability to bias at all levels allowing them to
create floor and ceiling values for both the category and the rule scoring functions that
are members of each category.
Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) gives us a definition of what a TFM component
interface document comprises of:
• a complete description of the component’s inputs (their type).
• a complete description of the component’s outputs (their type).
• a description of a set of relations, each one describing the relation of the value of
an output to the history of the values of the inputs. The range of each relation is
the set of possible values for the associated output variable. The domain of each
relation is a subset of the set of all possible histories for that component.
Elaborating beyond this it is noted that if the behaviour being documented is determin-
istic, the relations will be functions. Further, histories should include all past behaviour
including the actual output values as well as the actual input values; in some methods,
non-determinism causes difficulty because one can only refer to input values (Parnas
and Dragomiroiu, 2006).
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5.4.2 Component Programs and Inputs
The first point of reference is the definition of all program1 components or modules
(Parnas, 1972a) defined within the model. These programs in the case of our CDD
model breakout according to each category examined within CDD.
Beginning with the most important element of the CDD software model’s function
the first program examined is Table 5.12. This program is responsible for the final
aggregation of scores from all CDD category pillars. As we are looking at scores the
associated type of each element of the program is an integer type. The ranges are
generally determined by a given financial institution but generally will follow a pattern
like zero to one hundred or zero to one thousand.
The associated range values can then be bucketed by an institution to highlight risk
level and generally the resulting curve should show the majority of the client popula-




COUNTRYSCORE < int >
ENTITYSCORE < int>
PRODUCTSCORE < int >
The program we evaluate next is the one responsible for country score element ag-
gregations. As noted from earlier in the chapter, country score is a category of the
CDD model that examines data elements within the client populations information
pertinent to addresses, places of birth, residence and citizenship etc. These are exam-
ined thoroughly against lists of countries that have a diplomatic sanction against them
to highlight that a client is a potential risk for the bank.
1As the concept of the module evolved around specific work tasks the terminology evolved to be
inclusive of language like software components or programs.
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The component program, Table 5.13 encapsulates some extra logic around variable
weighting for the convenience of the banks compliance department. Not all risk vari-
ables are of equal importance. Thus a bank needs to be able to adjust the model to
take into account its subjective view of the risks to its business and align the weights
accordingly.
Further, there is the ability to allow both a floor and ceiling values to certain variables
once again based off the banks overall business model and risk tolerance. These last
elements have a clear impact on the range of values associated with the variables that
vary bank to bank.
Table 5.13: PGM(CountryScore)
Name Type Range
ATTR_NAME < enum >
MAX_SCORE < int>
MIN_SCORE < int >
WEIGHT < int >
The component program, Table 5.14 follows the same structure as its predecessor,
Table 5.13, but differs in domain context. As previously discussed this program com-
ponent area focuses on private individuals and corporate entities. It examines several
areas of their business dealings and associates a risk value with them. The same mech-




ATTR_NAME < enum >
MAX_SCORE < int>
MIN_SCORE < int >
WEIGHT < int >
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The next program in the series, Table 5.15, also follows the structure of the last two
programs. The domain in this case examines the product mix that a client may be
taking advantage of from the banking institution i.e. lines of credit, corporate loans,
commercial payments, correspondent banking, wealth management. These products
have different risk ratings and this program allows the banks analysts to adjust them




ATTR_NAME < enum >
MAX_SCORE < int>
MIN_SCORE < int >
WEIGHT < int >
The final key program in the CDD model is presented in Table 5.16. This program is
a mechanical means of showing an exact match with a high risk concern. It allows for
any client to be flagged as mapping completely to a country, entity or product category
risk. Should this occur this function allows for an over-ride that is surfaced via a case
management work-flow that an analyst would be able to investigate.
Structurally we are looking at a flag variable for the associated client and a message




AUTO_HIGH_IND < Char >
The purpose of this section of the TFM is to provide a very concise and clear
overview of what each component programs variables are, their types and associated
ranges. Through this specification we also can ascertain some of the logic that is nec-
essary but this is really only apparent because of the labelling we have used in this
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use case. Plain simple language is a benefit in any specification style and as such this
should not act as a biasing element in a decision to use the TFM.
5.4.3 Set Elements
In this section we will examine all program data elements examined by the CDD
model and used within its code base for the purposes of validating compliance. These
set elements align directly to the legislation requirements derived from EU (2012).
As observed from the previous section these elements are consumed and compared
against the banks client data set and the associated attributes contained therein. The
other consumed data source is global watch lists that contain data elements that the
scoring harness uses during processing.
Beginning with Table 5.17 this set of elements consumed is made up of some domain
assets and some logical assets that are used in the associated program, Table 5.13,
previously discussed. The focus here is sanctioned country data attributes.












The next set of elements, Table 5.18, follows the exact same pattern as Table 5.17
in that it is a set of domain and logical assets used by the program Table 5.14. The
focus area is risk associated with entities such as individuals and corporations. The set
elements here reflect that focus and highlight concerns that regulators have with this
aspect of due diligence.
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The final set of elements, Table 5.19, provides the set of data assets necessary for the
final program component discussed earlier, Table 5.15. Product elements are a much
smaller asset tailored to each bank and their marketplace and clientelle.






Through the provision of these set elements the TFM provides developers with an
easily maintainable list of all data of interest to the model. In the case of our CDD use
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case this is simplified from being one big long list by the fact that the model is broken
into specific pillars. This allows for easier consumption based off of the domain aspect
of CDD that each category is solving for. Once again though this provision is more of
a best practice activity rather than a specific designation within the TFM itself.
That being said, the availability of these lists allows developers to easily check and
validate that they are accounting for key elements of legislation being examined. The
lift this approach provides is that augmentation of the specification is greatly simplified
meaning that as new legislation occurs an augmentation strategy for the code base can
easily be aligned to the specification change without negatively impacting the execu-
tion of the model.
5.4.4 Auxiliary Functions
Auxiliary functions in this case are representative of the mechanisms used to create the
composite scores within the CDD model. Further, they also are used for the logic to
control minimum and maximum values for scoring elements for each category group.
We originally described Tables 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 as the high level of
program components that make up the model we are describing. We next examine
the auxiliary functions that are the actual worker elements for these programs. These
represent the underlying functions that carry out this work within the model.
Table 5.20 provides a list of the auxiliary functions that provide the logical work
discussed in the previous section. These auxiliary functions are responsible for acting
as setters and getters for the different scoring elements that these programs require.
Specifically this listing address country related category functions.
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Table 5.21 provides the same functional listing as Table 5.20 provides but does so for
the entity category. To elaborate this allows for easily bread-crumbing for a developer
to track data elements and functions through the TFM. They can quickly ascertain
in this case where to look in the specification for functions pursuant to entity related
scoring by using this simplified index.





Table 5.22 follows the same pattern as both Table 5.20 and Table 5.21 in providing a
listing that is centric to auxiliary functions that are necessary for the product category
of the CDD model to function as designed.





With this listing of auxiliary functions the TFM is giving developers access to a
functional index of what functions are available for use within the program components
of the CDD model. Once more, it helps that this use case has already separated out
the categories as it simplifies the auxiliary function listing. In this case the function
names are not very transparent and provide no semantics on what they do at this level
of obfuscation. That detail will come at later levels of decomposition.
5.4.5 Output Messages
This section of the TFM specification contains the absolute outputs of the software
components being specified/described. In the case of the CDD model we are describing
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there are two to note, namely, the final score and an auto high indicator. The latter is a
mechanism used in CDD to alert investigators that there was a high correlation match
with against the customer data and that the client needs to be treated as high risk.
Table 5.23 presents the messages that are being written to each customer profile that
the model is processing. The intent of the model is to append each customer record
with the appropriate value with the end state being an accurate map of risk scores
across the entire customer population. These outputs would be consumed by a work-
flow case management system to track changes in customer scores and to act upon
these changes in state.




The focus of the TFM here is to allow a developer or any reader of the software
specification to be able to easily check the intended outputs of the software. Once
again this is presented in a very clear and concise fashion. The variables in question
though are helped through the naming convention and standards used in this domain
model.
5.4.6 Output Function
Under the context of the TFM specification, the purpose of the output function is
to create a summarized variant of the program using a trace. These traces provide a
sequence of expected actions for the associated functions. It further decomposes the
earlier indices to this final level where all the mechanics are exposed. The representa-
tion should show the path for success and also paths to error states.
This representation can be utilized in formal verification processes for formal veri-
fication purposes. Earlier work in tabular expressions created tools backed by mech-
anized mathematical tools for this purpose Jing (2000). The majority of these tools
utilized theorem proving systems like PVS Shankar et al. (1993).
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With a verified output function developers are able to check for completeness and
disjointness on the output function and thereby provide confidence around the potential
states that the program can enter into and outputs it can create. For critical systems
this is highly advantageous and helps against the manipulation of the program into
unforeseen applications.
As our example is effectively a series of aggregate model elements we can break
the subsequent categories up into their effective program elements. Each rule score is
an isolated element of common form focused on one data element within the category
as such we can describe this code once and sum where appropriate in the aggregation
group. With each category aggregated we can conduct a final logical aggregation.
The final point of order is the management of the AUTO_HIGH_INDICATOR which
is a fundamental element which cascades from all rule score functions. The logic is
thus, if any rule score function exhibits an immediate match without any potential data
misrepresentation then the variable should flag as high and tag the entity accordingly.
5.4.6.1 Country Category Output Functions
These functions are specific to the generation of values associated with the CDD
model for the country category of risks that a banks client base will be evaluated
against. We will describe each function using the TFM.
Table 5.24 presents us with a trace that describes how the program arrives at the
outcomes for RULE_SCORE and AUTO_HIGH for the CDD pillar examining country
risk. The TFM creates an omnibus view of what the program is trying to achieve along
with all potential error states. Thus, below we are presented with traces(T) that provide
the path to generating the values for each. Where last(T) is an auxiliary function to find
the corresponding output message for the trace T in valid situations that do not result
in an error state.
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Table 5.24: Output Function Country Group Rule Score Function
T O(T)
last(T) INSET RULE_SCOREˆ
last(T) = (WEIGHT*(RULE_SCORE_EXP+LOOKUP_SCORE)) RULE_SCORE
last(T) NEQ ((WEIGHT*(RULE_SCORE_EXP+LOOKUP_SCORE)))ˆ ERROR
last(T) INSET AUTO_HIGHˆ
last(T) = (RULE_SCORE > MAX_SCORE) AUTO_HIGH_INDICATOR
last(T) NEQ (AUTO_HIGH)ˆ ERROR
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Table 5.25 is a trace representation of the function responsible for setting a max
value for CDD country pillar attributes, the logical ceiling value, to allow for tailoring
the model at a specific banking institution.
Table 5.25: Country Max Attribute Value
T O(T)
last(T) INSET COUNTRYATTRIBUTEMAXˆ
last(T) = (CDD_RULE_ATTR_MAX) COUNTRYATTRIBUTEMAX
last(T) NEQ ((CDD_RULE_ATTR_MAX))ˆ ERROR
Table 5.26 is the trace that gives us the view into how the final aggregate score,
COUNTRYSCORE is generated. It shows the summation of all generated RULE_SCORE
values while accounting for the logical bounding mechanics that are unique to a given
bank.
To summarize what we have represented above using the TFM; we have documented
using the TFM specification the traces of functions necessary to create an aggregate
score for the attribute rules defined earlier specific to the country related risks defined
in CDD legislation. These traces show how bounding logic, aggregation and error
mitigation come together in the TFM to show how a score is generated and managed.
Further, it provides a developer with a reference document to generate a program to
solve for this agnostic of development language.
5.4.6.2 Entity Category Output Functions
These next set of functions are specific to the generation of values associated with the
CDD model for the, previously described, entity category of risks that a banks client
base will be evaluated against. We will describe each function using the TFM.
Table 5.27 describes using the TFM the process of generating a rule specific score
for the variable RULE_SCORE and whether or not an AUTO_HIGH has been triggered.
Table 5.28 behaves in the same way as Table 5.25 and acts as a logical boundary to
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The final function of note within the entity category is Table 5.29 which behaves in
a similar fashion to Table 5.26. The TFM representations shows how the final aggre-
gation of the entity scores occurs whilst accounting for logical conditions applied to
them. It also shows potential error states.
5.4.6.3 Product Category Output Functions
The final category in the CDD model we are describing is the product category. As
before we will describe each functional element using the TFM and consider the traces
for each.
Table 5.30 behaves as the previous two category rule score aggregations (Table 5.24
and Table 5.27). Thus the TFM representation is similar. There would be an opportu-
nity to collapse elements of this specification but due to the design decision to bundle
by category in our industrial example we have to ensure an accurate mapping.
Table 5.31 presents the TFM representation of the attribute value functions that
bound the max value that can be attributed in this case to a specific product attribute
e.g. The risk of the cheque products is low in comparison card products so attribute
maximums are set accordingly.
Table 5.32 is the TFM specification of the final aggregation scoring function associ-
ated with aggregating all the product rule scores and bounding conditions. Here, as per
the previous categories, the TFM shows the summation of all product rules to arrive
at that final score along with articulating the error state. Further, it accounts for the
flagging of the AUTO_HIGH_INDICATOR on the product category for use within an
enterprise case management system at a specific bank.
This final category followed the pattern of the previous ones ultimately showing the
possibility of collapsing the specification down for the purposes of the TFM represen-
tations. Arguably though because we are working with a pre-drafted industrial example
we have followed the design decisions made by the developer rather than h0ave an ex-
pectation that a code variant of the domain problem be derived from the specification
provided here.
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5.4.6.4 Final Program Output Function
The purpose of a CDD model is to score. This final function is the end point of all
previous aggregation mechanisms and takes into account all category scores. It also
provides a final tally of for the presence of an AUTO_HIGH_INDICATOR flag such
that the model will tag all clients with a score and add the flag as necessary.
Table 5.33 provides us with that final perspective of the model in TFM terms. It
shows the specification aggregating the categorical variable elements as designated
and shows the propagation of the flag variable from categories to this final evaluation
of the client.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4.7 Reading the TFM
In order to understand this representation a little more clearly it helps to utilize
an example. Consider a fictional bank, MEGABANK, that has several million clients.
MEGABANK is required by its regulators to collect information as it on-boards its new
customers and to monitor existing ones for potential indicators of money laundering
related risk. When the client John Doe sits with a relationship manager they are asked
many compliance related questions so that the bank can manage the risk of doing
business with John Doe. The questions asked add values for the fields we collect in
Table 5.4.3 for John Doe’s client record. Table 5.4.3 gives a holistic view of all the
assets that should be collected for each category and aligns directly against EU (2012).
In a situation where the EU adds a new data point to be collected the person responsible
for this TFM representation would update the appropriate category.
While MEGABANK could use manual processes to check the risk that business
with John Doe gives them and assign a risk band accordingly, it is very tedious to do
so in a bank with millions of customers. As people change roles, move homes etc.
it is incumbent upon MEGABANK to track changes in case it introduces a change
that causes a material impact on the risk band John Doe is assigned to. Technology
simplifies this effort significantly. In the case of the SAS model it scores data presented
from the client records, like John Doe, against information repositories that hold data
on sanctioned countries, known terrorists etc. SAS made a development decision to
separate the model into a number of groupings to simplify the maintenance of the code
base. This on examination is a good decision in terms of implementation. It is not
reflective though of how the industry at large documents models and is definitely an
example of a very transparent industry solution.
In the case of our TFM model we align to the implementation decision to separate
the rules into groups that thus become programs that are responsible for distinct inputs
and outputs as presented in Table 5.4.2 focusing on country, entity and products. The
outlier being the programs responsible for aggregation and mechanical activity within
the program logic. Each of which have subcomponents, Table 5.4.4, to help generate
the scores they are responsible for. We can easily extrapolate the bounding logic of
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the maximum and minimum values we saw in the code using these two sections of
the TFM which ensure no vital information is lost. MEGABANK would have unique
values for its implementation and as such the values for each of the variables presented
in Table 5.4.2 would be a decision that MEGABANK would make in its deployment
of the solution.
The same is true of the auxiliary functions presented in Table 5.4.4 as MEGABANK
would make a decision based on the business it conducts and the type of clients. The
SAS code provides a holistic reference but by using the TFM MEGABANK would be
able to create an accurate map of their instance of that solution to provide to regula-
tors. MEGABANK would be able to show its regulators how John Doe’s risk score is
created by starting with the output function of the TFM; Table 5.4.6.1 and showing the
messages this creates; Table 5.4.6.
Assuming that John Doe is a high risk customer with a score of 900. The regulator
should be able to trace using the TFM what data fields were collected. See how John
Doe’s score climbed. In this case we suggest because he was doing business with
North Korea selling arms so that would flag high scores in both Country category rules
and in Entity category rules. This would also flag the AUTO_HIGH_INDICATOR and
immediately require a review by investigators into the dealings of John Doe.
This example is reflective of what a regulator needs to ensure a bank monitors and
executes against. It shows the valid paths and paths that lead to errors being intro-
duced. The regulator would look at all available documentation on a solution, exam-
ine the model, rules and variables. Often this event takes weeks of audit. The TFM
could provide significant lift as it acts as a reference document that the regulator could
train its staff to read and validate. However, some vendors have opted for code level
transparency and while regulators may have some technical acumen such skill is not
common. While we argue here the TFM is readable we validate this assertion later
in this thesis. Ultimately, regulators need documentation they can read and under-
stand. Complex training requirements would cause problems. The fact that the TFM
is language agnostic would help as often localisation issues are introduced in solution
documentation where it is available resulting in further effort to translate accurately.
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5.5 TFM Analysis
Financial crime detection systems are an example of modern complex programming
applications. Earlier in this thesis we defined financial crime detection systems as
critical as they have a profound effect within our society to root out illicit behaviour
and bad actors. The concern with such systems is that with such breadth they can
become incomprehensible and as a result would have the potential to not meet the
specifications laid out by regulators.
Within the FATF guidelines FATF (2012) there is a very exacting set of information
on how to conduct AML compliance at a government level and at an operational level
in banking institutions. This acts as a regulatory reference point for defining the inclu-
sions and exclusions for any model focused on regulatory compliance. In the case of
customer due diligence one can note that the inclusions are focused on the entity, be
that a legal entity or a human client. However, as with any set of laws there is a cer-
tain amount of interpretation applied in the implementation of those regulations into
software.
The software models used in this case would have to use a series of disparate data
stores in order to aggregate each of the specified elements and as a result of the risk-
based approach that the EU demands EU (2012) there can be further variance associ-
ated with the priority of the elements to the aggregate risk score. By using the TFM
we have a means of creating a complete and accurate documented representation of the
model. The TFM contrasts well against other specification methods as it is allows us
to create a complete representation and allows for complexity through its use of partial
functions in its mathematical logic. However, having direct access to the code means
that we have a level of depth that would not be available to regulators and banks as
the company may only provide higher level documentation that does not disclose this
degree of transparency.
One of the major questions in this research has been to understand if the TFM has
applicability across the board to describe an example of financial crime detection code.
This work has sought to understand all the major approaches used by these systems in
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order to build a comprehensive picture of where the TFM could be used successfully.
With regard to our core use case we can see some coverage for the specification of the
customer due diligence model by simply parsing the set elements to ensure inclusion.
Full coverage testing is necessary to ensure that complete coverage is provided by the
TFM specification.
As the entire model can be summarized into a series of concise artefacts we can
observe and validate the compliance of the model with national regulations EU (2012)
as we have been trained to read this form of representation. Without said training a
developer could probably ascertain more value from the code directly but as previously
pointed out clients may not get access to the code being utilized. As all data elements
exposed are provided in clean and concise representations. Not only does this give
us heightened clarity versus other specifications methods like TAM for example but
it also allows for flexibility in the specification. As the regulatory entities themselves
are very dynamic any programs implementing them and specifications therein should
equally be as flexible for additions and subtraction of elements.
Empirically we can prove this by supposition of a new regulation being introduced.
New regulations often require that the banks acquire and monitor a new data field As
each category is similar in mechanics it does not matter where the addition occurs.
Effectively the changes necessary would require the addition of the new rule in the
programs should it be massively different in structure to the other data attributes, but
assuming that it is not the only real addition necessary to the TFM would be the ad-
dition of the attribute to the set elements under examination. Now in comparison to
other formats of reference material, even code, there would be a larger material change
required. Aggregate changes or new category groups would have a similar functional
change but would be more involved than just a specific data attribute but not dramati-
cally so.
Further, the question of readability is answered through the specification as the reg-
ulators can quickly ascertain compliance through a swift analysis of the documentation
which would be a boon for developers. However, this assumes that regulators would
take the time to acquire the necessary expertise to read this form of specification.
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As the TFM is built around messages and documenting each message type through a
table our description of the above model is easily adjustable to include more elements
as long as it doesn’t impact the overarching behaviour of the model. As an example the
proposed changes for the 5th EU anti-money laundering directive include several new
areas of interest that would just be simple program additions to this specification. As
this specification is event based distinct modules for each new regulatory change that
extend the specification could be defined. Like the industrial example posed in Quinn
(2007) this application is equally as extensible as long as functional impact is assessed
as remaining intact.
The major influencing factor in this method is our ability to verify the output using
verification based testing methods. As discussed in Jing (2000) there exist a series of
different mechanized mathematical tools that have the potential to be used as a verifi-
cation engine for specifications in this format. As legislation changes, the specification
can be updated by adding new rows to the TFM representation per legal update and
potentially could be checked using the methods outlined in Jing (2000). Given the
sensitivity of the domain area it is difficult to acquire data from a financial institution
for this purpose and thus was de-scoped.
This final specification could provide significant lift to industrial partners as it would
improve the confidence associated with the specification of the program. We survey
some industry professionals to validate this assertion in a later chapter. As a financial
institution faces fines that can exceed millions and billions when they are found to
be non-compliant with regulation there is significant pressure on vendors to meet the
exacting demands of the regulations being represented in software form. The TFM
helps by providing a specification of the model that is compact, has more clarity that
traditional documentation standards, and is mathematically rigorous. The latter allows
vendors to verify with a high degree of credibility that the program meets with the
client requirements.
Some noted disadvantages to the method include the ramp up time associated with
educating model developers with the approach. There do exist some tools that could
be utilized such as Group (1997), Kahl (2003), Heitmeyer et al. (2005), Lawford et al.
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(2004) and Eles and Lawford (2011), however none of these are natural extensions to
more common development environments. For the most part they demand a separate
kernel and installation which could lead to duplication of specification or documenta-
tion effort for the developer. Any such duplication of effort would quickly negate the
benefits of the specification method as too much time would be wasted on formalizing
the specification.
Another concern was the relative weak adoption of the approach outside of some
research centres globally. However, as we’ve seen through our analysis of the other
specifications many formal methods face a similar issue in terms of adoption to indus-
try. Some more recent examples like Singh et al. (2017) show continued application
of tabular expression technology to describe complex programs. Should more tooling
around the approach exist in more modern integrated development environments the
potential for more mainstream adoption exists.
A further concern is the realistic lift of the method versus good development prac-
tices where code governance and documentation standards are in place. Best practices
as seen in this industrial example allowed for the CDD model to be flexible in multi-
ple modes so that attributes and categories could be manipulated with ease for a bank.
Banks have unique tolerances and risk appetites which demands such flexibility in
their regulatory compliance tools. The TFM becomes very repetitive in this case and
ultimately doesn’t provide much value in the face of such aggregation elements.
The TFM has benefits but there are still concerns on whether they outweigh the dis-
advantages above. An experienced developer that has been educated in formal methods
would quickly acclimatise to using the method to address new regulations and extend
the model program as appropriate. This efficiency gain coupled with the verifiability of
the tabular representation provides developers in this domain with enough justification
to warrant exploration in other financial crime applications.
However a developer inexperienced in formal method approaches would be critical
of the time delay to generate these specifications but would probably appreciate the
insulation they would provide for regulatory risk. Further, the industrial code presented
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while a real world example is only one type of operational system that would need
such specifications and other systems would introduce further complexity in the TFM
representations accordingly. Given the lack of broad industrial application of these
approaches it is questionable if developers would truly see advantage in using this
approach without the presence of a mandate from their marketplace and management
chain.
We explore some strategies to potentially test the coverage of the specification pro-
vided above and to validate the ease of comprehension through as survey in the next
chapter of this work.
5.6 Summary
This chapter introduced the reader to an industrial application of financial crime
detection methods in the form of a customer due diligence model. A customer due
diligence model is an approach to risk rate both traditional clients and legal entities.
Risk rating takes into account many variable describing the behaviour of the entity.
These variables can be more or less important to a financial institution depending on
its active business model and risk appetite.
An example model tied to the subject area was introduced and described literally in
terms of its intent and the code based representation. All aspects of the model were
discussed including aggregation, rule logic and variables considered in the operation of
the program. To add clarity each aspect of the model was divided into subcomponents
addressing the areas of interest documented in EU legislation (EU, 2012).
The model was described formally using the formal methods Trace Function Method
approach (Parnas and Dragomiroiu, 2006). This broke the program into a series of
discrete elements finalizing in an output function in tabular form. This tabular form is
easy to read to those trained in its use, verify and allows for efficient consumption of the
logic of the model. An analysis on the advantages and disadvantages followed arriving
at the conclusion that the method provides some lift in financial crime detection system
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design whilst having concern about the ramp up time for education and the lack of
integration into traditional development environments.





To ensure the validity of the approach it is important to test the specification we gen-
erated as part of the TFM process. We examine two fundamental questions in this
chapter;
1. Does the specification provide adequate coverage in accurately describing the
requirements for the software?
2. Does the specification provide lift in comprehensibility of complex software re-
quirements?
In order to answer these questions we attempt to solve using both quantitative and
qualitative approaches. For the first question we examine some systematic testing
strategies that could be leverage to validate the coverage of the specification. We pos-
tulate whether we could utilize an automated means using a mechanized mathematical
tool for this purpose as has been utilized in the past research (Jing, 2000).
In terms of comprehensibility of the specification we are reliant on human inter-
pretation of the specification and as such generated a survey to study the perception
domain experts of the TFM approach around requirement description. This study pro-
vides examples of specifications using the TFM and requires experts to comment on
ease of use, accuracy, detail retention and flexibility. We analyse and discuss the re-
sults of the survey and draw conclusions regarding the usefulness of the method in this
space.
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6.2 Coverage Testing
Independent of the domain problem being solved it is important that any software mod-
ule undergoes testing. The IEEE standard for software test documentation IEEE Std
829-1998 defines testing as "the process of analysing a software item to detect the dif-
ferences between existing and required conditions (that is, bugs) and to evaluate the
features of the software item." The inference from this definition is that the software
module under test is presented with all possible variants of input variable feasible for
the program and that a verification of the expected outputs for these variables is per-
formed.
Given the complexity of modern programs, some of which utilize millions of lines
of code, it can be difficult to create an exhaustive suite of tests to examine all variations
of input variables for a given program. As such, common sense needs to be applied
in determining bounding criteria for the scope of testing that needs to be performed
and to leverage as much automation as possible to increase the coverage of these test
suites across the software. Coverage testing tools, like those discussed in Horgan et al.
(1994), would provide significant lift in helping developers automate much of this
process as we recommend.
As we are utilizing an industrial example for our use case we are going to assume
that the conventional forms of testing have occurred and rather focus instead on the
verification of the specification generated over the course of this research. Pivotally,
we will examine coverage testing the specification itself. Quinn (2007) defines re-
quirements coverage testing as being the examination of the component to verify that
it adheres to the specified requirements. They continue by noting that the aim of cover-
age testing is to cover as much of the description as possible so that the implementation
has been exercised and shown to be consistent with the description and no assumptions
made regarding frequency.
The results of applying coverage testing to our TFM specification would show
which aspects of the description were accurately satisfied. Quinn (2007) also discusses
limitations associated with the approach. They note that no weighting is assumed for
any part of the description as we assume equal probability for all the requirements.
Given our previous remarks earlier in the chapter around the increasing complexity of
modern software programs testing every potential input demands an ever increasing
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volume of test cases. Arguably, we should be able to use a testing harness like those
mentioned in Yang et al. (2009) which examines many examples of these tools for
configuration, automation and test reporting functionality but given the unique nature
of our descriptions there would potentially be further development necessary to extend
these.
In the case of our use case there are a broad range of potential values that could
be utilized in the input variables consumed due to breadth of the domain problem.
Example data would be inclusive of elements of names, date of birth information,
address information etc. As such we can only apply a limited range of values and
permutations to test the accuracy of the specification giving rise to the potential for
other bugs to arise later in the implementation.
The TFM description of the requirements does provide some lift when conducting
coverage testing. Namely;
1. Due to the fact TFM representations are tabular they simplify coverage testing
execution by each row of the table partitioning the inputs of the module. The ag-
gregate of all partitions thus becomes a simplified variant showing full coverage
of the requirements description.
2. For each partition, a corresponding testing pattern can be inferred. Quinn (2007)
notes that these would include sets of events that are expected at each point in
a trace. From these, the possible sets of test case traces can be derived for each
row of the table.
3. By using these test patterns it is possible to generate test cases randomly or
with a predetermined selection of constraints. Given this option it is feasible to
generate multiple test cases per row of the TFM description.
Earlier in this thesis we discussed some of the previous work conducted in the area of
tabular expressions such as Jing (2000), Lawford et al. (2004), Heitmeyer et al. (2005)
and Eles and Lawford (2011). Many of these attempted to utilize automated means of
checking tabular expressions using a mechanized mathematical tool. Many ended up
using an automated theorem proving system.
Automated theorem proving is a field of automated reasoning which concentrates
on the proving of mathematical theorems using a computer program. A theorem is
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made up of two main components, a set of assumptions and conclusion derived from
the said assumptions and a set of inference rules. In computer science we can describe
and document certain aspect of software using mathematics. These descriptions can
be transformed into theorems describing there components, a theorem which then can
be verified by using automated or human means. Using this technique we can draw
certain conclusions about the validity of a specification for a piece of software.
In Janicki (1995) we are introduced to the concept of describing functions using
tabular expressions. Earlier work provided us with a logic for comprehending these
expressions Janicki et al. (1996) and gave a foundation for us to see that by using
such means of documentation it made the possibility of verification easier. Tabular
expressions, fundamentally, are nothing more than a different format for observing
the components of a function and the resultants for operations of that function under
varying conditions. Using these components it is then possible to construct a theorem,
based on the logic discussed in Parnas (1993a), and to verify whether we can or cannot
verify this theorem.
This aligns with our goal of checking the coverage of our specifications and pro-
vides a means of cleanly automating the tests. In the previous iterations of research
into a checking tool PVS Owre et al. (1992) was the tool chosen for this purpose. PVS
has a number of built-in structures that support the checking of tabular expressions
such as its built-in table data structure as well as automation in the form of a batch
mode Owre (1997). It also supports partial functions and the logic proposed in Parnas
(1993a) which is crucial for automating the checking of tabular expressions. PVS is
also the only theorem prover known to successfully answer the challenge set in Parnas
(1993b).
Given the fact that our use case is effectively an aggregate model automation to the
degree described in Jing (2000) is unnecessary. However, in future research of more
complex financial crime programs such automation could provide significant value
in shortening the validation cycle for developers working in the field. This would
be especially true if we were in a position to test against real data extracted from a
financial institution as the volumes in question would be too high to allow for manual
review in a reasonable time frame.
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6.2.1 Testing Strategies
As our use case is an aggregate model made up of several subcomponents we can
dissect the model and deal with each subcomponent in isolation should we so desire
or look at the final outputs and test there. Given that a customer due diligence model
is designed to scale horizontally to map to changes in legislation it is more beneficial
to create strategies based on both of these perspectives and determine the test cases
necessary for coverage of the requirements considered.
However, it would be foolish to assume there is only one strategy to test for ade-
quate coverage even given the domain regulatory requirements. Cai and Lyu (2005)
makes solid arguments for having several testing profiles or strategies to solve for cov-
erage to ensure against potential faults within the software.
We consider the following testing strategies building on previous research that also
examined industrial applications for TFM use cases (Quinn, 2007);
1. Strategy 1: Consider every test pattern respectively and for all successive ele-
ments of the trace choose a message. This set of selected messages should not,
in accordance to the description, result in an error state.
2. Strategy 2: Consider every message and for all successive elements of the trace
sample at least one test case which should undergo multiple test passes. This test
evaluates for constructive messages and error states.
3. Strategy 3: Consider all test patterns and evaluate that every combination of
constructive and error state messages. Assuming only test cases not resulting
in a member of the error set are considered this should attempt to exhaust all
constructive message outcomes.
Test Strategy 1 The purpose of this strategy is to look at evaluating the constructive
traces for the software and ensuring that the outputs don’t result in an error state that
wasn’t included in the trace. Whilst it’s prudent to be exhaustive in testing this given
the domain of the problem combining multiple data elements for the model there is
still the potential for error to creep in. This effectively results in more of a sample data
set applied to the test pattern. The description in the trace tells us that we shouldn’t
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arrive in an error state but without trying the combinations of all messages it’s difficult
to give a complete guarantee.
An example from our industrial use case to consider would be industrial occupation
codes, OCCUPATION, (Commision, 2008) an element of the set EntityScore 5.18). For
this strategy one may consider one type of OCCUPATION listed in Commision (2008)
and on evaluation deign the test pattern a success.
Test Strategy 2 This strategy ensures that more comprehensive coverage compared
to that of our first pattern, by making sure that every message occurs once. It attempts
to give a broader test list of all potential inputs for the program. This mechanism
provides a more controlled means of validating the interfaces of the model. While
still not exhaustive it gives a better indication of potential bugs and error states within
the software. Failures detected though could also be indicative of issues in how the
description was implemented rather than the description itself.
Continuing our example from our industrial use case for this strategy, consider the
variable OCCUPATION from 5.18 once more. We would sample several OCCUPA-
TION types listed in Commision (2008) along with a number of error candidates and
on evaluation deign the test pattern a success should it consistently react as per the
description.
Test Strategy 3 This strategy is similar to the first test strategy in that attempts to test
every variation of messages but deviates in that it is inclusive of those that result end
in an error condition also. This is the most exhaustive test strategy and requires a huge
number of variant test cases cascading through the model. It also would be the most
comforting in terms of ensuring a fully comprehensive result regarding the accuracy
of the description as it would showcase all potential failures and unpredicted events
within the system.
As before we can continue our previous example from our industrial use case to
explain this strategy. Once again considering the variable OCCUPATION from 5.18.
We would execute all six hundred and forty OCCUPATION types listed in Commision
(2008), approximately, along with a number of error candidates and on evaluation
deign the test pattern a success should it consistently react as per the description.
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Recommendation Given the regulatory nature of the domain use case we believe
that only the most exhaustive and comprehensive test strategy would satisfy regulators.
As such test strategy 3 would be the logical path to utilize for financial crime use cases
pertinent to the anti-money laundering domain. Whilst this does mean significant more
pressure on the developers to ensure accuracy they can ensure the confidence of their
clients and subsequently regulators because of this rigour.
Further, it would be our recommendation to maximize the use of automation to
fulfil this requirement as it would become very tedious to manually execute each test
case.
6.2.2 Analysis
Fundamentally, we arrive back at the question of whether the specification is complete.
Given the strategy necessary to ensure that completeness requires extensive levels of
information available to a bank it is difficult to give clear guidance on this. Our argu-
ment is that the TFM as a method should be able to provide the right degree of rigour
and is expressive in its construction to allow for mathematically accurate representa-
tions of industrial applications.
Further, we do not have a suite of tools to automate the test strategy we recommend
above which necessitates a large manual effort to ensure completeness. Thus, we return
to our assumptions that if we are confident that the TFM is mathematically sound
and we are further confident that the representation of the CDD model is an accurate
and correct specification, arguments can be made that the specification is somewhat
complete. Only when we have conducted full testing of the model TFM specifications
via a test harness with complete bank data would we be able to be completely confident
in the completeness of the specification.
6.3 Comprehensibility Testing
In order to effectively evaluate comprehensibility of the method it is necessary to in-
volve experts that have had exposure to financial crime software solutions to evaluate
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the method. Such endeavours are qualitative in nature but to ensure a more robust eval-
uation we prepared a survey which was circulated to several unbiased experts in the
area. To ensure a more accurate assessment we included several important organiza-





We make a series of assumptions regarding this study. Firstly, we assume that each
of the respondents have limited or no exposure to formal methods and specifically
the Trace Function Method Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006). Second, we assume that
each of the respondents plays is active in presenting software solutions for financial
crime domain use cases to financial institutions and thus, are exposed to the limitations,
grievances and gaps associated with this time of software. Finally, we assume that
our experts have an understanding of mathematics and under stand the software life
cycle. This is critical to ensure that they have the potential to see lift in a more formal
approach to writing software document specifications.
6.3.1 Survey Structure
The survey firstly introduces the reader to the importance of both readable and precise
documentation. This is accomplished by guiding the reader through a guided example
that showcases the issue of separating readability at the cost of precision and precision
at the cost of readability.
Building on this foreword we introduce the trace function method and highlight
the potential lift that specifications that are both easily understandable/readable and
precise. The justification for this basis is provided by highlighting the concerns of
financial institutions in being able to provide accurate descriptions of software utilized
in anti-money laundering compliance. We can assert that regulators of the banking
sector are not experts in software development nor formal methods. They are our
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ultimate reader and thus the representations need to be presented in a format that is
understandable by those that have had limited exposure to these topics.
The survey itself is provided as an appendix to this work and can be found in
Appendix 2. This survey was sent to ten industry professionals and of the ten we
received responses from five. These five provided their comments through a series of
expert interviews.
6.3.2 Results
The results of the survey echo a similar study into formal method utilization in industry,
Barnes (2011). There the author concluded that the challenges that exist for formal
methods in industry could be summed in the following categories;
• scalable
• notation approachable to all stakeholders
• expressive (ease of capturing the problem)
• tool supported
In the case of the TFM arguments can be made for each of these problems given the
availability of supporting literature examining industrial examples, some tools have
been developed in different academic settings and the constant demonstrations by the
methods author that the method is easily trained to developers.
However, even making that argument there are concerns of findings similar to Wassyng
and Lawford (2003) in another formal methods project with industry. We looked at
elements of this project earlier where some tools were created for the purpose of sup-
porting the method namely Lawford et al. (2004).In this case the authors noted that
the use of formal methods in the project was a success but the reality is that a lot of
this was success was built off the level of expertise of the team involved whom were
highly trained in this method. Further, they noted that the industrial client in this case,
a nuclear power plant, had sufficient motivation to ensure the success and thus was
able to bring resources to bear to ensure success.
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The author also critically pointed out concerns regarding the practicality of using
formal methods. Some issues they noted were not completely solved like, timing but
were mitigated during the course of the project. The biggest critique though was the
lack of comprehensive tool support for using formal methods on that project. A situa-
tion that frankly has not advanced much since this paper was authored.
While some tooling has been created in academic environments there still is no suite
of tools available that would be necessary for an industrial environment. This was
cause for concern amongst our survey respondents.
Candidly even the author of the TFM method has similar concerns. As discussed
in Parnas (2010) the author queries why formal method approaches have not been
adopted into mainstream software development. There are several key observations
in this research that examine previous industrial use cases and if the formal method
employed was further adopted. Generally speaking it is clear that all the industrial
examples specified are isolated cases of use of the formal method employed pointing
at major gaps between research and application.
Reasons for this include the divided perception of the use of mathematical specifica-
tions in software development. As software complexity continues to increase software
developers have become jaded regarding the potential of employing mathematically
based specification methods to improve software quality. Another cited gap is the
foundational training according to Parnas (2010). Engineering principles taught to
students of software development when formal methods were originally proposed are
generally no longer as important as technology related topics. The final gap is a gap
between the mathematics employed by software developers where the methods they
use could be simplified by older mature methods once dominant in the field.
Extrapolating from these remarks it is clear to see that many formal methods seem to
be trapped within a bubble and are extremely unlikely to be utilized in industrial soft-
ware development companies. The concerns delivered in Parnas (2010) were echoed
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by the survey respondents. For the survey a cross section of developers, domain ex-
perts, and product managers. The consensus of our survey results was that formal
method utilization would not be beneficial in this industry.
The examples in the survey were understandable for those with a heavier mathemat-
ical background. One of our respondents, a senior developer and product owner noted
that with regard to the examples provided; "They give an outline of the main access
methods as well as a concise and range limited description for their operation, with
boundary conditions clearly indicated". Their focus area is "Data storage and analyt-
ics platform for storing sensitive time series data that is immutable and is FDA CFR 22
Part 11 Compliant" for compliance applications. The company in question is a small
development house employing five to ten developers. However when questioned on
the potential of using formal methods they responded by noting that they "Considered
using formal methods, but determined use would not be cost effective".
Further, the same respondent elaborated; "Rigorous testing and compliance verifi-
cation provides a greater certainty and validation of applications than the appliance
of formal specification that would still need testing against the implementation. The
formal methods would prove the design but not validate the implementation". This
provides industrial validation for some of the concerns stated in Parnas (2010) and
Barnes (2011). "Compliance with regulatory requirements is always bespoke to the
needs of the regulatory body and their testing paradigms, which required individual
approaches per body", was the concern regarding using the approach in the regulatory
compliance domain. The conclusion was quite stark; "Math is always off-putting to
the layman, which is a barrier to adoption".
Another respondent, a subject matter domain expert from a large software house
with over one thousand developers, noted that "The CDD example has the clear preci-
sion and description of the input and output but lacks the description of the process."
Their concern was that the utilization of mathematics obfuscated the meaning of the
regulation and could cause difficulties for a regulator. The business focus of this re-
spondent is "Transaction monitoring, CDD, and sanction screening for AML compli-
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ance."As such, their opinion carries impact as they represent a true practitioner in the
field.
They were more optimistic about utilizing the TFM (Parnas and Dragomiroiu, 2006)
stating that "The approach can further reduce the ongoing operating cost due to ease of
software maintainability. In addition, the compliance risk can be reduce due to better
model interpretability". They further noted that "Clients expect to have end-to-end un-
derstanding of their own financial crime program. Ultimately, the software is deployed
to support the program, so program owners such as CAMLO1 has the ultimate respon-
sibility to respond to regulatory requests". Extrapolating from these remarks shows
that there is potential for use if the barriers regarding training and comprehension can
be addressed.
Ultimately, the responses to the survey had a common theme regarding the high
barrier to train developers to use the method, impart the knowledge around the math-
ematical notation and ensure that the rigour necessary to ensure document accuracy
is ensured. Even with such provisions our respondents had doubts that the use of the
TFM would be provide significant enough lift to warrant the expenditure necessary to
train their teams. This was held true even when the concern regarding regulatory risk
was weighed with them.
Potentially, when formal methods evolves to map to the engineers work-flow and
intuitive mechanisms exist via non intrusive tool kits for application development there
is potential for formal methods to help financial crime developers. Quite some time
has passed since Parnas (2010) and it does not look like industry is ready for these
approaches yet.
6.4 Summary
This chapter proposed some strategies to test the coverage of the TFM representation of
the model provided. It focused at three levels of exhaustive testing and concluded that
1CAMLO; Chief Anti-Money Laundering Officer, a senior role in banking responsible for a banks
regulatory compliance framework.
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for regulatory driven applications that only the most exhaustive would be acceptable
to regulators.
The chapter further introduced a survey to check for the comprehension level re-
quired by developers and domain experts working in the financial crime industry when
studying TFM specifications. There was some optimism about lift using the method to
persuade clients of accurate software specification but the ultimate conclusion was that
the barrier to entry was the heavy reliance on complex mathematics and training for
developers. As such they did not see a place for formal methods in their development
teams at present.
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"Programming is like sex: one mistake and you’re pro-




We consider the main results of this thesis are as follows
• A Trace Function Method Description of a Financial Crime Model focused on
Customer Due Diligence
• An analysis of financial crime detection systems, with an in-depth review of
how they attempt to systematically solve for financial crime activity coupled
with some examples on how they do this in code.
• Some background reference material on regulation for financial crime detection
software from the European Union and other regulatory entities.
• A review of popular formal methods technology and in depth analysis of the use
of tabular expressions for document driven design.
• A survey sent to industry professionals regarding their ability to comprehend the
method and to learn their opinion on whether it is industry applicable.
More detailed discussions of these results are considered later in this chapter.
7.1.1 Review of Formal Methods Technology and Introduction to
the Trace Function Method
Chapter two provides a succinct review of the strengths and weaknesses of several
popular formal methods utilized to describe critical systems. We evaluate several can-
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didates and decide on the utilization of the trace function method in order to describe
our industrial use case.
Further the chapter introduces the mathematics behind the trace function method
and helps provide tangible visualizations for the reader so that they can understand how
we formulate the tabular representations of the use case model later in the document.
These preliminaries showcase the difference between the Parnas approach Parnas and
Dragomiroiu (2006) and what it offers to software developers who are looking to create
bullet-proof specifications.
Further, this chapter gives the reader several examples of how to create tabular
expression trees from several table types, thereby allowing one to assess whether the
program could easily be translated using this formal method approach.
7.1.2 Model Legal Reference Analysis
Anti-money laundering compliance is a thorough field with a broad depth of legislation
adopted by governments globally. Customer Due Diligence is a process that exists
within the broader area of this legislative area. Chapter 3 provides the background to
the legalities adopted by the European Union member states EU (2012) that provide
the basis for financial regulators efforts at a national level.
Our analysis shows how FATFFATF (2012) recommendations are considered and
enacted. These in turn put further compulsory requirements on the financial services
sector. Given the volume of transactions and the client populations it quickly becomes
a problem to scale any manual process to search for money laundering indicators.
Technology has been deployed across all financial service products and channels for
this purpose but these technologies are often black boxes.
Given the urgency in government and the punitive measures adopted by regulators to
banks that fail to comply further rigour is necessary within the technologies deployed
to solve for money laundering use cases. Our analysis concludes that through better
standards of verifiable documentation using formal methods software developers could
meet that demand with ease. Further, it would provide them with an easily managed
representation of all applied code elements and how it meets any legal reference.
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7.1.3 An analysis of financial crime detection systems, with an in-
depth review of how they attempt to systematically solve for
financial crime activity
We examine financial crime detection systems in Chapter 4 as a modern example of a
critical system. The basis being the integrity of the global financial system and the im-
plications on terrorist financing. We examined what mathematically driven techniques
are applied to capture illicit behaviour and conduct an analysis on how that would
translate into use with a formal methods approach.
Each technique has mature use within the sector to solve for financial crime con-
cerns. Industry uses several techniques in combination in order to address different
vectors of the attack schemes that criminals use to target financial institutions. We
examine the history of research into each technique to isolate their strengths and to
understand how complex it would be to translate them into a formal method represen-
tation.
Example code was examined to determine how fit for purpose the TFM was for
industrial level code. Two examples were discussed one which examined the problem
of name recognition, a common concern from the regulations enacted throughout the
European Union. Second, was a neural network applied to a specific seeded data set.
This second example is more illustrative of modern financial crime techniques as they
attempt to embrace more predicative capabilities coupled with machine learning.
7.1.4 Trace Function Method Description of a Financial Crime
Model
This thesis presents a full described model of a customer due diligence problem in
chapter 5. The initial code for the model is provided so that the reader can quickly
assess how the trace function method transforms the code into a compact entity that can
be readily assessed and verified (manually or through mechanized mathematical tools).
The model integrates a complete interpretation of EU law and FATF recommendations
on the area of KYC (Know Your Customer) data collection and risk scoring.
The model is a translation of SAS model code that specifically targets client risk
rating problems. The model incorporates numerous data elements mostly harvested
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from curated collections of information on known terrorists, sanctioned individuals and
drug traffickers It looks at risk topologies by dividing it into three pillars and creating
a nested aggregation facility that ends with a final aggregate score of comprehensive
customer due diligence related risk. Once that score is provided other operational
systems use it for the purposes of ongoing surveillance of a given client such that the
bank can make a quick determination should they become too risky to do business
with necessitating a report to regulators and de-risking the client from their book of
business.
7.1.5 Use Case Conclusions
Financial crime detection systems are a valuable area which we believe worthy of fur-
ther analysis and applications in formal methods. The above work examined code con-
structs that attempt to solve for customer due diligence risk ratings within the financial
crime domain.
We have earlier in this work discussed the plethora of different methods utilized in
this domain to solve for financial crime. What is clear though is that formal methods
could play a vital role in the definition of new scenarios and model developments.
Currently considerable effort is expended by financial institutions and governments in
efforts to optimize detection methods at play across the financial spectrum.
If we take a more formal approach like Parnas (2003a) there is more impetus put on
designing a higher quality of specification which is more code or realization agnostic.
This gives us many benefits in that it provides a larger degree of flexibility in how
the realized design is applied to new technological advances. Further, it provides the
detection methods themselves with a more refined definition and enhances an analysts
knowledge of all potential outcomes in the implemented code base.
While very different in design from traditional applications for formal methods
there is a clear bridge here between improved software design and a realized goal of
better detection facilities impacting us all.
The criticality of these systems is not in dispute but due to the proprietary nature
of many of these systems it is difficult to assert the impact of formal methods on a de-
velopment cycle at one of these institutions. However given the predominance of agile
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paradigms at this institutions one could foresee considerable push back on utilization
of the approach.
7.1.6 Survey into Industrial application
Several strategies were presented with regard to solving for coverage tests for the
CDD model and examining the representations provided. Of the three strategies posited
only one could provide the right degree of rigour that would satisfy regulators and those
under regulatory supervision for their software.
To further explore the comprehensibility of the methods presented a survey was
issued to a group of industry domain experts, developers and product managers in the
financial crime domain. The aim of the survey was to get a measure of how effective the
Trace Function Method was at creating specifications that industry professionals could
understand. A further goal of the survey was to understand if industry professionals
could see a value in using formal methods in financial crime software development.
Of the 10 people surveyed, the respondents indicated a clear commentary on their
lack of comprehension of the specifications provided. Even when give ancillary ma-
terial to improve their education they found the specifications convoluted and compli-
cated. After some discussions they agreed that some lift could be provided assum-
ing regulators could be trained into understanding the specifications themselves but it
would take a massive investment in education of developers, bankers and regulators at
a global scale to be worth the cost of implementing formal methods at an industrial
scale.
Further critique was given regarding the lack of industrial level tooling available
to support the use of any formal method and sufficient reference sources from other




From the outset this research has been about proving that formal methods have a
place in describing industrial financial crime programs. As argued in Parnas (2003a)
formal methods provide a safety net enabling the verification of software programs and
a useful mechanism to consume complex design elements. Within the context of our
industrial domain, financial crime, a complex reference entity in the form of regional
legislation exists to provide hard limits and precise operational demands of the finan-
cial services sector. EU (2012) is an exacting framework which demands EU member
states to address through legislative measures within their own national constitutions.
It specifically addresses the area of anti-money laundering and related topics under that
umbrella and calls for operational means of inspection the data collected by financial
institutions to highlight anti-money laundering risks.
This research examines the use case of customer due diligence which is a sub-
component of anti-money laundering measures. Customer due diligence primarily
asks banks to acquire from prospective and existing clients authentic documents to
prove identity, source of wealth and to disclose potential risks. As per FATF guide-
lines (FATF, 2012) an accurate reflection of customer data is imperative to measuring
the likelihood of money laundering related risk in a given financial institutions. Clients
of significant risk will not disclose all information if possible and will hide behind fa-
milial entities, mules, shell corporations or simply just provide doctored information to
bypass control mechanisms at the bank in question. As such, banks often turn to tech-
nology to solve for customer due diligence related concerns in order to ensure that they
can prove they provide the correct degree of rigour on client risk profiles to regulators.
The intention of using technology in this space is to provide a safety net for financial
institutions to conduct the analysis on the client base for them. Often this is driven
by the volume of clients and transactions involved but also due to the complexity of
modern financial channels and how clients interact with them. As such an implicit
relationship exists between regulators, the banks and vendors in this space to meet the
stated needs outlined in legislation. There is however, a burden of proof required by
regulators to ensure everything is operating as it seems and when this fails the penalty
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tends to be immense financial fines and threats to the banks license to operate. Vendors
are thus placed in a position where they need to verify and validate inputs and outputs
associated with their programs to ensure adequate coverage.
As a result of these explicit laws and the implicit relationships between entities this
research argues that formal methods has a place to bridge the gap between software
and legislation by providing accurate documentation elements that can be verified for
accuracy. The field of formal methods is broad and there are many potential candidates
for use in this area as proven by Abrial (1996), Heitmeyer (2001) and Lawford et al.
(2004). This research argues that Parnas and Dragomiroiu (2006) represents a logical
choice of candidate method. The argument is that the TFM represents a modern take
on methods employed for almost half a century in both academia and industry stem-
ming from original work introduced in Parnas (1972b). Extensive research has been
compiled across several organizations focused on proving precursors of the method,
the method itself and developing tools for use with these methods. It provides a math-
ematical model that provides a high degree of flexibility allowing for the representation
of highly complex programs as clearly illustrated by Bane et al. (2004).
The contrary view is that the method provides too much functionality for a use case
that can effectively be described as a aggregation model. The use case examined here is
just one aspect of anti-money laundering programs and not all are simple aggregation
mechanisms. Further, as you attempt to describe more complex programs that utilize
more complex techniques the full breadth of the TFM would provide support without
the need for extending the method. Another concern is the complexity of the traces
associated with the output of the method and the usability of these traces. Given that
these traces are machine readable for systems like PVS, a theorem proving system
developed as per Shankar et al. (1993), that can be verified and have successfully been
analysed in the past in Rushby and Srivas (1993). As per machine readability we argue
that simple tabular representations are a more effective means of consuming complex
data relationships than relying on text that may be interpreted in several ways.
Other concerns point to the lack of industrial penetration by this and the other formal
methods and build upon the argument presented in Parnas (2010). Without substantive
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changes to the educating engineers on the utility of formal methods and the lift they
provide it is unlikely that any industry, financial crime software development included,
would use any of them to pursue a more comprehensibly accurate form of specifica-
tion reference documents. This is especially true given the lack of tools available to
developers to support these approaches.
This research posits that it is feasible to use formal methods to describe financial
crime software programs. Further, it argues that the benefits of these methods is higher
transparency and a white box approach thus improving the confidence in such systems
by financial institutions and those that regulate them. The TFM represents a formal
method that could be used to provide the coverage needed to describe such programs as
it provides the mathematical means of doing so and the flexibility to describe complex
critical systems. However, as stated given the lack of penetration of formal methods
into software development it is extremely unlikely that these approaches will find a use
in industry at present, but potentially in the future.
7.3 Future Work
This work examined an entirely new area for formal method based design specifica-
tions that of financial crime detection that to date has been overlooked academically.
We have only begun to research this area and did not consider some of the broader
areas of interest in this field like neural networks, machine learning or Bayesian/Pre-
dictive Analytics. As these areas were out of scope for this research we would like
to advance our research by completing a review of models and coding standards for
design using these other techniques.
A logical next step would the the design of a means of verifying such descriptions
to allow developers of financial crime systems a mechanism to automate the verifi-
cation of the expressions generated during development. Work such as the research
in the area like Eles and Lawford (2011) makes more sense as it applies the tabular
expression checking context and would act as a foundation to such efforts. It does
introduce some potential logical gaps but ultimately provides more usability. As such
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we would seek to build a more cohesive integrated framework with mechanized math-
ematical tools for verification purposes but utilize the logic of Bane et al. (2004) for
completeness.
As our specification design is intended to work with the financial crime detection
domain another area of future work would be the extension of an integrated tabular
expression environment with development tools designed around specifying these sys-
tems. While it is not feasible to integrate cleanly with proprietary vendor offerings it
would be of interest to see if we could construct a tabular development environment
with specific emphasis on modelling languages like SAS, Python or R. This could
solve for some of the concerns raised by our survey respondents.
One limitation that was a major concern in our research was the scale and complex-
ity of the information being examined. Modern financial crime systems are designed to
operate on tens to hundreds of millions of financial and non financial transactions daily.
This means for a pretty harsh but data rich environment where many permutations and
variances on the data can exist. Testing new scenarios described in our tabular spec-
ifications here would hit scaling problems. It would be interesting to conduct further
research into a scalable tool suites for formal methods that examine proving strate-
gies in an environment like Spark and Hadoop which are typically used in financial
institutions.
7.4 Summary
This work has aimed to provide a basis to evaluate a formal method description ap-
proach using an industry use case so as to understand if if the method provides utility
to developers. By employing an example of a new critical system in the financial crime
detection domain it was hoped to expose new applications for both a formal methods
based approach to document driven design (Parnas, 2003a) and further to provide de-
velopers of solutions in that field with a mechanism to check these specifications.
Methods utilized in financial crime detection and the back-end regulations were
discussed and insights provided. An examination of code used in this area yield an
analysis that suggests that tabular expressions based on financial crime detection code
provide a more compact form that also could be verified. Further we postulated that
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formal methods would give great value to this domain but would be hindered by us-
ability and currently adopted development paradigms by the vendors that dominate
this field. In summary, it is clear that while formal methods provide some lift it is




8.1 CDD Use Case SAS Code
8.1.0.1 CDDR_C101
The following code utilizes several variables and is focused on a data field examining
the client field ’ORGANIZATION’. The code works by passing the variables to the
execution harness. In this case the ORGANIZATION registration information is being
evaluated against a country watch-list. As such the attribute in question, REGISTRA-
TION, is evaluated by the model. Some of the variables manage ceiling, floor and auto
setting values for situations where the bank would require those values to be preset.
It has logic to evaluate the score of this rule versus the maximum allowable score for
a rule within a category. Further, logic is provided on value range controls and the









, auto_high_exp=%nrbquote(ifc(RULE_SCORE > MAX_SCORE,’Y’,’N’))
, triggering_value_var=ATTRIBUTE_CHAR_VALUE
, triggering_value_type_code=CHAR
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);
8.1.0.2 CDDR_C102
This element examines the mailing address associated with the entity to determine if it
maps to addresses provided in published sanction watch lists (OFAC, United Nations
etc.) or with internal hot lists. 8.1, follows the same pattern as 5.5 in terms of input
but instead examines a different aspect of the customer record. Each of the attributes
examined under the input variable ATTR_NAME align directly to fields of interest in
EU (2012) that banks are required to monitor.
Table 8.1: C102 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ("STREET" "MAILING")
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 200
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 1
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8.1.0.3 CDDR_C103
This grouping examines the address of a potential beneficial owner of the account. A
beneficial owner is someone that uses an intermediary in order to mask their activities.
There can exist multiple layers in between the account and the ultimate beneficial
owner. The practice of layering is a common tool in money laundering and can be
commonly observed in use by drug trafficking cartels. 8.2 shows here the attribute of
interest is focused on beneficial ownership risks and understand how much in terms of
percentages is substantive risk for the bank.
Table 8.2: C103 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ’BENE_OWNER_RESIDENCE’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 0.5
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 200
PCT_OWNERSHIP Numeric Constant Minimum Amount of Ownership Required 0.25
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8.1.0.4 CDDR_C104
This field, 8.3, examines address information associated with directorships. A common
practice to clean money is to utilize income/dividend splitting between directors of a
shell corporation. Most national registrars of incorporation require that some KYC
information is collected regarding directors but this for the most part is incomplete.
Some of the information regarding address information can point to sanction based
irregularities previously discussed.
Table 8.3: C104 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name "DIRECTOR_RESIDENCE"
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 200














8.1.1 Rule Group CDDRG_C020
A sanctions rule group is one that examines for breaches of national and international
sanctions on people, goods and countries. Not every sanction rule group contributes
the same level of risk to the bank. In our example the developer simplified matters by
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creating one group of rules to map to sanctions regulations in EU (2012). However
in a situation where others exist the use of minimums and maximum values would be
more of a necessity.
8.1.1.1 CDDR_C910
No parameters are utilized here as this manages the maximum value attributed to the
overall group. Once all values from each rule within the group are aggregated the score
is checked against the maximum value here and if it is exceeded the model uses the
score here otherwise the aggregate number. Here a bank would be able to decide and
adjust the overall risk attributed to country-based KYC risks and make a determination
if it is more/less important to the operations of the bank. Normally a bank would deter-
mine this area to be of higher importance when they have more of a multi-geographic
presence or if they operate within a region where there is extreme risk of terrorist group
activities.
/* Country Max Attribute Rule */
%cdd_rule_attr_max;
8.1.2 Rule Group CDDRG_C030
The country category group will always be a dynamic category due to the changing
nature of sanctions lists. As new lists and risks are identified the logic controlled how
those scores impact country risk scores would be considered in this section.
8.1.2.1 CDDR_C920
No Parameters are necessary for this group as it creates the composite score based off
of the guiding logic of the maximum and the overall combinatorial logic of the sub-
groups. The PRIMARY_ENTITY_NUMBER referred to below is indicative of a unique
identifier that the bank would use to identify all client activity at the bank through any
channel. The code behind this group behaves by doing the actual aggregation of all
necessary rules for this specific client.
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/* Weighted Sum of Country Attribute Scores Divided by
Weighted Sum of Max Country Score */
/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */





, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_
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8.1.2.3 CDDR_E102
Similar to industrial attributes banks also risk rate the details it has with different
legal entity types in order to ensure it meets with overall risk goals. As per 8.4, le-
gal entities are a highly utilized mechanism for masking ultimate beneficial owners.
Through the practice of layering transactions through shell legal entities a long trail of
transactions can successfully clean money and if an institution is not paying attention
through vigorous entity resolution mechanisms it can allow transactions to criminal
elements. When this occurs regulators are judicious in the fines they impose upon said
banks.
Table 8.4: E102 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name "LEGAL_ENTITY_TYPE"
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight .75
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 100
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8.1.2.4 CDDR_E103
One of the saddest aspects of money laundering is the use of charities to mask illicit
activities. As charities generally operate around people at risk in war-torn countries
they have become a favoured means of terrorist financing as the influx of funding to
them can be hard to track and their activities tend to utilize logistic chains to bring
goods to high risk geographies. As a result, banks tend to treat non-profit corporations
and charities with a risk rating process to validate the actions claimed as humanitarian,
8.5.
Table 8.5: E103 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name "NON_PROFIT"
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 0.5
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 100















Certain types of financial activity are prone to utilization by money launders. Of par-
ticular emphasis are mechanism that can be used that mask identity. As such entities
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that have links to money service bureaus or where there is a higher than average usage
of certain financial instruments are treated as high risk. The bank measures ’normalcy’
for instrument use by assessing a sample of similar businesses and gauging the trans-
action and product types utilized in their operational profile as per the inputs we see in
8.6.
Table 8.6: E104 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name
"MONEY_ORDERS" "MSB" "PREPAID_CARDS"
"TRAVELERS_CHEQUES" "CURRENCY_EXCHANGE"
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score















It is difficult to validate identity using the Internet and often gambling entities are more
focused on profit than they are on compliance. In a high number of countries money
laundering occurs by using both online and physical gaming locations. What occurs
is the money launderers create gaming accounts through an influx of prepaid cards or
other products where anonymity can be maintained. They conduct low risk gaming for
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a nominal amount of time and ’cash out’. The cash out effectively creates clean money
that can then be used by the launders legitimately. Hence the importance of examining
client records where links to gambling are defined as per 8.7.
Table 8.7: E105 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ’INTERNET_GAMBLING’
WEIGHT Character Constant Weight 1
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 100
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
/* Non-Personal Entity Rule: Engaged in Internet Gambling /















Accounts held in trust are another example of a legal instrument that are common in
banking that can be used to mask money laundering activities and need to be examined
as a key input as per 8.8. Trust accounts can be credited with dividend returns from
illicit activity and can be placed in the names of children in order to avoid prosecution.
Depending on national legislation and the strength of KYC requirements the trusts may
not be obliged to publish all elements of the beneficial owner.
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Table 8.8: E106 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ’TRUST_ACCOUNT’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score















Not all governments are democratic and there exists in many countries examples of po-
litical despotism, dictatorships or proxy governments. FATF maintains a list of coun-
tries that exhibit behaviour patterns that do not put their citizens first and are more to-
talitarian regimes. Such countries further look to use diplomatic ties to launder money
and illegal activities such as meth-amphetamine trafficking as a means of bolstering
their exchequers. The activity of consulates and embassies can be party to controlling
these activities and warrant due diligence in terms of transactional governance as a
result.
/* Foreign Consultate Embassy Attribute Rule */
%cdd_rule_attr_level( attribute_code=&attr_name
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Table 8.9: E107 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Numeric Constant Attribute Name ’FOREIGN_CONSULATE_EMBASSY’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score














Corporations that issue bearer shares are immediately suspect in any credible regu-
latory environment due to the nature of the financial instrument. Originally these were
a common product utilized in trade finance in order to close business internationally
prior to modern telecommunications practices. Since the advent of modern telecom-
munications though the need for instruments of this ilk has declined rapidly. Generally,
these are used to mask beneficial ownerships as they are used as cash equivalents and
needed to be examined. Hence the inclusion below in 8.10
Table 8.10: E108 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ’ISSUES_BEARER_SHARES’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score
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/* Non-Personal Entity Rule: Corporations that issue Bearer















A PEP or ’Politically Exposed Person’ is a term given to individuals legal entities with
links to individuals in roles that are deemed to be high risk (8.11). Classical examples
are government leaders, parliamentarians and bureaucrats of all descriptions. At a
corporate level these people become interesting in terms of the corrupt practices act
where influence pedlars bribe these individuals. To hide the trail of illicit influence
the politicians create shell corporations often in a family members name and establish
said family member as a director in order to hide the proceeds of suspicious activity.
This mechanism is also used for the purposes of off shoring income to avoid taxation
regulation. In comparison to CDDR_E202 this section examines a legal entity whereas
CDDR_E202 looks at individuals.
/* Non-Personal Entity Rule: Politically Exposed Person (PEP)
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Table 8.11: E109 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ’PEP’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score











Negative news in isolation is not a credible means of isolating money laundering
activity. However, in terms of client risk rating negative news can be used to highlight
illicit activities that a client may have obfuscated from a financial institution regarding
source of wealth. This area has become a focus area for financial institutions in order
to data-mine for potential risks within their client base. The signal to noise ratio asso-
ciated with negative news means that each artifact hit that occurs has to be validated
thoroughly as the false positive rate is high. 8.12 looks at negative news references
associated with a specific client record.
Table 8.12: E110 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ’NEGATIVE_NEWS’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score
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This grouping, 8.13, looks at the individual rather than a legal entity. In the same
way as industry ties have certain risks associated with them the same is true for oc-
cupations. As such banks often create a correlation between client occupation codes
and risk tolerances. Occupation codes allow the bank to segment their population and
establish a mean income for the segment. When occurrences for a client are beyond
that established segment mean it becomes a highlight for enhanced due diligence re-
quirements.
Table 8.13: E201 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 1
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name "OCCUPATION"
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 100
/* Occupation Attribute Rule */
%cdd_rule_attr_level( attribute_code=&attr_name
, party_type_desc=’INDIVIDUAL’













As per the entity group this ties the individual to political exposure. Further, it links
the client population as relatives or close associates to known political entities/per-
sons. Family members often become a trusted means to launder ill gotten gains and
mask financial activity or corruption, thus it is important that banks monitor their client
populations for changes in status for PEPs through using inputs like 8.14.
Table 8.14: E202 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name "PEP"
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
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The "Personal Entity Rule: Negative Media News Search Attribute Rule" acts in the
same way as the legal entity based negative news indicator but acts on the individual.
This indicator is even more dangerous in terms of false positive generation as name
commonality allows for unwarranted escalations to occur with ease. Hence the need for
a robust entity resolution program to establish identity of the client versus the reported
individual in the negative news excerpt. 8.15 assumes that such entity resolution has
occurred prior to examination of the client record.
Table 8.15: E203 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character List Attribute Name ’NEGATIVE_NEWS’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score










, auto_high_exp=%nrbquote(ifc(ATTRIBUTE_CHAR_VALUE=’Y’, ’Y’, ’
N’))





A SAR ( Suspicious Activity Report) or STR ( Suspicious Transaction Report) is a
regulatory filing that a bank is obligated to send to regulators when activity within the
transactional feeds of an individual warrants investigation. Generally this is triggered
during conventional transaction monitoring scoring when a scenario trigger (e.g. per-
sonal cash, velocity, large cash transaction) occurs. These trigger case investigations
that have a final state of either closure or the submission of a regulatory filing. When an
individual has transactions that are under review and have filings then it makes sense
for the the bank to maintain a corollary risk rating at the client level. 8.16 looks at the
counts of historical SARs associated with a client record.
Table 8.16: E204 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character Constant Attribute Name ’SAR_COUNT’
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score










BEST32.) > 0, ’Y’, ’N’))





8.1.3 Rule Group CDDRG_E020
This group looks at the logic around setting a minimum or maximum value for the
associated entity based category.
8.1.3.1 CDDR_E910
No parameters are required but similar to the previous grouping around country indi-
cators this rule group is used to set a maximum score for entity type risks. This means
that the maximum score is compared against the aggregate score generated and the
model determines which one is used based on the values presented.
%cdd_rule_attr_max;
8.1.4 Rule Group CDDRG_E030
We examine all combinatorial logic associated with the construction of a category
score.
8.1.4.1 CDDR_E920
This group creates a composite score for the entity risk categories discussed and rates
it against the logical surrounding the category maximum in the previous group using
the logic determined by the bank and its risk appetite.
/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */
/* A different weight can be applied when calculating the
overall score. */
%cdd_rule_cat_agg( weight=1
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,by_list=PRIMARY_ENTITY_NUMBER
,score_type_code="CAT"
, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_




/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */





, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_
SCORE*WEIGHT / SUM_MAX_SCORE*100, .))
, auto_high_exp=MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND
);
8.1.5 Rule Group CDDRG_P020
The product category group should also employ mechanisms examining variables such
that floor and ceiling values can be applied with ease.
8.1.5.1 CDDR_P910
As with previous categories this rule group looks at setting a category maximum risk
score for the all groupings with the product domain.
%cdd_rule_attr_max;
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8.1.6 Rule Group CDDRG_P030
As the bank updates the groupings further product sub-groupings could be instantiated
due to legislative changes. This section examines combining all sub-groups into score
elements.
8.1.6.1 CDDR_P920
This is the composite score creation mechanism we’ve used previously in order to es-
tablish a category score for the group. In this case the bias is around product utilization
and the banks offered product range and how it risk scores them.
/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */





, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_








length MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND $ 1;
retain MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND;
drop MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND;
if first.PRIMARY_ENTITY_NUMBER then do;




if AUTO_HIGH_IND > MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND then MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND=
AUTO_HIGH_IND;
if CATEGORY_CODE = "COUNTRY" then TEMP_RULE_SCORE = TEMP_RULE_
SCORE + RULE_SCORE * &country_weight;
if CATEGORY_CODE = "ENTITY" then TEMP_RULE_SCORE = TEMP_RULE_
SCORE + RULE_SCORE * &entity_weight;
if CATEGORY_CODE = "PRODUCT" then TEMP_RULE_SCORE = TEMP_RULE_
SCORE + RULE_SCORE * &product_weight;







/* Apply weight based on customer age */
if RULE_SCORE ne . then do;
if CUSTOMER_SINCE_DATE eq .
then do;
/*use missing date weight*/
RULE_SCORE = ROUND(RULE_SCORE * &missing_age_weight,1);
end;
else do;
if yrdif(datepart(CUSTOMER_SINCE_DATE), today(), ’AGE’) <= &
new_customer_age
then do;
RULE_SCORE = ROUND(RULE_SCORE * &new_customer_weight,1);
end;
end;
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end;
8.1.6.4 CDDR_X020
/* Assign Score Classification */
if RULE_SCORE <= &l_max then SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE = ’L’;
else if RULE_SCORE <= &m_max then SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE =
’M’;
else SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE = ’H’;
/* Auto High flag overrides score classification */
if AUTO_HIGH_IND eq ’Y’ then SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE = ’H’;
/* Use the override rating if the new score is close to the
last review score */
if CDD_REVIEW_FLG ne ’1’ and
SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE=’H’ and
OVERRIDE_SCORE_CLASS_CODE ne SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE and
OVERRIDE_SCORE_CLASS_CODE ne ’’ and
( RULE_SCORE <= LAST_REVIEW_SCORE or






/* Suppression Rule */
if FINAL_DISPOSITION_CODE=’RETAIN’ and
CDD_REVIEW_FLG ne ’1’ and
SCORE_CLASSIFICATION_CODE=’H’ and
( RULE_SCORE <= LAST_REVIEW_SCORE or
(RULE_SCORE - LAST_REVIEW_SCORE) <= &score_diff









9.1 A Survey on understanding software specifications
written in formal methods
9.1.1 Instructions
The following survey is aimed at financial crime software professionals. It aims to
understand if formal methods, a means of describing software using mathematical ex-
pressions, could provide lift if financial crime software was described using them. We
examine one specific type of formal method in our study, the Trace Function Method
(Parnas and Dragomiroiu, 2006), but are interested to understand if formal methods in
any form are in use in your organizations.
As you read through this survey please keep in mind a few basic assumptions. We
are trying to understand if the mathematics are easily read and comprehended or if the
opposite is in fact true. We are interested also to learn if you see potential wins for your
business if these methods where put into practice in your industry or if they would hin-
der your ability to sell. We assume that you have an understanding of the mathematics
included but would be happy to answer any questions you have and clarify.
9.1.2 Introduction
We utilize some example material and excerpts from the following paper just to set
expectations regarding the approach: Parnas (2006)
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Is it possible to have financial crime specifications that are both precise and human
readable? Precision generally comes at a price and that is the associated readability of
the specification. For example the following is precise but is quite difficult for a human
being to parse;
Frankly speaking, unless it was due to stringent requirements few in industry would
consider the above example a statement that is easy to parse and comprehend and this
is just an example. However in the world of regulatory compliance precision and read-
ability are vitally important to showcase accuracy in meeting regulatory requirements.
The following example is easily readable but lacks precision;
"Set i to indicate the place in the array B where x can be found and set present to be
true. Otherwise set present to be false"
It introduces vague statements that would leave a developer unclear on how to pro-
ceed. Vague statements within the financial crime domain would open a financial
institution to compliance related regulatory risk which could result in severe penalties.
Thus we arrive at a format that has the potential to be both precise and readable;
The above example is both easy to parse whilst remaining mathematically correct.
The goal of this survey is to study the validity of this statement.
9.1.3 Date Management Software Example
The following example looks at a simple program for managing dates. It has a series of
simple inputs and output variables. As you can imagine it will need several functions
to save and get days, months and years. It also will require some utility functions.
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9.1.4 Time Management Software Example
The following example is similar to the previous one but focuses instead on time
storage rather than dates. Time storage means hours and minutes are stored in this case
example, like a simple watch mechanism.
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9.1.5 Stack Example
The last example is a simple stack from basic programming concepts. It provides
the traditional functions, inputs and outputs.
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9.1.6 A CDD Program Scoring Banking Products
Consider the following example from a CDD Model scoring products for a bank.
We examine a number of component elements from a example written using SAS code
and being executed in a modeling harness.
9.1.6.1 CDDR_P010
This rule examines all the products that a bank offers and rates it against a risk ranked
scale of how the bank assesses them. The bank changes this hot-list often as new
products are created/retired and as a result is often in flux. Given the changing nature
of banking, moving from a physical interactions to digital, banks are increasingly wary
of ensuring more security controls for product offerings in order to meet regulatory
needs. This however counteracts customer experience measures and profitability as it
inhibits a clients ease of use for new banking products.
Table 9.1: P010 Parameters
Name Type Description Value
ATTR_NAME Character Constant Attribute Name "PRODUCT"
MAX_SCORE Numeric Constant Maximum Score 200
MIN_SCORE Numeric Constant Minimum Score 0
WEIGHT Numeric Constant Weight 1
9.1.6.2 CDDR_P010
/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */





, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_
SCORE*WEIGHT / SUM_MAX_SCORE*100, .))






/* Weight should be set to 1 if the category level score
should not be weighted. */





, rule_score_exp=%nrbquote(ifn(SUM_MAX_SCORE ne 0, SUM_RULE_
SCORE*WEIGHT / SUM_MAX_SCORE*100, .))
, auto_high_exp=MAX_AUTO_HIGH_IND
);
The above code is an example from a CDD model that is evaluating risk scores
associated with products. Here is an alternative perspective of the same specified code
presented in a formal representation that provides the program inputs, set elements,
functions and some traces regarding the functions to explain their operation.
9.2, is a program focused on scoring banking products as part of an overall CDD
program. The domain in this case examines the product mix that a client may be
taking advantage of from the banking institution i.e. lines of credit, corporate loans,
commercial payments, correspondent banking, wealth management. These products
have different risk ratings and this program allows the banks analysts to adjust them
accordingly.




ATTR_NAME < enum >
MAX_SCORE < int>
MIN_SCORE < int >
WEIGHT < int >
The set of elements, 9.3, provides the set of data assets necessary for the program
component discussed earlier, 9.2. Product elements are a much smaller asset tailored
to each bank and their marketplace and clientelle.






9.4 provides a listing that is centric to auxiliary functions that are necessary for the
product category of the CDD model to function as designed.








• A product manager
• A domain expert/Subject Matter Expert
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How many full-time software developers does your company employ?
Briefly describe the type of financial crime software your company develops.
Does your company use formal methods in any aspect of its software development?
• Yes
• No
• Unaware if we do.
If the answer is no, please indicate why. (Select all that apply.)
• Never considered using formal methods.
• Considered using formal methods, but determined use would not be cost effec-
tive.
• Considered using formal methods, but determined that employees do not have
necessary skills.
• Other Reasons? Please state.
Overall, indicate if you feel that the use of formal methods would be beneficial in
your company. By beneficial we mean that the use of formal methods could lead to
improvements in the cost, development time, and/or quality of software, compared to





Do you think that the tools and techniques used for different development activities
in your organization would complement the use of formal method based descriptions?
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9.1.7 Comprehension Questions
















Given the timescale and size of a project undertaken for financial crime software
development do you think more precise description would provide lift? Why?
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9.1.8 Regulatory Questions
Would providing the experience and training provided to the personal involved in
development be beneficial if it results in a marked improvement in software quality
and regulatory acceptance of your product? Why?
How complex is it currently to meet regulatory requirements using software?
• Easy: Does add considerable overhead to how we design our software
• Average: Does add some overhead but we manage it appropriately.
• Complex: Does add considerable overhead and we have difficulty managing it
appropriately.
Why is that?
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Why?





How do you currently education your clients/regulators regarding the specifics of
your software solutions?
9.1.9 Utility Questions
Would you consider the formal representations of CDD software useful? Why?
Do you consider them comprehensible?
Did the CDD Product example reduce or increase the complexity to understand the
program?
Any further remarks?
Given our previous questions and introduction to this form of the accuracy of these
representations and mathematical verification options available to ensure accuracy of a
specification do you see potential for using the latter form of representation in financial
crime software specifications. Please Discuss.
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